Globalisation and Information Revolution

Introduction

At the threshold of the 21st century, two topics have dominated the study of international relations in the USA: globalization and the 'new' security environment after the end of the Cold War. The latter has been the object of intense debate, largely dominated by those arguing about the relative importance of structural, institutional, and cultural variables for explaining the likelihood of global or regional peace. The former dynamic has been discussed so widely in scholarly and popular circles that it has reached the ignoble status of 'buzzword', familiarly used by many to refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trend in the world, but hardly understood by any. This essay explores how the processes of globalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. In spite of the plethora of literature on security and globalization, there is relatively little work written by US security specialists that inter-connects the two. In the case of security studies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the 'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and constructionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, this has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globalization. The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity.

Security and Globalization

Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon. It is not an 'event', but a gradual and ongoing expansion of interaction processes, forms of organization, and forms of cooperation outside the traditional spaces defined by
sovereignty activity takes place in a less localized less insulated way as transcontinental and interregional patterns criss-cross and overlap one another.

The process of globalization is analytically distinct from interdependence. The latter, as Reinicke states, denotes growth in connections and linkages between sovereign entities. Interdependence complicates external sovereignty in that sovereign choices have to be made to accommodate these interdependent ties. Globalization processes are not just about linkages but about interpenetration. As Guehenno noted, globalization is defined not just by the ever-expanding connections between states measured in terms of movement of goods and capital but the circulation and interpenetration of people and ideas. It affects not only external sovereignty choices but also internal sovereignty in terms of relations between the public and private sectors. Contrary to popular notions of globalization, this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to exist in the traditional Weberian sense (i.e. monopoly of legitimate authority over citizen and subjects within a given territory). Instead, globalization is a spatial reorganization of production, industry, finance, and other areas which causes local decisions to have global repercussions and daily life to be affected by global events. Comparisons are often made between globalization at the end of the 20th century and the period before World War I when the developed world witnessed unprecedented high volumes of trade across borders and movements of capital that led to the dissolution of empires and traditional structures of governance. However, these analogies are not accurate because the process of change at the turn of the 20th century was driven by, and had as its final outcome, nationalism and the consolidation of statehood. A century later, statehood and notions of sovereignty are not so much under attack by so-called 'globalization forces' as empires were, but are being modified and re-oriented by them. In short, the nation-state does not end; it is just less in control. Activity and decisions for the state increasingly take place in a post-sovereign space. In this sense,
globalization is both a boundary-broadening process and a boundary-weakening one.

**Agency and Scope of Threats**

The most far-reaching security effect of globalization is its complication of the basic concept of ‘threat' in international relations. This is in terms of both agency and scope. Agents of threat can be states but can also be non-state groups or individuals. While the vocabulary of conflict in international security traditionally centred on interstate war (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalization, terms such as global violence and human security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular sub state units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets are not exclusively opposing force structures or even cities, but local groups and individuals.

At the same time, globalization has made us both more aware and less decisive about our motivations to intervene in such ethnic conflicts. Real-time visual images of horror and bloodshed in far-off places transmitted through CNN make the conflicts impossible to ignore, creating pressures for intervention. On the other hand, the hesitancy to act is palpable, as standard measures by which to determine intervention (i.e. bipolar competition in the periphery) are no longer appropriate, forcing us to grope with fuzzy motivations such as humanitarian intervention.

**Non-Physical Security**

Globalization has anointed the concept of non-physical security. Traditional definitions of security in terms of protection of territory and sovereignty, while certainly not irrelevant in a globalized era, expand to protection of information and
technology assets. For example, Nye & Owens (1998) cite 'information power' as increasingly defining the distribution of power in international relations in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the revolution in military affairs highlights not greater firepower but greater information technology and 'smartness' of weapons as the defining advantage for future warfare.' These non-physical security aspects have always been a part of the traditional national defence agenda. Indeed, concerns about the unauthorized transfer of sensitive technologies gave rise to such techno-nationalist institutions as COCOM during the Cold War. However, the challenge posed by globalization is that the nation-state can no longer control the movement of technology and information (Simon, 1997). Strategic alliances form in the private sector among leading corporations that are not fettered by notions of techno-nationalism and driven instead by competitive, cost-cutting, or cutting-edge innovative needs. The result is a transnationalization of defence production that further reduces the state's control over these activities.

**Propositions for Security Behaviour**

If non-physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm, then how might this translate in terms of a state's foreign policy? The literature on globalization in both Europe and the USA remains conspicuously silent on this question. Globalization authors might argue that this criticism is inappropriate because it suggests an ideal end state at which a 'globalized' country should arrive. However, the point here is not to suggest that there will be a single uniform model, but that as globalization processes permeate a state's security agenda, this might be manifested in certain general inclinations and contours of behaviour. Put another way, we should observe globalization processes altering in some cases, and creating in other cases, new sets of security interests for states.
**Intermestic Security**

First, the globalization and security literature asserts but does not elaborate how security decisions increasingly take place outside the traditional purview of sovereignty. Globalization creates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues that national governments must recognize in developing policy. One example of this 'intermestic' approach to security policy might be an acceptance that the transnationalization of threats has blurred traditional divisions between internal and external security. The obverse would be the frequency with which a state adheres to 'delimiting' security, formulating and justifying policy on the basis of 'national security' interests rather than universal/global interests (Moon Chung-in, 1995: 64). Examples of the former are European institutions such as Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accord, which represent an acknowledgment that domestic issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, and immigration increasingly require trans-national cooperation. TREVI was composed of ministers of the interior and justice of EC member-states whose purpose was to coordinate policy on terrorism (at Germany's initiative in 1975) and international crime. The Schengen Accords also represented a convergence of internal and external security with regard to common standards border controls, pursuit of criminals across borders, asylum procedures, and refugees. In Asia, one might see environmental pollution and transnational crime as issues where international and domestic security converges. However, in the near future, maritime piracy is the most likely focal point. These are cases where sub-state actors armed with sophisticated weapons, satellite-tracking technology, and cutting-edge document-forging equipment hijack vessels in the South and East China seas with millions of dollars worth of cargo (Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999). These groups operate transnational; planning may occur at one destination, tracking of the ship at another, the attack launched from another port, and the cargo off-loaded at yet another port. These acts fall under the purview of local law enforcement, but they
are clearly 'intermestic' security issues. The attacks occur in overlapping sovereign waters or international waters, and some-times receive the tacit consent of governments where the pirated vessels are clandestinely ported. Moreover, if targeted cargos move beyond luxury autos and video cassette recorders to strategic goods such as plutonium, then distinctions between external and internal security and criminal and strategic threats disappear.

**Multilateralism**

Second, the globalization literature acknowledges that security is increasingly conceived of in post-sovereign, globalized terms, but does not delineate how the modes of obtaining security should change. As noted above, globalization means that both the agency and scope of threats have become more diverse and non-state in form. This also suggests that the payoffs lessen for obtaining security through traditional means. Controlling pollution, disease, technology, and information transfer cannot be easily dealt with through national, unilateral means but can only be effectively dealt with through the application of national resources in multilateral flora or through encouragement of transnational cooperation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intimated, US bombing of targets in Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings of two US embassies in Africa is a unilateral piecemeal approach far inferior to concerted global efforts at denying terrorists sanctuaries, financing, and technology and encouraging their extradition and prosecution.

**Bureaucratic Innovation**

The globalization literature has not done justice to the role bureaucratic innovation plays in response to the new challenges of globalization. On this point, indeed, the literature has not kept pace with the empirics. For example, in the
USA, the Clinton Administration created the position of Undersecretary for Global Affairs, whose portfolio included environmental issues, promotion of democracy and human rights, population and migration issues, and law enforcement. In a similar vein, the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute now has a new core course for FSOs on narcotics-trafficking, refugee flows, and environmental technologies. In May 1998, the Clinton Administration put forward its first comprehensive plan to combat world crime, identifying drug-trafficking, transfer of sensitive technology and WMD, and trafficking of women and children as threats to the USA (EWashingtonPost, 1998). One might also expect to see foreign service bureaucracies placing greater emphasis on international organizations and NGOs in terms of representation, placement, and leadership if these are recognized as the key vehicles of security and politics in a globalized world.

**Aggregating Capabilities**

The globalization literature remains relatively silent on how globalization processes substantially alter the way in which states calculate relative capabilities. The single most important variable in this process is the diffusion of technology (both old and new). In the past, measuring relative capabilities was largely a linear process. Higher technology generally meant qualitatively better weapons and hence stronger capabilities. States could be assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-for-tank, jet-for-jet comparison in terms of the threat posed and their relative strength based on such linear measurements. However, the diffusion of technology has had distorting effects. While states at the higher end technologically still retain advantages, globalization has enabled wider access to technology such that the measurement process is more dynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilities are more frequent and have occurred in certain cases much earlier than anticipated. Second, and more significant, the measurement process is no longer one-dimensional in the sense that one cannot readily draw linear
associations between technology, capabilities, and power. For example, what
gives local, economically backward states regional and even global influence in
the 21st century is their ability to threaten across longer distances? Globalization
facilitates access to select technologies related to force projection and weapons of
mass destruction, which in turn enable states to pose threats that, are asymmetric
and disproportionate to their size. Moreover, these threats emanate not from
acquisition of state of the-art but old and outdated technology. Thus countries like
North Korea, which along most traditional measurements of power could not
compare, can with old technology (SCUD and rudimentary nuclear technology)
pose threats and affect behaviour in ways unforeseen in the past (Bracken, 1998).

Strategies and Operational Considerations Finally, the literature on
globalization is notably silent on the long-term impact of globalization processes
on time-tested modes of strategic thinking and fighting. In the former vein, the
widening scope of security engendered by globalization means that the definition
of security and the fight for it will occur not on battlefields but in unconventional
places against non-traditional security adversaries. As noted above, when states
cannot deal with these threats through sovereign means, they will encourage
multilateralism and cooperation at the national, transnational, and international
levels. However, the nature of these conflicts may also require new ways of
fighting, i.e. the ability to engage militarily with a high degree of lethality against
combatants, but low levels of collateral damage. As a result, globalization's
widening security scope dictates not only new strategies (discussed below) but
also new forms of combat. Examples include incapacitating crowd control
munitions such as blunt projectiles (rubber balls), non-lethal crowd dispersal
cartridges, 'stick' and slick traction modifiers or 'stink' bombs.
Conclusion

What then is the 'new' security environment in the 21st century that the globalization security literature must strive to understand? It is most likely one that sits at the intersection of globalization and national identity. In other words, as globalization processes complicate the nature of security (i.e. in terms of agency and scope), this effects a transformation in the interests that inform security policy. Globalization's imperatives permeate the domestic level and should be manifested in some very broad behavioural trends or styles of security policy. Manifestations of this transformation are inclinations toward intermestic security, multilateralism, and bureaucratic innovation and specialization.
NEW WORLD ORDER

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s has had a dual impact on international relations. On the one hand, the Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Third World brought an end to the Cold War, allowed democratization to proceed in many states previously ruled by Marxist dictatorships, and led to significant progress in resolving several Third World conflicts that had become prolonged during the Cold War. The reduction in East-West tension also resulted in a great decrease in inter-state conflicts, some of which occurred due to the superpower ideological rivalry during the Cold War. Even it became fashionable to argue that force, used here as military power, has run its course in international politics. On the other hand, however, it would be rather unwise to argue that the world is now at peace. The collapse of the “Soviet Empire” was followed by the emergence, or re-emergence, of many serious conflicts in several areas that had been relatively quiescent during the Cold War. Some of these new conflicts have been taking place within the former Soviet Union, such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fighting in Chechnya. But some conflicts also erupted or intensified in several countries outside of it and many Third World conflicts in which the superpowers were not deeply involved during the Cold War have persisted after it, like the secessionist movements in India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

Ethnopolitical conflicts aside, there have been other threats to international order that are, indeed, beyond the full control of major powers, even the United States, the victor of the Cold War. The most notable ones include religious militancy, terrorism, North-South conflict, and severe competition over scarce resources. Thus, the end of the Cold War can be said to have brought about both stability and instability to international relations. The purpose of this article is to evaluate nearly two decades of the post-Cold War era in terms of the elements of
stability and instability. In this respect, the study will start with an overview of the general characteristics of the international system. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion on basic trends and new threats in international relations. Several observations will also be outlined in concluding the study with respect to possible future directions of international affairs.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE COLD WAR

With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar international system dominating the Cold War period disappeared, leaving its place to basically a unipolar system under the leadership of the United States, speaking especially from a military/political point of view. The former rivals of the United States, especially the Soviet Union and China, have either collapsed or jettisoned the central features of their ideologies that were hostile to the United States. Other countries have turned to American military protection. The “American Empire” may best be seen operating in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Middle East, in general, where the armed forces of the United States have established a semi permanent foothold and thousands of soldiers deployed at bases keep a watch on Iran, Syria, and other “potential enemies”.

In Asia, the presence of the United States stabilizes the region in which a number of states might otherwise feel compelled to develop much larger military forces than they currently have. American military power in Japan does only protect Japan against foreign enemies. It indirectly protects China and other Asian states against the consequences that might flow from a heavily re-armed Japan. Moreover, American military power serves as an organizer of military coalition, both permanent (such as NATO) and ad hoc (such as peacekeeping missions). American military participation is often necessary to the command and control of coalition operations. When the Americans are willing to lead, other countries often follow, even if reluctantly. However, these are certainly not to argue that American
interventions occur in every large conflict around the world. But it means that almost any country embarking on the use of force beyond its borders has to think about possible reactions of the United States (See, Sanders, 2008).

From an economic/political point of view, on the other hand, the international system can be said to be multipolar, rather than unipolar. The United States certainly a great economic power, but it is not the only power. There are other power centers, most notably, the European Union, the Organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, as well as many nation-states outside of these integrations or organizations (See, Harrison, 2004). As a matter of fact, when the United States exercised military operations to “stable” the world in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, it insisted on sharing the costs of the operations with other major powers or relevant countries. Thus, the international system of the post-Cold War era actually reflects a mixture of both unipolar and multipolar system in which at least five major powers, the United States, Europe, China, Japan, and Russia, dominate international affairs.

**BASIC TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

The general wish of the dominant powers in the post-Cold War era is to preserve the status quo from which they mostly benefit. Hence, international cooperation evidently increased among major powers, as exemplified by the increase of peace operations. To be more specific, while from 1948 to 1978, only a total of 13 peacekeeping forces were set up, and in the following ten-year period, no new forces were established, from May 1988 to October 1993, a further twenty forces were created. As of December 2008, the number of UN peacekeeping operations has reached 63, 18 of which are still operating in the field, involving 112660 military personnel and civilian police.

The decreasing ideological clashes between the United States and Russia manifested itself most clearly in the decline of the veto at the Security Council. permanent members of the Security Council cast the following number of vetoes:
China, 3; France, 18; United Kingdom, 30; US, 69; and the Soviet Union, 114. Then between June 1990 and May 1993, there was no single veto. One exception occurred in May 1993 when Russia blocked a resolution on financing the peacekeeping force on Cyprus. With this exception, the post-Cold War capacity of the Security Council to reach agreement has survived and constituted a key reason for the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations (See, Yılmaz, 2005).

Another feature of the post-Cold War era is that since the West has become the victor of the East-West ideological rivalry, Western systems and Western influences, in general, started to dominate the whole world. For example, the United States has visibly enhanced its influence in the Middle East and in Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and the following Gulf Crisis, in a way, created an opportunity for the Unites States to exercise its hegemonic power in the Middle East. In the following years, in the absence of a counter-power, the influence of the United States increased further. With the military operation to Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States perpetuated its dominance in the region.

The region of Caucasus was formerly under the Russian sphere of influence. But the United States managed to enter this energy-rich region with some new allies, used to be the part of the Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia. Although Russia certainly did not want the United States presence in the region, its ability to prevent it has remained limited.

Likewise, NATO expanded to involve Eastern Europe, a region also used to be under Soviet influence. Russia, in the beginning, tried to resist NATO expansion, posing several threats, including creating a counter defense organization. But it was eventually convinced with the project of “partnership for
peace”, through which it preserved many of its privileges in Eastern European countries (See, US Department of State, 1996).

In the same way, the European Union expanded towards Eastern Europe, symbolizing, once again, Western dominance. Particularly with the 2004 expansion, eight formerly-communist countries, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Check Republic (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta) joined the Union. And in 2007, two other previously-communist states, Bulgaria and Romania, became full members as well.

While all these dictate Western dominance in the post-Cold War era, the effects of this dominance have manifested itself in the world as both stability and instability. On the one hand, the hegemonic power of the United States and expansion of Western originated organizations have an impact on decreasing international anarchy and thus, increasing international stability. On the other hand, however, growing Western dominance brought about many reactions and challenges towards the West. It seems that most of the reactions take place in the Islamic world as if it proves Samuel P. Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis (See, Huntington, 1997). However, such reactions currently appear to be disorganized, less powerful, and thus they are far away from posing a serious challenge to Western dominance. But nonetheless, anti-Westernism in the Muslim world and elsewhere seems particularly to feed terrorism, a serious threat to peace in the post-Cold War period, as it will be discussed below.

NEW THREATS

Although the ending of the Cold War clearly increased the willingness of governments to work through the United Nations and other international channels to resolve conflicts and keep peace around the globe, several new threats have emerged in the post-Cold War era that are, indeed, beyond the full control of nation-states, even major powers. One of the greatest threats, in this regard, is the prevalence of intra-national conflicts, conflicts occurring within the borders of
states. These are mostly ethnically-driven conflicts over self-determination, succession or political dominance. Until the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were outdated concepts and largely resolved problems. On both sides of the Cold War, the trend seemed to indicate that the world was moving toward internationalism rather than nationalism. As a result of the threat of nuclear warfare, great emphasis on democracy and human rights, economic interdependence, and gradual acceptance of universal ideologies, it became fashionable to speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movements.

Despite contrary expectations, however, a fresh cycle of ethnopolitical movements have re-emerged recently in Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), Central Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world. While wars fought among sovereign countries are increasingly the exception to the norm, intra-national conflicts have account for over 90 percent of the major armed conflicts recorded in recent years worldwide. This trend appears to be holding.

Yet the international community cannot be said to have well prepared to this trend. Major international organizations, including the United Nations, were designed to cope with inter-state problems, historically the main source of threat to global peace and security. Besides, the fact that internal conflicts occur within the borders of states made major international actors reluctant to intervene, either for legal concerns or for concern to avoid probable loses. For example, during Clinton administration, the United States government issued PDD-25 (Presidential Decision Directive-25), limiting the conditions that the United States can participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

But such conflicts could be as serious, costly, and intense as any in the past. And somehow they need to be resolved, or else international peace and security will not be in a stable situation. Although intra-state conflicts appear to be local, they can quickly gain an international dimension due to global interdependence.
and to various international supports. In fact, when external parties provide political, economic, or military assistance, or asylum and bases for actors involved in local struggles, these conflicts inevitably assume an international dimension (See, Yılmaz, 2007).

Undoubtedly, effective management of intra-state conflicts requires an understanding of the root causes of these conflicts, as well as application of proper strategies for stopping violence and building peace. By far, the international community has been relatively successful in deploying peacekeeping forces in violent internal conflicts, whereby such conflicts were tried to be controlled. As mentioned above, 50 peace operations were realized in the post-Cold War era, 18 of which are still on duty. And, generally speaking, thousands of civilian and military peacekeepers have been successful in keeping people alive and in preventing conflict escalation. However, it has not been well understood that United Nations peacekeeping is a “palliative”, not a cure. Peacekeeping forces do not directly resolve conflicts. That is not their purpose. All they can do is to manage the conflict for a period of time to allow the people who can resolve it to negotiate a resolution of their differences in an atmosphere not poisoned by death and destruction. More problematic is the idea of expanded peacekeeping which leads to the militarization of peacekeeping. Rather than turn to increasingly militarized solutions -a habit that pervades thinking about conflict management at the international level- non-violent alternatives, which take account of the range of complex issues involved in violent conflicts and the people who experience them, should be considered. Hence, what is actually needed in intra-state conflicts is proper peace building efforts that complement peacekeeping. Although since the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to involve many peace building activities (such as monitoring, even running local elections, assisting in the reconstruction of state functions, and so on- See,
Serafino, 2005; Daniel et al, 2008), the ability of the international community, nevertheless, has still remained limited, in this respect.

Another threat to peace in the post-Cold War period is rising religious militancy. To some extent, it seems that religiously-driven conflicts have replaced the ideological zone of the Cold War as a serious source of international conflict. Some analysts even contended that it is now cultural rather than “iron” curtains that divide the world, and that religion fuels the conflict in a special way by inspiring intolerant and irreconcilable images of identity and commitment among competing civilizations. Even more than ethnicity, Huntington argues, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people …As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an “us” versus “them” relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity and religion (Huntington 1993, 40, 45).

Although Huntington’s thesis is a provocative one, in its support, one can point to governments in countries like Iran, Sudan, and to Islamic movements throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, which readily resort to the language of cultural confrontation. In many of these places, a spirit of religious militancy, at times called “religious fundamentalism”, prevails. It often includes support for violence against the manifestation of sacrilege and oppression seen to be imposed upon Muslim peoples by the West or its sympathizers.

Though relations between Asia and the West have not been expressed in such violent terms, “civilizational tension” is frequently reported, nevertheless. Most of the Asian countries are now less inclined than they once were to acquiesce to Western cultural preference, as, for instance, in the interpretation of rights or the development of certain political and social institutions.

Many religious militants are strongly committed to the direct use of violence in pursuing their mission. There have been numerous widely publicized examples, such as the massacre by a Jewish zealot of two dozen Muslim worshippers in
Hebron, the explicit blessing of violence by both Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic Christians in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the September 11 attacks on the United States, and the July 2005 bombings of the London subway in which so many innocent people became victims.

Religiously-driven violent intolerance can also be connected to terrorism in many cases. In fact, some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations today, like Islamic Jihad and El-Kaida, are ideologically fed by religious fundamentalism. Most people in such organizations strongly believe that direct use of violence in the name of religion is obligatory.

Terrorism, whether it is fed by religious fundamentalism or not, is another serious threat to peace in the post-Cold War era. While occasional terrorist activities have been part of human history, terrorism particularly became a serious problem after the end of the Cold War, especially after the September 11 attacks. The term terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic, a reaction to oppression, and a crime. Obviously, the description depends on whose point of view is being represented. The Unites States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Outside the United States, there are greater variations in what features of terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations, for instance, defined terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, where in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets”.

But it should be noted that the phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for
what they believe in, by whatever means possible (See, Martin, 2006). On the other hand, a victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a criminal with no regard for human life.

However it is defined, terrorism has become a serious problem in the post-Cold War era, though, as mentioned before, it is not limited to this particular period. Over the past twenty years, terrorists have committed extremely violent acts for alleged political or religious reasons. Political ideology ranges from the far left to the far right. For instance, the far left consists of groups, such as Marxists and Leninists, who propose a revolution of workers led by revolutionary elite. On the far right, dictatorships can be found that typically believe in a merging of state. Religious extremists, on the other hand, often reject the authority of secular governments and view legal systems that are not based on their religious beliefs as illegitimate. They also view modernization efforts as corrupting influences on traditional culture.

Above all, terrorism influences an audience beyond the immediate victims. The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that draw the attention of the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public's or government's reaction to the act. For instance, the September 11, 2001 attacks killed about 3000 people. They were immediate victims. But their real target was the American people and the United States government.

After this terrorist attack, the United States President George W. Bush declared a war against terrorism and many states supported him (See, Mahajan, 2002). But the fact that terrorists do not fight on clear fronts and do not play according to the rules of war makes struggling with terrorism extremely difficult. The United States and its supporters have been relatively successful in defeating and punishing the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq claimed to be supporting
terrorist acts. Yet it seems that it is not possible to terminate terrorism with these defeats. On the contrary, the United States invasions and its increasing influences in the Middle East -and elsewhere- brought about mass reactions, feeding, indeed, many terrorist organizations. Consequently, no matter how the United States and its allies can be militarily strong, the threat posed by various terrorist organizations will likely to continue in the years to come.

The post-Cold War period also witnessed the resurgence of North-South economic antagonism. Such confrontation is not new. It has occurred before in international arena. But in accordance with the decline of ideological clashes, it has begun to occupy a more significant agenda in international affairs.

To understand the greater consequences of the present North-South conflict, some historical perspective is needed. In the early 1970s, developing countries at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) coalesced into what became known as the Group of 77 to press their demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This aspiration grew out of the neo-Marxist political economy theory of the 1960s, which argued that the international trading system was condemning the “periphery” -Latin America and other developing countries- to poverty, exploitation, and dependency. Among other measures, the NIEO specifically called for a system of price supports for a number of key developing country commodity exports, indexation of developing country export prices to developed countries' manufactured exports, technology transfer, and the negotiated re-deployment of some developed country industries to developing nations. By the 1980s, the NIEO agenda at the United Nations had foundered due to divergences in developing country interests, the inability to replicate OPEC's success with other commodities and, most importantly, the discrediting of its command-based economic theories. This was evidenced by the astonishing success of Taiwan, South Korea and others that pursued trade liberalization and export-led growth.
Thirty years later, at Cancun, many officials opined that the harsh rhetoric employed by major developing countries, such as Brazil and India, as well as smaller African and Caribbean countries, was strongly reminiscent of the 1970s UNCTAD experience. The themes of Northern economic exploitation have become fashionably recurrent, even though the remedies demanded by the South at the WTO now differ from the NIEO. Rather than price supports for commodities and exports, developing countries at Cancun called for unilateral trade concessions and compensation by the rich countries.

While there were many reasons enumerated for the failure at Cancun, the common theme was that talks fell apart along a North-South divide. The G-21 opposed developed countries' agricultural subsidies. The Lesser Developed Countries (LDC) refused to lower their astronomical agriculture and manufacturing tariffs, which stoked the frustration of the United States and others (See, Sevilla, 2003).

With the talks ended with no clear success, the conflict between the poor developing nations living in the Southern Hemisphere and the rich industrial countries of the North has entered a new phase. The phenomenon of the economic dependence of the developing countries on the multinational companies from the industrialized countries is named today neo-colonialisms, what refers to the economic exploitation of these countries, which resembles the conditions in the colonial age in various regards. With global problems like the climate change, a further dimension of injustice is added: Whereas the problems are caused over proportionality in the North, the consequences of the desertification or extreme weather conditions occur over proportionally in the South. This extends to the threat to the existence of numerous small island states, which will no longer exist if the sea level continues to raise any further (See, Seligson and Passe-Smith, 2003).
It remains marking that the economic North-South conflict has not led so far to military conflicts. Many critics, nevertheless, see to the neo-colonialism’s as one main cause for the re-flashing of terrorism in the 21 century. Growing economic globalization in the post-Cold War era does not appear to be breaking the historical stratifications between the North and South. Rather, it is economic globalization that channeled by past grooves of strong and weak growth.

The national units already integrated to the world economy become more integrated to the world economy; the less well-connected often stay that way. So far only a very small number of states have managed to break out of the low-growth ruts of the world system. The implications of this grim outcome for world political stability are stark. To the extent that poverty and underdevelopment facilitate continuing conflict between the North and South, we may expect to see international order as fragile.

Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, shattering the bipolar system, resulted in power gaps in some region and triggered struggles for influence. In the post-Cold War environment, states that seemed to be in the same bloc or former allies became competing rivals. For instance, the European Union, as well as Japan, rose as rival centers of power against established United States dominance. No doubt the rise of China and the resurgence of the Russian Federation as powerful rivals to the United States are also notable. States -or integrations- aspiring to become world powers (such as Russia, China, and the European Union), states seeking to strengthen their position as regional powers with burgeoning ambition to become global powers in the future (like Iran and Turkey), and the United States still holding onto its position are strategizing to reach their goals in Eurasia. Especially the newly independent states of Eurasia lie at the center of power struggles.

The United States is pushing forward to not only maintain but strengthen alliances with various states in the region. Particularly three states, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Armenia, are at the center of much of this struggle. So as to promote their national interests in the region, major powers have often been motivated to take advantage of destabilizing conflicts between these states and alternatively have attempted to follow a path of reconciliation or proposing cooperation, fluctuating between these options based on a calculation of which would best fit their own broader agenda and vision for the region (See, Simons, 2008).

There are several reasons for why especially the South Caucasus represents a significant regional interest for major powers, in general, and for the United States, in particular. Controlling the region means to contain Russian expansion, to contain Iran, to control natural resources in the region, to secure safe transportation of the region's natural resources to the global market, and to acquire bases for “war against terrorism” (See, Aslanli, 2008).

At present, the United States continues to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus. However, resurgent Russia certainly does not welcome this development and feels compelled to punish both American military interventions in the region, as well as regional states that espouse pro-American policies (See, Kanet, 2007). The latest Georgian conflict is a clear indication of how far Russia is willing to go to defend its own interests in the complicated and unpredictable region.

CONCLUSION
In discussing the post-Cold War developments and the emerging world order in that era, several concluding remarks can be drawn from the above analysis, summarized as follows:

• The new international system in the post-Cold War period has been marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. This trend will likely to be holding.
• On the level of the relations among states, the new world order is based on major power cooperation. The international system contains at least five major powers—the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and China. There appears to be no serious challenger to these powers. That means the world politics in the near future will largely be shaped by the above-mentioned major powers.

• Among major powers, the United States will continue to be the greatest hegemonic power in the short run, but its military and economic power will gradually decline. In the long run, some growing states or integrations will likely to get close to the United States’ power. Hence, the international system will possibly gain a multipolar character in the future, though it may take some decades to reach that point.

• International relations have become truly global in the post-Cold War world. Communications are instantaneous and the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence.

• In conjunction with increasing international cooperation, inter-state wars have declined and “low politics” gained greater importance in international affairs. The years to come, however, are likely to witness severe competition of major powers on natural resources, particularly, energy resources. In this regard, disputes about unfair trade practices and worries about dependence on externally concentrated or monopolistic sources of goods, services and
technologies will remain to be addressed. But the prospects for collective rules and regulations, rather than unilateral accusations and restrictions, will seem to be improved.

• With the spread of global market economy and rapid expansion of foreign investments, developing countries, though they are cautious about foreign investments, are likely to be doing better in the future. But structurally-rooted North-South inequalities will seem to remain as a potential source of international conflict.

• The North-South conflict aside, the post-Cold War world faces several other threats, most notably, ethically-driven conflicts, religious militancy and terrorism, supported by some revisionist powers. These are particularly challenging threats as they are beyond the full control of nation-states, calling for international cooperation if they are to be effectively dealt with. Thus, the future of the world will depend on whether major powers, in particular, and the international community, in general, are able to show the will to cooperate on these serious problems.
REALISM AND NEO-REALISM

Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. Great powers, the main actors in the realists’ account, pay careful attention to how much economic and military power they have relative to each other. It is important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour. For realists, international politics is synonymous with power politics. There are, however, substantial differences among realists. The most basic divide is reflected in the answer to the simple but important question: why do states want power? For classical realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948a), the answer is human nature. Virtually everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them, which effectively means that great powers are led by individuals who are bent on having their state dominate its rivals. Nothing can be done to alter that drive to be all-powerful.

For structural realists, human nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power. In a system where there is no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for each state to be powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked. In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive. Structural realist theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime type, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it acts towards other states. Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state’s foreign policy. Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less
powerful than others. There is a significant divide between structural realists, which is reflected in the answer to a second question that concerns realists: how much power is enough?

**Defensive realists**

Like Kenneth Waltz (1979) maintain that it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy.

**Offensive realists**

Like John Mearsheimer (2001) take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival. For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival. Power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. The balance of power is mainly a function of the tangible military assets that states possess, such as armoured divisions and nuclear weapons. However, states have a second kind of power, latent power, which refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power. Latent power is based on a state’s wealth and the size of its overall population. Great powers need money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state’s latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states. It should be clear from this discussion that war is not the only way that states can gain power. They can also do so by increasing the size of their population and their share of global wealth, as China has done over the past few decades. Let us now consider in greater detail the structural realists’ explanation for why states pursue power, and then explore why defensive and offensive
realists differ about how much power states want. The focus will then shift to examining different structural realist explanations about the causes of great power war. Finally, I will illuminate these theoretical issues with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully.

**Why do states want power?**

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for power. It is based on five straightforward assumptions about the international system. None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each other’s expense. But when they are married together, they depict a world of ceaseless security competition. The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states. The opposite of anarchy is hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic politics. The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. Each state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbour. Of course, that capability varies among states and for any state it can change over time. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states).

The problem, however, is that it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. One might respond that policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy documents, which can be
assessed. The problem with that argument is policy-makers sometimes lie about or conceal their true intentions. But even if one could determine another state’s intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with a revisionist or status quo state.

**STRUCTURAL REALISM**

The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. This is not to deny that they miscalculate from time to time. Because states operate with imperfect information in a complicated world, they sometimes make serious mistakes. Again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the possibility that there is a revisionist state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing about why all states pursue power. It is only when all the assumptions are combined together that circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense.

To begin with, great powers fear each other. There is little trust among them. They worry about the intentions of other states, in large part because they are so hard to divine. Their greatest fear is that another state might have the capability as
well as the motive to attack them. This danger is compounded by the fact that states operate in an anarchic system, which means that there is no night-watchman who can rescue them if they are threatened by another country. When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call. The level of fear between states varies from case to case, but it can never be reduced to an inconsequential level.

The stakes are simply too great to allow that to happen. International politics is a potentially deadly business where there is the ever-present possibility of war, which often means mass killing on and off the battlefield, and which might even lead to a state’s destruction. Great powers also understand that they operate in a self-help world. They have to rely on themselves to ensure their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they can turn to if they are attacked. This is not to deny that states can form alliances, which are often useful for dealing with dangerous adversaries. In the final analysis, however, states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states as well as the so-called international community. Fearful of other states, and knowing that they operate in a self-help world, states quickly realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful.

The reasoning here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the USA, because it is so powerful relative to its neighbours. This simple logic drives great powers to look for opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favour. At the very least, states want to make sure that no other state gains power at their expense. Of course, each state in the system understands this logic, which leads to an unremitting competition for power. In essence, the structure of the system forces every great power – even those that would otherwise be satisfied with the status quo – to think and act when appropriate like a revisionist state.
One might think that peace must be possible if all of the major powers are content with the status quo. The problem, however, is that it is impossible for states to be sure about each other’s intentions, especially future intentions. A neighbour might look and sound like a status quo power, but in reality is a revisionist state. Or it might be a status quo state today, but change its stripes tomorrow. In an anarchic system, where there is no ultimate arbiter, states that want to survive have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other states and to compete for power with them. This is the tragedy of great power politics. The structural imperatives described above are reflected in the famous concept of the **Security dilemma**

The essence of that dilemma is that most steps a great power takes to enhance its own security decrease the security of other states. For example, any country that improves its position in the global balance of power does so at the expense of other states, which lose relative power. In this zero-sum world, it is difficult for a state to improve its prospects for survival without threatening the survival of other states. Of course, the threatened states then do whatever is necessary to ensure their survival, which, in turn, threatens other states, all of which leads to perpetual security competition.

**How much power is enough?**

There is disagreement among structural realists about how much power states should aim to control. Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power and should do so whenever it seems feasible. States should maximize power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony, because that is the best way to guarantee survival. While defensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong incentives to gain additional increments of power, they maintain that it is strategically foolish to pursue hegemony. That would amount to overexpansion of the worst kind. States,
by their account, should not maximize power, but should instead strive for what Kenneth Waltz calls an ‘appropriate amount of power’ (1979: 40). This restraint is largely the result of three factors. Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. Specifically, the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at least less secure, and maybe even destroy it. This is what happened to Napoleonic France (1792–1815), Imperial Germany (1900–18), and Nazi Germany (1933–45) when they made a run at dominating Europe. Each aspiring hegemon was decisively defeated by an alliance that included all, or almost all, of the other great powers. Otto von Bismarck’s genius, according to the defensive realists, was that he understood that too much power was bad for Germany, because it would cause its neighbours to balance against it. So, he wisely put the brakes on German expansion after winning stunning victories in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-Prussian (1870–1) Wars. Some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–defence balance, which indicates how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. In other words, it tells you whether or not offence pays. Defensive realists maintain that the offence–defence balance is usually heavily weighted in the defender’s favour, and thus any state that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up fighting a series of losing wars.

Accordingly, states will recognize the futility of offence and concentrate instead on maintaining their position in the balance of power. If they do go on the offensive, their aims will be limited. Defensive realists further argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the costs outweigh the benefits. Because of nationalism, it is especially difficult, sometimes impossible, for the conqueror to subdue the conquered. The ideology of nationalism, which is pervasive and potent, is all about self-determination, which virtually guarantees that occupied populations will rise up against the occupier. Moreover, it is difficult
for foreigners to exploit modern industrial economies, mainly because information technologies require openness and freedom, which are rarely found in occupations. In sum, not only is conquest difficult but, even in those rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of trouble. According to defensive realism, these basic facts about life in the international system should be apparent to all states and should limit their appetite for more power. Otherwise, they run the risk of threatening their own survival. If all states recognize this logic – and they should if they are rational actors – security competition should not be particularly intense, and there should be few great power wars and certainly no central wars (conflicts involving all or almost all the great powers).

Offensive realists do not buy these arguments. They understand that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain that balancing is often inefficient, especially when it comes to forming balancing coalitions, and that this inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries. Furthermore, threatened states sometimes opt for buck-passing rather than joining a balancing coalition. In other words, they attempt to get other states to assume the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain on the sidelines. This kind of behaviour which is commonplace among great powers, also creates opportunities for aggression. Offensive realists also take issue with the claim that the defender has a significant advantage over the attacker, and thus offence hardly ever pays. Indeed, the historical record shows that the side that initiates war wins more often than not. And while it may be difficult to gain hegemony, the USA did accomplish this feat in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. Also, Imperial Germany came close to achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War. Both defensive and offensive realists agree, however, that nuclear weapons have little utility for offensive purposes, except where only one side in a conflict has them. The reason
is simple: if both sides have a survivable retaliatory capability, neither gains an advantage from striking first. Moreover, both camps agree that conventional war between nuclear-armed states is possible but not likely, because of the danger of escalation to the nuclear level.

Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay, they also point out that sometimes it does. Conquerors can exploit a vanquished state’s economy for gain, even in the information age. Indeed, Peter Liberman argues that information technologies have an ‘Orwellian’ dimension, which facilitates repression in important ways (1996: 126). While nationalism surely has the potential to make occupation a nasty undertaking, occupied states are sometimes relatively easy to govern, as was the case in France under the Nazis (1940–4). Moreover, a victorious state need not occupy a defeated state to gain an advantage over it. The victor might annex a slice of the defeated state’s territory, break it into two or more smaller states, or simply disarm it and prevent it from rearming. For all of these reasons, offensive realists expect great powers to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, with the ultimate prize being hegemony.

The security competition in this world will tend to be intense and there are likely to be great power wars. Moreover, the grave danger of central war will arise whenever there is a potential hegemon on the scene. The past behaviour of the great powers has been more in accordance with the predictions of offensive rather than defensive realism. During the first half of the twentieth century, there were two world wars in which three great powers attempted and failed to gain regional hegemony: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany. The second half of that century was dominated by the Cold War, in which the USA and the Soviet Union engaged in an intense security competition that came close to blows in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Many defensive realists acknowledge that the great powers often behave in ways that contradict their theory. They maintain,
however, that those states were not behaving rationally, and thus it is not surprising that Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany were destroyed in those wars they foolishly started. States that maximize power, they argue, do not enhance their prospects for survival; they undermine it.

This is certainly a legitimate line of argument but, once defensive realists acknowledge that states often act in strategically foolish ways, they need to explain when states act according to the dictates of their structural realist theory and when they do not. Thus, Waltz famously argues that his theory of international politics needs to be supplemented by a separate theory of foreign policy that can explain misguided state behaviour. However, that additional theory, which invariably emphasizes domestic political considerations, is not a structural realist theory. The theories of defensive realists such as Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera conform closely to this simple Waltzian template. Each argues that structural logic can explain a reasonable amount of state behaviour, but a substantial amount of it cannot be explained by structural realism. Therefore, an alternative theory is needed to explain those instances where great powers act in non-strategic ways. To that end, Posen (1984) relies on organizational theory, Snyder (1991) on domestic regime type, and Van Evera (1999) on militarism. Each is proposing a theory of foreign policy, to use Waltz’s language. In essence, defensive realists have to go beyond structural realism to explain how states act in the international system. They must combine domestic-level and system-level theories to explain how the world works. Offensive realists, on the other hand, tend to rely exclusively on structural arguments to explain international politics. They do not need a distinct theory of foreign policy, mainly because the world looks a lot like the offensive realists say it should. This means, however, that they must make the case that it made strategic sense for Germany to pursue hegemony.
In Europe between 1900 and 1945, and for Japan to do the same in Asia between 1931 and 1945. Of course, offensive realists recognize that states occasionally act in strategically foolish ways, and that those cases contradict their theory. Defensive realists, as emphasized, have a fall-back position that is not available to offensive realists: they can explain cases of non-strategic behaviour with a separate theory of foreign policy.

**What causes great power war?**

Structural realists recognize that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which makes it impossible to come up with a simple theory that points to a single factor as the main cause of war. There is no question that states sometimes start wars to gain power over a rival state and enhance their security. But security is not always the principle driving force behind a state’s decision for war. Ideology or economic considerations are sometimes paramount. For example, nationalism was the main reason Bismarck launched wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1). The Prussian leader wanted to create a unified Germany. Wars motivated largely by non-security considerations are consistent with structural realism as long as the aggressor does not purposely act in ways that would harm its position in the balance of power. Actually, victory in war almost always improves a state’s relative power position, regardless of the reason for initiating the conflict. The German state that emerged after 1870 was much more powerful than the Prussian state Bismarck took control of in 1862. Although isolating a particular cause of all wars is not a fruitful enterprise, structural realists maintain that the likelihood of war is affected by the architecture of the international system. Some realists argue that the key variable is the number of great powers or poles in the system, while other focus on the distribution of power among the major states. A third approach looks at how changes in the distribution of power affect the likelihood of war. Finally, some realists claim that variations in the offence–defence balance have the greatest influence on the prospects for war.
The polarity of the system

A longstanding debate among realists is whether bipolarity (two great powers) is more or less war-prone than multipolarity (three or more great powers). It is generally agreed that the state system was multipolar from its inception in 1648 until the Second World War ended in 1945. It was only bipolar during the Cold War, which began right after the Second World War and ran until 1989. It is tempting to argue that it is clear from twentieth-century European history that bipolarity is more peaceful than multipolarity. After all, there were two world wars in the first half of that century, when Europe was multipolar, while there was no shooting war between the USA and the Soviet Union during the latter half of that century, when the system was bipolar.

This line of argument looks much less persuasive, however, when the timeline includes the nineteenth century. There was no war between any European great powers from 1815 to 1853, and again from 1871 to 1914. Those lengthy periods of relative stability, which occurred in multipolar Europe, compare favourably with the ‘long peace’ of the Cold War. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether bipolarity or multipolarity is more prone to great power war by looking at modern European history. Proponents of these rival perspectives, however, do not rely on history alone to make their case; they also employ theoretical arguments. Realists who think bipolarity is less war-prone offer three supporting arguments. First, they maintain that there is more opportunity for great powers to fight each other in multipolarity. There are only two great powers in bipolarity, which means there is only one great power versus great power dyad. In multipolarity, by contrast, there are three potential conflict dyads when there are three great powers, and even more as the number of great powers increases. Second, there tends to be greater equality between the great powers in bipolarity because, the more great powers there are in the system, the more likely it is that wealth and population, the principal building blocks of military power, will be distributed
unevenly among the great powers. And, when there are power imbalances, the stronger often have opportunities to take advantage of the weaker. Furthermore, it is possible in a multipolar system for two or more great powers to gang up on a third great power. Such behaviour is impossible, by definition, in bipolarity. Third, there is greater potential for miscalculation in multipolarity, and miscalculation often contributes to the outbreak of war. Specifically, there is more clarity about potential threats in bipolarity, because there is only one other great power. Those two states invariably focus on each other, reducing the likelihood that they will misgauge each other’s capabilities or intentions.

In contrast, there are a handful of great powers in multipolarity and they usually operate in a fluid environment, where identifying friends from foes as well as their relative strength is more difficult. Balancing is also said to be more efficient in bipolar systems, because each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other. After all, there are no other great powers that can do the balancing or can be part of a balancing coalition and, although lesser powers can be useful allies; they cannot decide the overall balance of power. In multipolarity, however, threatened states will often be tempted to pass the buck to other threatened states. Although buck-passing is an attractive strategy, it can lead to circumstances where aggressors think they can isolate and defeat an adversary. Of course, threatened states can choose not to pass the buck and instead form a balancing coalition against the threatening state. But putting together alliances is often an uncertain process. An aggressor might conclude that it can gain its objectives before the opposing coalition is fully formed.

These dynamics are absent from the simple world of bipolarity, where the two rivals have only each other to think about. Not all realists, however, accept the claim that bipolarity facilitates peace. Some argue that multipolarity is less war-prone. In this view, the more great powers there are in the system, the better the prospects for peace. This optimism is based on two considerations. First,
deterrence is much easier in multipolarity, because there are more states that can join together to confront an especially aggressive state with overwhelming force. In bipolarity, there are no other balancing partners. Balancing in multipolarity might be inefficient sometimes, but eventually the coalition forms and the aggressor is defeated, as Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany all learned the hard way. Second, there is much less hostility among the great powers in multipolarity, because the amount of attention they pay to each other is less than in bipolarity. In a world with only two great powers, each concentrates its attention on the other. But, in multipolarity, states cannot afford to be overly concerned with any one of their neighbours. They have to spread around their attention to all the great powers. Plus, the many interactions among the various states in a multipolar system create numerous cross-cutting cleavages that mitigate conflict. Complexity, in short, dampens the prospects for great power war. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union many realists argue that unipolarity has arrived (Wohlforth 1999). The USA, in other words, is the sole great power. It has achieved global hegemony, a feat no other country has ever accomplished. Other realists, however, argue that the post-Cold War system is multipolar, not unipolar. The USA, they maintain, is by far the most powerful state on earth, but there are other great powers, such as China and Russia. What are the consequences for international stability if the international system is unipolar? Such a world is likely to be more peaceful than either a bipolar or multipolar world.

Most importantly, there can be neither security competition nor war between great powers in unipolarity, because it includes just one great power. Furthermore, the minor powers are likely to go out of their way to avoid fighting the sole pole. Think about the Western Hemisphere, where the USA clearly enjoys hegemony. No state in that region would willingly start a war with the USA for fear of being easily and decisively defeated. This same logic would apply to all regions of the
world if the USA was a global hegemony. There are two caveats to this line of argument. If the hegemony feels secure in the absence of other great powers and pulls most of its military forces back to its own region, security competition and maybe even war is likely to break out in the regions it abandons. After all, the sole pole will no longer be present in those places to maintain order. On the other hand, the hegemony might think that its superior position creates a window of opportunity for it to use its awesome military power to reorder the politics of distant regions. A global hegemony engaged in large-scale social engineering at the end of a rifle barrel will not facilitate world peace. Still, there cannot be war between great powers in unipolarity.

**Balanced or imbalanced power**

Rather than look to the number of great powers to explain the outbreak of war, some realists argue that the key explanatory variable is how much power each of them controls. Power can be distributed more or less evenly among the great powers. Although the power ratios among all the great powers affect the prospects for peace, the key ratio is that between the two most powerful countries in the system. If there is a lopsided gap, the number one state is a preponderant power, simply because it is so much more powerful than all the others. However, if the gap between numbers one and two is small, there is said to be a rough balance of power, even though power might not be distributed equally among all the great powers. The key point is that there is no marked difference in power between the two leading states.

Some realists maintain that the presence of an especially powerful state facilitates peace. A preponderant power, so the argument goes, is likely to feel secure because it is so powerful relative to its competitors; therefore, it will have little need to use force to improve its position in the balance of power. Moreover, none of the other great powers is likely to pick a fight with the leading power, because they would almost certainly lose. However, war among the lesser great
powers is still possible, because the balance of power between any two of them will at least sometimes be roughly equal, thus allowing for the possibility that one might defeat the other. But, even then, if the preponderant power believes that such wars might upset a favourable international order, it should have the wherewithal to stop them, or at least make them unusual events. The historical case that proponents of this perspective emphasize is the period between Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. There were only five wars between the great powers during these hundred years (1853–6, 1859, 1866, 1870–1, 1904–5), and none was a central war like the two conflicts that bracket the period. This lengthy period of relative peace – sometimes called the *Pax Britannica* – is said to be the consequence of Britain’s commanding position in the international system. Conversely, the reason there were central wars before and after this period is that Napoleonic France and Imperial Germany, respectively, were roughly equal in power to Britain. Other realists take the opposite view and argue that preponderance increases the chance of war. Indeed, central wars are likely when there is an especially powerful country in the system. A preponderant power, according to this perspective, is a potential hegemony. It has the wherewithal to make a run at dominating the system, which is the best guarantee of survival in international anarchy. Therefore, it will not be satisfied with the status quo, but instead will look for opportunities to gain hegemony. When there is rough equality among the great powers, no state can make a serious run at hegemony, ruling out deadly central wars. Great power wars are still possible, but the fact that power tends to be rather evenly distributed reduces the incentives for picking fights with other great powers. Proponents of this viewpoint argue that the Napoleonic Wars were largely due to the fact that France was a potential hegemon by the late eighteenth century. The two world wars happened because Germany was twice in a position during the first half of the twentieth century to make a run at European hegemony. The long period of relative peace from 1815
to 1914 was not due to the *Pax Britannica*, because Britain was not a preponderant power. After all, no balancing coalition ever formed against Britain, which was hardly feared by Europe’s continental powers. The reason there were lengthy periods of peace in Europe during these hundred years is that there was a rough balance of power in multipolar Europe. Unbalanced multipolarity, not balanced multipolarity, increases the risks of great power war.

**Power shifts and war**

Other realists maintain that focusing on static indicators like the number of great powers or how much power each controls is wrongheaded. They claim that instead the focus should be on the dynamics of the balance of power, especially on significant changes that take place in the distribution of power (Copeland 2000). Probably the best known argument in this school of thought is that a preponderant power confronted with a rising challenger creates an especially dangerous situation, because a central war usually results. The dominant state, knowing its days at the pinnacle of power are numbered, has strong incentives to launch a preventive war against the challenger to halt its rise. Of course, the declining state has to act while it still enjoys a decided power advantage over its growing rival. Some scholars argue that the rising power is likely to initiate the war in this scenario. But that makes little sense, because time is on the side of the ascending power, which does not need a war to catch up with and overtake the leading state. The origins of the two world wars are said to illustrate this line of argument. Germany was the dominant power in Europe before both conflicts, but each time it faced a rising challenger to its east: Russia before 1914 and the Soviet Union before 1939. To forestall decline and maintain its commanding position in the European balance of power, Germany launched preventive wars in 1914 and 1939, both of which turned into devastating central wars.
The offence–defence balance

As noted, some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–defence balance which almost always favours the defence, and thus works to dampen security competition. As such, that balance is a force for peace. Some defensive realists, however, allow for significant variation in the balance between defence and offence, and argue that offensive advantage is likely to result in war, while defence dominance facilitates peace. For example, the Second World War occurred because the tank and the dive bomber, when incorporated into a blitzkrieg doctrine, markedly shifted the offence–defence balance in the offence’s favour. On the other hand, there was no shooting war between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, because the coming of nuclear weapons sharply shifted the balance in the defence’s favour. The Chinese economy has been growing at an impressive pace since the early 1980s, and many experts expect it to continue expanding at a similar rate over the next few decades. If so, China, with its huge population, will eventually have the wherewithal to build an especially formidable military. China is almost certain to become a military powerhouse, but what China will do with its military muscle, and how the USA and China’s Asian neighbours will react to its rise, remain open questions. There is no single structural realist answer to these questions. Some realist theories predict that China’s ascent will lead to serious instability, while others provide reasons to think that a powerful China can have relatively peaceful relations with its neighbours as well as the USA. Let us consider some of these different perspectives, starting with offensive realism, which predicts that a rising China and the USA will engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.

The rise of China according to offensive realism

The ultimate goal of the great powers, according to offensive realism, is to gain hegemony, because that is the best guarantor of survival. In practice, it is
almost impossible for any country to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to project and sustain power around the planet and onto the territory of distant great powers. The best outcome that a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, which means dominating one’s own geographical area. The USA’s ‘Founding Fathers’ and their successors understood this basic logic and they worked assiduously to make the USA the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. It finally achieved regional hegemony in 1898. While the USA has grown even more powerful since then, and is today the most powerful state in the system; it is not a global hegemon.

States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other geographical regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemony do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several major states, which will then compete with each other and not be in a position to focus on them. Thus, after achieving regional dominance, the USA has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from controlling Asia and Europe. There were four great powers in the twentieth century that had the capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900–18), Imperial Japan (1931–45), Nazi Germany (1933–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–89). In each case, the USA played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemony. In short, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. If offensive realism is correct, we should expect a rising China to imitate the USA and attempt to become a regional hegemon in Asia. China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push US military forces out of Asia, much the way the USA pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. China can be expected to come
up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. From China’s perspective, these policy goals make good strategic sense. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the USA prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. All Chinese remember what happened in the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its backyard? US policymakers, after all, become incensed when other great powers send their military forces into the Western Hemisphere. They are invariably seen as a potential threat to US security. The same logic should apply to China. It is clear from the historical record how US policy-makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The USA does not tolerate peer competitors, as it demonstrated in the twentieth century; it is determined to remain the only regional hegemon. Therefore, the USA will work hard to contain China and ultimately to weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to control the commanding heights in Asia. In essence, the USA is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s neighbours are also sure to fear its rise, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. In fact, there is already evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join a US-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the USA to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

**The rise of China according to defensive realism**

In contrast to offensive realism, defensive realism offers a more optimistic story about China’s rise. For sure, defensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong incentives for states to want additional increments of power to ensure their survival. A mighty China will be no exception; it will look for
opportunities to shift the balance of power in its favour. Moreover, both the USA and China’s neighbors will have to balance against China to keep it in check. Security competition will not disappear altogether from Asia as China grows more powerful. Defensive realists are not starry-eyed idealists. Nevertheless, defensive realism provides reason to think that the security competition surrounding China’s rise will not be intense, and that China should be able to coexist peacefully with both its neighbours and the USA. For starters, it does not make strategic sense for great powers to pursue hegemony, because their rivals will form a balancing coalition and thwart – maybe even crush – them. It is much smarter for China’s leaders to act like Bismarck, who never tried to dominate Europe, but still made Germany great, rather than Kaiser Wilhelm or Adolf Hitler, who both made a run at hegemony and led Germany to ruin. This is not to deny that China will attempt to gain power in Asia.

But structure dictates that it will have limited aims; it will not be so foolish as to try to maximize its share of world power. A powerful China with a limited appetite should be reasonably easy to contain and to engage in cooperative endeavors. The presence of nuclear weapons is another cause for optimism. It is difficult for any great power to expand when confronted by other powers with nuclear weapons. India, Russia, and the USA all have nuclear arsenals, and Japan could quickly go nuclear if it felt threatened by China. These countries, which are likely to form the core of an anti-China balancing coalition, will not be easy for China to push around as long as they have nuclear weapons. In fact, China is likely to act cautiously towards them for fear of triggering a conflict that might escalate to the nuclear level. In short, nuclear weapons will be a force for peace if China continues its rise.

Finally, it is hard to see what China gains by conquering other Asian countries. China’s economy has been growing at an impressive pace without foreign adventures proving that conquest is unnecessary for accumulating great
wealth. Moreover, if China starts conquering and occupying countries, it is likely to run into fierce resistance from the populations which fall under its control. The US experience in Iraq should be a warning to China that the benefits of expansion in the age of nationalism are outweighed by the costs. Although these considerations indicate that China’s rise should be relatively peaceful, defensive realists allow for the possibility that domestic political considerations might cause Beijing to act in strategically foolish ways. After all, they recognize that Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany made ill-advised runs at hegemony. But they maintain that the behaviour of those great powers was motivated by domestic political pathologies, not sound strategic logic. While that may be true, it leaves open the possibility that China might follow a similar path, in which case its rise will not be peaceful. There are other structural realist perspectives for assessing whether or not China’s rise will be peaceful. If the world is unipolar, as some structural realists argue, then the growth of Chinese power will eventually put an end to unipolarity. When it does, the world will be a more dangerous place, since there cannot be war between great powers in unipolarity, while there certainly can be if both China and the USA are great powers.

Furthermore, if Japan acquires nuclear weapons, Russia gets its house in order, and India continues its rise, there would be a handful of great powers in the system, which would further increase the potential for great power conflict. Of course, one might argue that China’s ascendancy will lead to bipolarity, which is a relatively peaceful architecture, even if it is not as pacific as unipolarity. After all, there was no shooting war between the superpowers during the Cold War. Indeed, the security competition between them was not especially intense after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was more dangerous before then, mainly because the USA and the Soviet Union had to come to grips with the nuclear revolution and also learn the rules of the road for dealing with each other under bipolarity, which was then a new and unfamiliar structure. China and the USA, however, would
have the benefit of all that learning that took place during the Cold War, and could deal with each other from the start much the way that Moscow and Washington dealt with each other after 1962. Not all structural realists accept the argument that bipolarity is more prone to peace than multipolarity. For them, a return to bipolarity would be a cause for pessimism. However, if the rise of China was accompanied by the emergence of other great powers, the ensuing multipolarity would give these realists more cause for optimism.

Finally, for structural realists who believe that preponderance produces peace, the rise of China is ominous news. They argue that US power has had a pacifying effect on international politics. No other great power, and certainly no minor power, would dare pick a fight with the USA as long as it sits at the pinnacle of world power. But that situation would obviously change if China reached the point where it was almost as powerful as the USA. Preponderance would disappear, and without it the world would be a much more dangerous place. Indeed, these realists would argue that the USA would have strong incentives to launch a preventive war against China to forestall decline. In sum, there is no consensus among structural realists about whether China can rise peacefully. This diversity of views is not surprising since these same realists disagree among themselves about how much power states should want as well as what causes war. The only important point of agreement among them is that the structure of the international system forces great powers to compete among themselves for power.

**Conclusion**

It was commonplace during the 1990s for pundits and scholars to proclaim that the world was rapidly becoming more peaceful and that realism was dead. International politics was said to have been transformed with the end of the Cold War. Globalization of the economic sort was supposedly tying the state in knots; some even predicted its imminent demise. Others argued that Western elites were
for the first time thinking and talking about international politics in more cooperative and hopeful terms, and that the globalization of knowledge was facilitating the spread of that new approach. Many argued that democracy was spreading across the globe and, because democracies do not fight each other, we had reached the ‘the end of history’. Still others claimed that international institutions were finally developing the capacity to cause the major powers to act according to the rule of law, not the dictates of realism. In the wake of September 11, that optimism has faded, if not disappeared altogether, and realism has made a stunning comeback. Its resurrection is due in part to the fact that almost every realist opposed the Iraq War, which has turned into a strategic disaster for the USA and UK. But, more importantly, there is little reason to think that globalization or international institutions have crippled the state. Indeed, the state appears to have a bright future, mainly because nationalism, which glorifies the state, remains a powerful political ideology. Even in Western Europe, where there has been unprecedented economic integration, the state is alive and well. Furthermore, military power is still a critical element in world politics. The USA and the UK, the world’s two great liberal democracies, have fought five wars together since the Cold War ended in 1989. Both Iran and North Korea remind us that nuclear proliferation remains a major problem, and it is not difficult to posit plausible scenarios where India and Pakistan end up in a shooting war that involves nuclear weapons. It is also possible, although not likely, that China and the USA could get dragged into a war over Taiwan, or even North Korea. Regarding China’s rise, even the optimists acknowledge that there is potential for serious trouble if the politics surrounding that profound shift in global power are handled badly.

In essence, the world remains a dangerous place, although the level of threat varies from place to place and time to time. States still worry about their survival, which means that they have little choice but to pay attention to the
balance of power. International politics is still synonymous with power politics, as it has been for all of recorded history. Therefore, it behoves students of International Relations to think long and hard about the concept of power, and to develop their own views on why states pursue power, how much power is enough, and when security competition is likely to lead to war. Thinking smartly about these matters is essential for developing clever strategies, which is the only way states can mitigate the dangers of international anarchy.

QUESTIONS
1. Why do states in international anarchy fear each other?
2. Is there a reliable way to determine the intentions of states?
3. Is China’s rise likely to look like Germany’s rise between 1900 and 1945?
4. Does it make sense for states to pursue hegemony?
5. Why was the Cold War not a hot war?
6. Does it make sense to assume that states are rational?
7. Is balancing a reliable deterrent against aggressive states?
8. What is the security dilemma and is there a solution to it?
9. Is the USA a global hegemon?
10. Is unipolarity more peaceful than bipolarity or multipolarity?
11. Is realism relevant in contemporary Europe?
12. What is the tragedy of great power politics?

FURTHER READING
Sophisticated brief for the claim that major wars are caused by sharp changes in the balance of power.


Snyder, J. (1991), *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and the International Ambition* (Ithaca
NY: Cornell University Press). Excellent case studies on how the great powers behaved in the twentieth century from a defensive realist perspective.


**NEO-NEO DEBATE**

*Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism* stronger focus both on the problem of "Hobbesian fear" (Butterfield 1958) and on theory-guided empirical research which examines a wider range of "real" instances of foreign policy decision-making. Origins: traditional realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. The current concern of neo-realist and neo-liberal scholars with game theoretic formulations originated partly with Waltz's efforts (Waltz 1979) to convert "traditional realism" into a "neo-realist" or "structural" theory.

Traditional realism was both a simple decision-making theory and a protostructural theory about outcomes in the international system (Morgenthau 1967; Carr 1946). In decision-making terms, it offered an unambiguous, if simplistic, analysis of foreign policy calculation. Strategy was aimed fundamentally
at maximizing the state's interests and was underpinned by three "Hobbesian" motives: achieving and maintaining the state's security; satisfying the economic demands of politically significant sections of the domestic population; and enhancing the state's international prestige. The paramount need for security was best achieved by maximizing the state's power capabilities. Traditional realism took on the character of a proto-structural theory in two senses.

First, the condition of international anarchy (which derived from the absence of a Leviathan-like world government) was seen as the determining structural factor that lead decision-makers to adopt "safety first" strategies of realpolitik in order to protect and maximize the interests of their respective nation-states. Second, the character and outcomes of the interactions between different states were determined by the overall pattern of national interests: friendship and cooperation between states were considered to derive fundamentally from convergences of their respective national interests; enmity and confrontation from conditions of interest-divergence. Waltz's central claim was that any analysis of international politics which confined itself merely to the attributes of the (nation-state) units or to the interactions between units was fundamentally "reductionist" and therefore inadequate (Waltz 1979: 18-37).

On the contrary, what was required was a thoroughgoing analysis of international structure and its consequences both for nation-state behavior and for the outcome of nation-state interactions. Notwithstanding Waltz's critique of the Hobson-Lenin thesis, what he attempted to develop was precisely what Marxism always claimed to provide: a structural explanation of state behaviour? Relations Waltz developed the notion of structural explanation in two ways. First, in his exposition of balance of power theory, Waltz (1979: 126) attempted to provide a structural explanation of the dominant alliance strategy (the avoidance of power preponderance) that states pursue. As in traditional realism, a pivotal role was
accorded to the notion that under anarchic conditions there is no security for the junior partner(s) in a winning coalition.

Second, Waltz developed a structural explanation of system outcomes. Defining structure as a set of constraining conditions which produce a gap between intention and outcome, Waltz (1979: 89-93, 119-22) drew a powerful analogy between balance of power theory and the theory of perfect competition. Under perfect competition, because of the structure of the market in which there are no barriers to entry and perfect information, firms which aim to maximize profit end up minimizing it (i.e. earning a normal profit) because more firms enter the market if greater than normal profits are being made. Waltz argued that structure exerts a similar set of effects in international political systems, where a balance of power (the outcome) emerges "fortuitously" as a result of each state independently pursuing its own self-interest (the intention). The idea that outcomes occur which are neither intended nor desired by any of the actors involved had, of course, been a familiar theme in game theory since the 1950s. Indeed, Prisoner's Dilemma had long been recognized as a possible restatement of the Hobbesian security problem which was central to traditional realism (Axelrod 1970; Snyder 1971). It was therefore quite natural that the "unintended and undesired outcome" principle should have been taken up by a new generation of neo-realists who sought to develop it further both in terms of other sorts of game and in terms of iterated games. It was perfectly possible for international actors to prefer mutual co-operation, but the structure of the situation in which they found themselves produced an outcome of mutual defection.

Equally naturally, neo-realism's neo-liberal opponents engaged in a similar exercise- though with the objective of showing that the structural constraints on co-operation implied by these games were far weaker than neo-realists supposed. In essence, Waltz's efforts to transform realism into a scientific, structural theory led directly to international relations theorists placing much more emphasis on
game-theoretic approaches. The logic was simple International relations theory should aspire to the status of structural theory; game-theoretic models described the structure of the situation in which nation-state decision-making takes place: it was obvious that the two should be combined to produce a new and more sophisticated theoretical apparatus—a task which both neo-realists and neo-liberals undertook with considerable vigor and enormous skill.

The neo-realist/neo-liberal debate has been criticized from a wide range of different positions, ranging from post-Marxian critical theory to feminism. Much of this criticism has been epistemological. Neo-realists and neo-liberals are variously accused of failing to recognize that their theories merely serve to justify an existing power structure (Peterson 1992); of reifying the concept of causality (Ashley 1986); of underestimating the importance of political discourses (Enloe 1994; Campbell 1992); and of failing to understand the centrality of subjective meanings, rules and rule-following behavior (Hollis and Smith 1990).

**Problems relating to the role of national interests**

In traditional realist theory, national interests played a pivotal role. In the discourse of foreign policy debate, "the national interest"—even in an age of proliferating international institutions and regimes—still appears to pre-occupy the private calculations and public utterances of a wide range of national leaders. The continuing centrality of interests (though they admittedly do not refer explicitly to national interests) is also acknowledged by Axelrod and Keohane (1993: 88): "Perceptions define interests ... To understand the degree of mutuality of interests (or to enhance this mutuality), we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined." Axelrod and Keohane (1993: 88) go on to specify the way in which rational choice theorists approach this problem: "One way to understand this process is to see it as involving a change in payoffs, so
that a game such as Prisoners' Dilemma becomes more or less conflictual ... " I have no quarrel whatsoever with Axelrod and Keohane's assertion that "we must understand the process by which interests are perceived." As I understand it, the game theoretic perspective assumes that a state's "interests" are maximized if its payoff gains are maximized (Axelrod and Keohane 1993: 88-91), while its payoff gains can themselves be regarded as "gains in capabilities" (Baldwin 1993b: 16-17).

In this sense "understanding the process by which interests are perceived" seems to consist in showing how different preference orderings can arise and how they correspond to different varieties of payoff structure: a given actor's interests are considered to vary according to the character of the particular game that it is playing at anyone time. Unfortunately, this is more a definition of interests defined in terms of payoff structures-than an account of the "process" whereby interests are perceived and determined. A theory of interests-for that is what Axelrod and Keohane are in effect calling for2-cannot be based on the notion that, if we have understood the principles of gain maximization, then we have also understood the way in which nation-states seek first to specify, and then to protect and promote, their interests. We may be happy to assume that it is "in a state's interests" to maximize its gains. But this is not equivalent to saying that the principle of gain-maximizing reveals all that needs to be known about interest protection and promotion. Interests need to be considered in their historical context. Before we can speculate intelligently either about the formation of interests or about the consequences of states having conflicting or overlapping interests, we need to know what states' leaders perceive their respective states' interests to be.

This can only be achieved through extensive, laborious and difficult empirical study. To be sure, some sort of "interest typology" might prove useful in this context. It might make sense, for example, to differentiate between a nation-state's economic-ecological interests (which could consist in maximizing the long-
term economic and ecological welfare of its population) and its political-security interests (which could consist in maximizing the state's ability to respond rapidly and effectively to any external threats or challenges that might impinge upon it in the future). Such a theory is nonetheless an essential prerequisite of a satisfactory explanation both of nation-state behavior and of the outcomes of inter-state interactions. It is also likely that a satisfactory theory of nation-state interests can only be developed, as it were, from the "bottom-up"; from a considered analysis of a large amount of (currently uncollected). Indeed. Keohane (1993: 294) explicitly suggests that "without a theory of interests ... no theory of international relations is possible."

I take it that this was what Morgenthau (1967: S-{-}) had in mind when he wrote that statesmen "think and act in terms of interests defined as power." empirical evidence relating to policy-makers' interest-perceptions. What international relations theory really needs is a new Quincy Wright: someone who has command of an enormous range of substantive case studies of interests and who possesses the theoretical insight to offer a simplifying synthesis of what s/he observes. I would certainly not want to advocate a purely inductivist approach to the analysis of international relations-that way lies mindless empiricism. Equally, as Hanson (1958) observed, there is a place for both inductive and deductive theorizing in the process of systematic enquiry. In the analysis of nation-state interests, at least for the time being, we desperately need a little less theoretically based deduction and a little more empirically based induction.

**The ineffective specification of "structural constraints"

As noted earlier, Waltz defines structure as a set of constraining conditions that produces a gap between intention and outcome. He goes on to suggest that the two main structural characteristics of an international system are the particular distribution of capabilities that it exhibits and the (anarchic) ordering principle upon which it is based. Accepting this definition, it is legitimate to ask how far the methods adopted by game theorists are capable of capturing the way in which
international structure might be considered to constrain the outcomes of state interactions. In terms of the importance of the distribution of capabilities, such methods have achieved a considerable amount.

For example, Snidal's recent (1993) work on the importance of relative gains under varying conditions of system polarity—which shows that the impact of relative gains declines as the number of actors increases—continues a long line of studies that have very effectively analyzed the connections between polarity, the decision calculus of major actors and system outcomes. The record is less convincing, however, in relation to game theorists' efforts to analyze the structural consequences of the anarchic character of the international system. The key difficulty in this context is whether the options defined even by multidimensional, multi-choice payoff matrices bear sufficient resemblance to the "real" choices of "real" policy-makers for the structure of the matrix to be regarded as an analogue for the (anarchic) structure of the international system. This question is particularly problematic with regard to the question of uncertainty. Uncertainty is one of the Waltz's (1979: 93-7) third component of structure as appalled in the domestic context.

The functional differentiation of units. is of no relevance in international political systems: nation states vary in capabilities, not in function; they are "like units." critical features of an anarchic structure that the payoff matrix approach seeks to encapsulate. The core of the problem in this regard is that payoff matrices radically understate the degree of uncertainty that actually faces policy-makers in the international system. A matrix specifies uncertainty in terms of the $k$ alternative strategies available to an opponent. Yet, even in a $k$-actor situation in the "real world," the uncertainties are much greater than this $k$-choice position would imply. In deciding between competing policy options, decision-makers in "real" situations are typically confronted with the following uncertainties: structure—that is, act as structural constraints upon—both the choices that are made and the
outcomes that obtain in the "real world:' The question must remain open therefore as to whether game-theoretic perspectives adequately reflect a central aspect of the anarchic international structure which they were expressly intended to encapsulate.

Towards a game theory-free concessional realism

Although the foregoing discussion is in no sense offered as a thoroughgoing critique of game-theoretic approaches to international relations, it does have some implications for the way in which the neo-realist/neo-liberal debate might be developed. The failure of the game theory approach to take adequate account of either interests or uncertainty suggests that it might be worthwhile considering what neo-realism and neo-liberalism would look like if they were shorn of their game-theoretic superstructure. The thought experiment" that follows offers precisely such a portrayal. In deference to the increasing recognition that neo-realist and neo-liberal propositions need to be subjected to more explicit empirical scrutiny (Keohane 1993), the "experiment" emphasizes the importance of direct empirical testing. The experiment also seeks to maintain the view adopted by diplomatic historians that realism constitutes both a theory of decision making and a simple structural theory about the origins and outcomes of nation-state behaviour.

In offering revised statements of neo-realist and neo-liberal theories which are presented in Appendices 17 A and 17B-I follow Lakatos (1970) in assuming that all theories have both (1) a largely non-negotiable and non-falsifiable "core" and (2) a set of testable propositions that are to a greater or lesser degree derived from that core. In terms of the testable propositions, I distinguish between (i) statements that can be empirically evaluated by a detailed examination of the decision calculus of individual policy-makers (the "decision-making level"); and (ii) statements that require empirical testing in the context of the transitional pattern of interests or co-operation (the "structural level").Readers will doubtless decide for
themselves as to the individual and collective adequacy of the theoretical statements outlined in Appendix Tables. First, it is clear that the content of the tables could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as sophisticated. ("Simplistic stuff" is one 436 International Relations self-criticism that occurs to me.) In comparison with the recent works of Keohane, Snidal, Grieco, Powell, Baldwin and many others, there is a huge loss of abstraction and theoretical rigor.

The second key feature of the tables concerns the concept of interests. The statement of concessional realism accords some prominence to perceptions of national interests. However, it is evident that a considerable amount of empirical work needs to be undertaken in order to determine what decision-maker actually perceive their states' interests to be. This investigation also implies the need for an analysis of how perceptions of interests are shaped by country-specific historical forces and by institutional practices and commitments at both the national and international level. This in turn implies an emphasis on domestic political structures and processes that is not normally allowed for in neo-realist theory. It is an emphasis, however, whose importance has certainly been recognized by neo-liberals and institutionalists.7 Given the obvious importance of domestic considerations in the study of foreign policy, it seems appropriate that a putative theory of international relations should make due allowance for the possible operation of domestic factors in the genesis of nation-state behavior.

A third feature of that merits attention concerns the concept of structure. It could be argued that the propositions as they stand significantly underplay the role of international structure and that the only hint of an analysis of structural effects, in Waltz's sense, occurs in the non-falsifiable core of realism. There is certainly nothing comparable to the sort of structural effects that Waltz describes in his discussion of the analogy between perfect competition and given the increasing role of contemporary international institutions, the notion of" decision-makers' perceptions" should probably be extended to include the leaders of major
transnational institutions. See, for example: Axelrod and Keohane 1993: 101-2; Elman 1995. Balance of power theory, in response to this criticism, I would argue that the overall pattern of perceived interests—which can only be specified by first considering states' perceptions of their interests—is just as much a structural characteristic as Waltz's "distribution of capabilities." In this sense, in looking at overlapping and contradicting patterns of interest, the model outlined. A does take some account of possible structural effects. If this still represents a weak analysis of structural effects in Waltz's sense, then so be it. I can only observe in mitigation that, as far as I am aware, no one else (Waltz included) has managed to produce and account of the effects of international structure that would bear comparison with the way in which structural effects operate under conditions of perfect competition. Although neo-realism and neo-liberalism accept some of the same preliminary assumptions (notably that the international system is an anarchic one composed of self-regarding, interest-maximizing states), it is generally accepted that the two theories do generate different expectations about the prospects for co-operation between nation-states with the neo-liberal position, obviously, being the more optimistic.

It is also widely acknowledged that neo-realism seems to provide a better model for analyzing the military-security problems that states confront, while neo-liberalism offers a more useful account of their relations in the political-economic sphere (Grieco 1993a: 131). The question that obviously arises in this context is why this pattern of differential success should be observed. Grieco gets the closest to providing an answer when he discusses his $k$ coefficient—which measures a state's "sensitivity to gaps in payoffs" in its dealings with another state. Grieco (1993b: 323) suggests that, "In general, $k$ is likely to increase as a state transits from relationships in what Karl Deutsch terms a 'pluralistic security community' to those approximating a state of war ... The level of $k$, for example, will be lower if a state's partner is a long-term ally rather than a long-term adversary."
What Grieco is implying here is that the character of the relationship between any pair of states will depend upon specific historical circumstances. If nations have established a reasonable degree of mutual understanding and trust through a long period of co-operation, they are less likely to worry about relative gains (they are insensitive to "gaps in payoffs") and are therefore more likely to co-operate with each other in the future than are nations which, for whatever historical reasons, are deeply suspicious of each other.

To historians, of course, this is self-evident. Yet to international relations theorists, somehow, its significance seems to be underestimated. As a formal theorist, Grieco quite rightly incorporates his $k$ coefficient into his formal model of the decision calculus of the state under anarchic conditions. In so doing, however, he misjudges the explanatory importance of historical circumstance. It might well be the case that states worry less about relative gains when they are dealing with long-term friends and allies. The crucial point, however is that when "real" states deal with long-term friends and allies the whole character of their interaction is fundamentally different from the sort of interaction that occurs when they deal with states for whom they retain a sense of Hobbesian fear. Grieco's coefficient though it is an extremely clever device-simply doesn't go far enough. It cannot be stressed enough that states discriminate in the ways that they relate to other states. Just as an individual relates differently to each of her/his various friends and acquaintances, so a state will behave and calculate differently towards the various states with which it has contact. And precisely because states discriminate, they make different sorts of calculation about the costs and benefits of cooperation depending upon whom they are dealing with.

Nation-states may or may not be sufficiently alike in the problems that they confront to merit Waltz's description of them as "like units." "Real"-discriminating-decision-makers most assuredly do not see all other states as "like units": they invariably regard some actors as "friends" and others as either real or potential
"enemies." What all of this suggests is that the attempt to develop a single decision calculus (based on either absolute or relative gains) in order to analyze nation-state decision-making is unlikely to capture the sheer inconsistency of decision-making in the "real" world. At a minimum, we need to develop two different models of nation-state decision-making—one for situations where historical circumstances mean that a condition of Hobbesian fear still exists between the parties involved; and one for situations where Hobbesian fear has, for whatever historical reasons, been transcended.

If we think about it, this is precisely what neo-realism and neo-liberalism have, in their separate ways, already provided us with. Where Hobbesian fear exists, military-security issues predominate and the neo-realist model proves broadly satisfactory. Where Hobbesian fear has been transcended, political-economic issues predominate and the neo-liberal model works smoothly. If this characterization fails to explain why Hobbesian fear is sometimes transcended and sometimes not, I am unconcerned: these are matters of historical contingency rather than questions of theory. Consider, for example, the case of post war Anglo-American relations.

Where the boundaries of Hobbesian fear have been eliminated between countries, political and economic co-operation between them will be more readily achieved. One way of thinking about neo-liberal theory is to regard it as a set of sub-hypotheses that fall within the confines of proposition. Where Hobbesian fear has been eliminated, the neo-liberal propositions summarized in would come into operation; where it has not, realism would still hold sway. The resultant combination could be described as a "concessional realist" model. Just as realism, in transmuting itself into neo-realism, made an epistemological "concession" to positivism ($pegele 1983), so neo-realism now needs to make a substantive concession to neoliberalism by recognizing that, in specified circumstances, the neo-liberals simply tell a more plausible story. It should also be
stressed that the idea of neo-liberalism as a special case of concessional realism is not intended to constitute a "demotion" of neo-liberalism, merely a convenient location of it.

Neo-liberals should be reassured that such a location would not imply a diminution of the theoretical power of their analysis. The removal of Hobbesian fear does not mean the end of anarchy. It merely means that the anarchic structure in which states must operate is "mature" as opposed to "immature" (Buzan 1991). There is still no Leviathan to see fair play and there is still considerable uncertainty both about the aims and future behaviour of other actors and about the outcomes of co-operation or confrontation. As with all compromises, this proposed fusion of neo-realist and neo-liberal thinking will probably appeal to neither. The Americans could trust the British sufficiently to sell them nuclear weapons. The U.S might have been uncertain about what foreign policies Britain would pursue in a wide range of contexts. What it was certain about, however, was that the British would never use the weapons against the U.S. and that the British were sufficiently responsible not to use them without close consultation with Washington. The U.S. decision could, of course, be analyzed in terms of either relative or absolute gains calculations, but this would not explain how the extraordinary degree of trust that exit had been built up over the previous 25 years.

The nature of the calculation that the U.S. government made was dependent on the character of the relationship that existed between Washington and London; and that character was in turn determined by contingent historical circumstances. The extent to which neo-liberal propositions were also relevant under conditions of Hobbesian fear could still be investigated empirically.
CONSTRUCTVISM AND POST CONSRUCTIVISM

CONSTRUCTIVISM

The basic insight behind the constructivist approach can be understood by unpacking a quick observation made by Alexander Wendt. He says that “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons” (Wendt 1995, 73). In this little observation are found traces of the features that distinguish constructivism from other approaches to international relations, including its critique of materialism, its emphasis on the social construction of interests, its relationship between structures and agents, and its multiple logics of anarchy. On its surface, the empirical puzzle of the threat embodied by North Korean missiles is easy to explain: as Wendt (1995, 73) says, “the British are friends and the North Koreans are not.” This of course begs an understanding of the categories of friend and enemy, and it is through this opening that Wendt and other constructivists have addressed both important substantive aspects of international relations (for instance, “how do states come to see others as friends and as enemies?”) and the philosophical background it presupposes (for instance, “how can we study social and relational phenomena like ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ in international relations?”).

This chapter examines the features that distinguish constructivism from other approaches to international relations and then looks at some controversies within constructivist scholarship today and between constructivists and others. There are many excellent short histories of the constructivist school (e.g., Barnett 2005; ReusSmit 2005), and my goal is to avoid repeating them and instead explain what I think the term constructivism means in international relations. To do so, I also for very useful comments on earlier drafts, I thank Karen Alter, Chris Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal define other approaches, including materialism, realism, and rationalism, in order to show how constructivism differs. This involves some controversy, because the lines that separate them are not at all clear. In
what follows, I take realism to be at its core about materialism (that is, the theory that states respond to *material* needs, incentives, and power) and rationalism to be about instrumentalism (that is, the theory that states pursue individual advantage by calculating costs and benefits). Constructivism, by contrast, emphasizes the *social and relational* construction of what states are and what they want. All these approaches might be used to focus on power politics, cooperation, conflict, or any other substantive phenomena. It is; therefore, wrong to associate a substantive interest in power exclusively with realism, because all the “paradigms” of international relations are interested in power, as either motivation, cause, or effect. I differentiate realism as a particular theory about *material* power in international relations, in contrast with constructivism’s emphasis on the social meaning attached to objects or practices. In asking for an explanation of the importance in world politics of social concepts like friend and enemy, the constructivist challenge opened two paths. One was more empirical and used the tools provided by Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), Nicholas Onuf (1989), Wendt (1992), and other constructivists to explain anomalies of other approaches. The other was more conceptual and concerned how these social concepts might work in the world and how they could be studied and used in study.

From constructivism’s starting point as a reaction to materialism, individualism, and rationalism, the empirical branch of research was like a downstream flow; it applied the insights of constructivism to understand interesting patterns, behaviors, and puzzles. The philosophic branch went upstream it sought to understand the reasons for, and implications of, the differences between constructivism and other approaches to social phenomena.
The Distinguishing Features of Constructivism

This section outlines four features of constructivism that distinguish it from other approaches and show how constructivism addresses both philosophical and empirical issues that were inaccessible through the prevailing models of international relations in the 1980s. The four are not necessarily exclusive to constructivism, but each has a constructivist variant that is distinct from both the materialism of J. Samuel Barkin (2003), by contrast, defines realism as a concern with “power” and then notes that this is consistent with social construction. realism and the rationalism of neo-liberalism, and carries distinct implications for how world politics is studied.

An Alternative to Materialism

The original insight behind constructivism is that meaning is “socially constructed.” This is also the source of the label “constructivism.” Wendt (1992, 396–7) says “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”2 In a socially constructed world, the existence of patterns, cause and effect relationships, and even states themselves depends on webs of meaning and practices that constitute them (e.g., Kratochwil 1989). These meanings and practices might sometimes be relatively stable, but they are never fixed and should not be mistaken for permanent objects. As ideas and practices vary over time or space, patterns that once looked solid and predictable may change as well. For instance, sovereignty is a social institution in the sense that a state can be sovereign only when it is seen by people and other states as a corporate actor with rights and obligations over territory and citizens (and they act accordingly). The practice of sovereignty has changed over time, and the powers and identities of actually existing
states have changed as well (see, e.g., the essays in Biersteker and Weber 1996). To take a more concrete example, since 1945 the idea has spread that massive human rights violations by states against their citizens may legally justify international intervention. Sovereignty is thereby changing, and the autonomy of some rulers (that is, rights violators) is reduced while that of others (potential interveners) is increased. Sovereignty is an important organizing force in international relations that rests on the shared ideas of people and the practices people engage in.

A contrasting approach to “social construction” in world politics is the position Known as “materialism,” which suggests that material objects (bombs, mountains, people, oil, and so on) have a direct effect on outcomes that is unmediated by the ideas people bring to them. Neorealism and neoliberalism are explicitly materialist approaches to world politics. They seek to explain international patterns and behaviours as the result of purely material forces, particularly the military hardware, strategic resources, and money that they see as constituting “power.” For example, John Mearsheimer (1995, 91) argues that “the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.” Among neorealists, Joshua Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1994) identify states’ material interests as distinct from people’s ideas about the world, and their research on the causal effects of ideas uses as its baseline the materialist hypothesis. Neorealists and neoliberals in this insight appears also in the work of Hedley Bull and the English School as well as of some classical realists.

This is the mistake of “reification.” the 1980s shared a commitment to materialism in which socially mediated beliefs were not important autonomous forces, and they argued among themselves over the likely implications of such a world for patterns such as cooperation, institution making, arms races, and balancing (see, e.g., the essays in Baldwin 1993). The ideas that give shape to
international politics are more than just the beliefs of individuals. They include ideas that are intersubjective (that is, shared among people) and institutionalized (that is, expressed as practices and identities). Intersubjective and institutionalized forms of ideas “are not reducible to individual minds” (Wendt 1999, ch. 4; Legro 2005, 5). Jeffrey Legro (2005, 6) summarizes the constructivist understanding of ideas: “ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective memories,’ government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.” This makes it clear that the constructivist insight is not that we replace “brute materialism” with “brute idealism” (cf. Palan 2000).

Rather, constructivism suggests that material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life. A purely materialist approach has difficulty explaining why the USA should see British missiles as any less threatening than North Korean missiles. The “self-evident” friendliness of Britain toward the USA as compared to the apparent hostility of North Korea is not self-evident from a purely material perspective. After all, the physical consequences of an attack by the nuclear weapons of either country would be devastating. The brute material threat to the USA posed by a British nuclear weapon is at least comparable to, and probably much greater than, that of a North Korean weapon. The difference between the two is the conviction among many American leaders that the North Koreans are more likely to act aggressively toward the USA than are the British. This conviction is based on interpretations of history, rhetoric, and behavior, and it generates the expectation that war with North Korea is more likely than war with the British, and in turn leads to different policy strategies in response to their weapons. For constructivists, beliefs, expectations, and interpretations are inescapable when thinking about international affairs, and their importance shows that the materialist position is untenable. While the shift from a materialist to a socially constructed view of
international relations was controversial in the early 1990s, it has now been broadly accepted. The constructivist insight has been largely internalized by the discipline. Even materialist theories of international relations now generally openly include at least two kinds of ideas (though mostly individual rather than collective ideas): first, “non-material” factors such as (for Mearsheimer 2001, 58) “strategy, intelligence, [and] resolve,” and, secondly, socially constructed interests. However, they usually also claim that the practical importance of the social content Jennifer Sterling Folker (2000) argues that this was made easier by the fact that many putatively materialist theories of international relations already incorporated social content of international relations is minimal when compared to the influence of brute material factors, and so the research agendas of neorealism and neoliberalism have at once conceded the constructivist insight while maintaining their core claims. As the socially constructed nature of world politics has been broadly accepted, it has become clear that what remains contestable between constructivists and others is how (not “whether”) this insight affects the study of world politics, both in its methodology and in its substance..

**The Construction of State Interests**

The scholarly interest in the “national interest” has always been central to international relations and foreign-policy analysis. The constructivist approach has been productive in this area because of its focus on the social content involved in the production of international relations, including state interests. While most scholars now acknowledge that state interests are at base ideas about needs, many non-constructivists maintain that the content of those interests is for practical purposes unchanging and includes some combination of the desires for survival, power, wealth, and security. They contend that the socially constructed nature of interests does not alter the fact that the primary interests that drive states are prefigured by the material resources and situation of the states, and so states are either constructed by material forces or can be treated as if their
construction is irrelevant to their interests and behavior (e.g., Brooks and Wohlfforth 2007). States are “minimally constructed.” By contrast, constructivists would argue that the apparent “hostility” of North Korean missiles shows that American leaders respond to the social relationship between the USA and the military resources of others, friend or enemy, rather than to the hardware itself. These social relations are not fixed, and the American national interest therefore cannot be ascertained, let alone pursued, without considering them. The USA has an interest in resisting North Korea, because American leaders perceive a hostile relationship with it, while it has no interest in containing the UK, because it perceives a mutually beneficial relationship. Constructivists often find it useful to examine the historical construction of “national interests” (e.g., Finnemore 1996, 2003; Weldes 1999). It is sometimes said that the difference between constructivism and other approaches is that the former is concerned with the construction of interests while the latter take interests as fixed and given (see, e.g., Goldstein 2005, 126). This is not true. Nor is it true that only constructivists suggest that state interests might be influenced by forces at the level of the international system. Constructivists do not have a monopoly on the study of how interests are made or of systemic influences on interests. Many non-constructivists are interested in how states come to hold the interests that structure their decision-making. Andrew Moravcsik (1999), for instance, provides a liberal theory of how state interests are constructed out of the economic interests of domestic industries and coalitions. Stephen Krasner (1999) argues from a realist perspective that individual rulers present as the national interest the policies they believe will ensure their personal survival as rulers. Both present these as “material” factors though they rest on ideas about needs. Game theorists sometimes endogenize the formation of interests so that interests change as a result of interactions (e.g., Gerber and Jackson 1993). On system level influences, Jon Pevehouse (2005) uses broadly rationalist tools to examine how the
constitution of states is affected by their membership and participation in regional organizations. What distinguishes a specifically constructivist story on interests is that the influences on interest formation are social. Legro (2005, 4) represents the constructivist view: “new foreign policy ideas are shaped by pre existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events.” This follows directly from the insight on social construction above. Wendt (1992, 397) says “actors acquire identities relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in collective meanings.” Interests are in part products of those identities. The social constitution of interests encompasses all the ways that actors’ interests and identities might be influenced by their interactions with others and with their social environment. This includes the processes of socialization and internalization (Hurd 1999), the drive for social recognition and prestige (Wendt 1999, ch. 5), the effects of social norms on interests and on behavior (including the desire to create norms that legitimize one’s behavior) (Hurd 2007a), and the presence or absence of a sense of “community” (Adler and Barnett 1998).

Mutual Constitution of Structures and Agents

The constructivist attention to the social construction of interests and identities introduces the more general problem of the relationship between structures and agents. By “structures” I mean the institutions and shared meanings that make up the context of international action, and by “agents” I mean any entity that operates as an actor in that context. Returning to Wendt’s illustration, the relationship of enmity that makes the USA fear North Korean nuclear weapons is not a fixed and stable fact. It is, instead, a result of ongoing interactions both between the two states and among the states and their social context. These interactions may reinforce the relation of enmity, or they may change it. They may also reinforce or change the broader social structures in
which the actors exist, including norms and other forms of shared meaning regarding sovereignty, threat, and interests.

Contrast this with realism, of which Moravcsik (1999, 680, n. 6) says “the distribution of ideas and information is a function of the underlying distribution of material power resources.”

The co-constitution of states and structures goes beyond recognizing that there are interaction effects between the unit and the system level. Kenneth Waltz emphasized interaction effects but in a way that maintained states as unchanging units. In *Theory of International Politics*, he suggested that two states interacting in anarchy are “not just influencing the other” by their actions; “both are being influenced by the situation their interaction creates” (Waltz 1979, 74). Consistent with his materialist premise, Waltz looked for how this changed the material incentives facing states as they weighed policy alternatives. A constructivist approach to co-constitution, by contrast, suggests that the actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states. Both the institutions and the actors can be redefined in the process. The recognition of mutual constitution is an important contribution to the theory of international relations, because many interesting empirical phenomena in international relations are understandable only by a methodology that avoids assuming a neat separation between agents and structures. In studying international norms, it quickly becomes clear that states are concerned simultaneously with shifting their behavior to match the rules and reconstructing the rules to condone their behavior (Hurd 2007a). For instance, when states claim they are using force only in self defence, they cannot avoid reinforcing Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter (which forbid aggressive war) and at the same time are redefining the rules by specifying how they wish the concepts of “sovereignty,” “self-defence,” and “aggression” to be understood. International norms are
simultaneously the products of state actions and influences upon state action. Thus, the idea that states and the international environment are mutually constituted is inherent in the constructivist approach.

**Multiple Logics of Anarchy**

The constructivist approach leads to a different interpretation of international anarchy from the one offered by neorealists or neoliberals, and, to the extent that the concept of anarchy organizes international life, it therefore leads to different patterns of world politics more generally. “Anarchy” is the term used in international relations to describe a social system that lacks legitimated institutions of authority (Milner 1991). It is a formal condition of a system in the sense that it describes any system that is not organized through hierarchical structures of authority and command. Waltz (1979), in defining the neorealist school, derived from the structural condition of anarchy a set of predictions about the behavior of units, including balancing behavior, self-help strategies, and a self-interested identity. Wendt’s critique of Waltz showed that these patterns did not follow simply from the structural condition of anarchy; they came from the additional assumption that units see each other as rivals over scarce goods. “Rivalry” is a social relationship that can best be understood, in international relations and elsewhere, by examining its social construction. This requires acknowledging that the relationship is not fixed, natural, or permanent. Wendt proposed a spectrum of international anarchies based on variation in the ideas that states have about themselves and others. With enmity at one end and friendship at the other, and with indifference in the middle, the formal condition of anarchy is by itself not very informative about the behavior of the units. After all, he says, “an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies” (Wendt 1995, 78). This allows for the possibility of community (Adler and Barnett 1998; Cronin 1999), hierarchy (Simpson 2004), rivalry (Wendt 1992), and other social relations within a formally anarchic structure. Inter-state conflict is also conditioned by the social qualities of
international anarchy, as illustrated by the efforts of states to appear to operate within the confines of the norms on war. Such diverse behaviours, and others, are compatible with the anarchical structure of the international system, and can be addressed through the constructivist approach. (I discuss below the constructivist possibility that the system is not anarchic.) These four elements are the distinguishing features of constructivism in international relations theory. They are related to each other in the sense that, if one adopts the first idea (that is, that world politics is partly socially constructed), then the other three logically follow as implications for studying international relations. However, each of the other three is also consistent with non-constructivist premises. For instance, one need not be a constructivist to study the origins of national interests, nor does finding that anarchy may differ across time and place necessarily mean that one is using a constructivist approach. This has helped to generate controversy over what is and is not constructivist research in international relations. The irreducible core of constructivism for international relations is the recognition that international reality is socially constructed. This has implications for the concept of anarchy, for the agent–structure relationship, and for national interests, but all three of these areas of research are also approachable through non constructivist means.

**Controversies within Constructivism.**

In defining constructivism in this way, widely diverse research falls within its scope. This includes work with major differences on issues such as the unit of analysis, the possibility of positivist paths to knowledge, and the nature of the international 6 On shared norms that govern inter-state war, see Price and Tannenwald (1996); Price (1998); Sands (2005). On humanitarian intervention, see Welsh (2002) system. In this section I highlight some of the controversies that arise over these issues and illustrate both the breadth of constructivist scholarship and the antagonisms it engenders among scholars.
State-Centrism

The constructivist approach does not imply any particular unit of analysis as fundamental in the study of international relations. As a result, it is compatible with a kind of pluralism about the unit that has been both productive and contentious among international relations scholars. The process of social construction cannot be understood by focusing exclusively on forces or actors at any of the three “levels of analysis” conventionally used in international relations theory (Waltz 1959; 1979). For any given puzzle in international relations, there are undoubtedly important elements of the answer to be found at all levels of analysis. In addition, one can examine how actors and structures at all levels of analysis are socially constructed. Constructivists have therefore provided interesting research on the constitution of individual state identity, on the making of meso-level norms and practices, and on the constitution of the international system (see, respectively, Lynch 1999; Reus-Smit 1999; Shannon 2000). The emphasis on forces or actors at one level over others may be defensible on pragmatic grounds given the interests of the particular scholar, but the co-constitution of actors and structures means there is no impetus in constructivism for a zero-sum debate over “which” level provides the most leverage over puzzles. There is no point in constructivist research to arguments over whether, for instance, domestic politics “matters” or not in international relations. There is, however, room for debate over what can be taken as given by assumption at the start of a piece of empirical research. For instance, to take states as given in order to study how their interactions are structured by and contribute to a particular set of international norms implies setting aside the (prior) social construction of the state as an institution. This is potentially problematic, since the historical construction of states as sovereign may well be an important element of any story about how states interact with norms. The analytic separation of actors, practices, and structures as distinct entities can be problematic, though it may sometimes be useful. The dilemma of
what to problematize and what to take as given is inherent in all research, and by
focusing on the complexities of mutual constitution the constructivist approach
encourages scholars to be open about what is lost by their particular choices and
assumptions. This at least makes possible debate over the tradeoffs implicit in
these choices.

**Science and Positivism**

The recognition of social construction in world politics leads directly into a
controversy over epistemology and the use of scientific methods in the field of
international relations. This divides constructivism into a positivist and a post
positivist camp, distinguished by their positions on epistemological questions and
the methods they believe are useful, given those epistemological positions.

Positivist epistemology maintains that the socially constructed international
system contains patterns that are amenable to generalization and to falsifiable
hypotheses. These patterns are the product of underlying laws that govern social
relations, where the laws can be identified by careful scientific research. While the
methods that are appropriate to study world politics may not be those of laboratory
science (for instance, controlled experiments with a strict separation between
observer and event), the ultimate goal of the social scientific project is the same
as for the physical sciences explaining cause-and-effect relationships that are
believed to exist independently of the observer's presence. Positivist
constructivists are careful to include constitutive explanations among the cause
effect relations they seek to understand, but they approach the study of social
constitution with the same tools of social science (e.g., Wendt 1999, 2000;
Finnemore 2003; Barnett 2005).

A competing view, represented by postpositivists, is that in social life data are not
fully objectifiable, observers cannot be fully autonomous of the subject under
study, and social relationships cannot be separated into discrete “causes” and
“effects.” What social “laws” a scholar might observe are, therefore, inherently
contingent rather than existing naturally and objectively in the world. As a result, according to David Campbell (2007, 209–10), social inquiry “has to be concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality, and the historicity of knowledge. This reaffirms the indispensability of interpretation, and suggests that all knowledge involves a relationship with power in its mapping of the world.” Claims to knowledge about world politics both reflect and act as structures of power, and there are no “Archimedean points from which to assess the validity of analytical and ethical knowledge claims” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 262). In this view, the purpose of theorizing is not to identify and test hypotheses about law like regularities. Instead, one objective for research is to interpret how social meaning and power produce the apparent stability in the social world (Devetak 2005, 169). The epistemological divide between positivists and postpositivists runs deep and may represent a decisive fissure among constructivists, and the matter is particularly sharp over the issue of ethics. (See Price, this volume.) For postpositivists, the ethical implications of international relations theory begin immediately once a scholar adopts or argues for an interpretative stance within which claims can be made. Without the positivist’s faith in an independently existing reality of world politics, the postpositivist is attentive from the start about the ethical consequences of the concepts and assumptions that frame the research. The positivist, by contrast, works from the assumption that he or she is insulated behind the claim that I am grateful to Elizabeth Shakman Hurd for her comments on this section. Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit (1998) argue for a middle position of “contingent generalizations.” On the capacity of international relations theory to constitute the international world, see Ashley (1986); Campbell (1998); Williams (2005) describing objectively existing relations makes ethical issues a separate question. For the positivist, the question of what “is” can be separated from what “ought.”
The post positivist position within constructivism is no less empirical (though not “empiricist” (Campbell 2007, 208–9)) than the positivist tradition. It is, however, empirical in a way that reflects the methods appropriate to its epistemology. For instance, Campbell’s study (1998, 13) of the Bosnian wars examines how: the settled norms of international society in particular, the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity—were not only insufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, they were complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself. This is because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the nationalist imaginary possible requires the expulsion from the resultant “domestic” space of all that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign, and dangerous. For Campbell, the Bosnian violence was exacerbated by outsiders’ insistence that there exists an underlying “law” of ethnic intolerance that counsels that the ethnic groups of Bosnia must be physically separated from each other. A more ethical response is possible, he suggests, by critiquing the assumption that individuals have unitary ethnic identities that map cleanly onto unitary territorial nation states.

**Anarchy or Authority**

Constructivists disagree among themselves on the nature of the international system. This is reflected in the debate over whether the system can be characterized as “anarchy.” Most constructivists have operated within what Ashley (1988) called the “anarchy problematique,” a position that they share with neoliberals and neorealists. This view acknowledges the existence of a formal condition of anarchy among states and makes anarchy a crucial element of the international structure. It sees hierarchy as the alternative to anarchy, where hierarchy refers to a system in which the units “stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination” (Waltz 1979, 81). On this level, constructivists often agree with the neorealists and neoliberals that anarchy is the fundamental organizing principle of the international system, even though they
may disagree with their claims about the implications of that condition for state behavior (Cronin 1999, for instance, argues that there is “community under anarchy”). They argue that the social construction of cultural content within an anarchic system produces variation in the structural constraints and opportunities for units and therefore leads to variation in outcomes and in the patterns of state behavior. As a formal condition, anarchy remains. However, constructivism also opens the possibility that changes in the social relations among states could transform the anarchical system into something that is not anarchic (Wendt 1999, 307–8). The key concept here is authority. Authority refers to a relation of legitimated power (Ruggie 1998, 65; Barnett and Finnemore 2004, ch. 1; Hurd 2007b). It creates a social hierarchy within which subordinates feel an obligation to follow the directives of the authoritative rule or actor. Authority and anarchy are therefore mutually exclusive. While some constructivists have remained within the anarchy problematique, others have found empirical evidence of the existence of institutions of legitimated power. International authority can be found in international organizations, in firms, and in practices such as international law. It exists in both public and private institutions. Public forms might include the UN Secretary-General (Barnett 2001), the UN Security Council (Hurd 2007b), the discourses of international law (Johnstone 2005), and norms on legitimate intervention (Finnemore 2003). Private forms include the legitimated power of firms and institutions in international markets (Sinclair 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2003). In settings where states recognize a rule, institution, or actor as having the right to make authoritative decisions on their behalf, we must recognize that authority rather than anarchy exists. Just as the epistemological disagreement among constructivists over positivism may create a fundamental disjuncture between two world views, the controversy over the existence of anarchy defines two camps. The presence or absence of authority divides constructivists between a “conventional” strand, which shares the anarchy problematique with neorealists
and neoliberals, and a “post-anarchy” strand that rejects the anarchist view on empirical grounds. The disagreement is basically empirical—that is, it is over whether authority exists or not and so it might be more amenable to resolution than is the epistemological divide that separates positivists and postpositivists (see Hurd forthcoming on the possibility of empirical “tests” of international authority). The conventional view allows that the content of anarchy might change (due to coordinating institutions, a shared culture, or other factors) but the basic structural condition of anarchy as the foundation of the international system does not. By contrast, the “post-anarchy” view is a fundamental challenge to the shared premise that anarchy is the continuing basis for international politics, and it has affinity with the English School, which has always been more attached to the image of an “international society” than international anarchy (see, e.g., Clark 2005).

**Continuing Challenges in International Relations Theory**

The rise of the constructivist approach has encouraged new strands of empirical and philosophical research in international relations, and has led to interesting problems at the boundary between constructivism and other approaches. Two strands of research, on the relations between strategic behavior and international norms and between rationalism and constructivism, serve as examples of promising research in constructivist international relations theory.

**Strategic Behaviour and Norms**

It is a mistake to characterize constructivism as focused on norms as opposed to neorealism and neoliberalism, which are alleged to be focused on power and interests. This is a common trope, and it is highly misleading. It obscures what is perhaps the most interesting and challenging puzzle in international relations theory disentangling the relationship between strategic actors and social/normative influences. Most constructivists agree that states act in the pursuit of what they see as their interests, and all are as concerned with
“power and interest” as are realists (and liberals). What differentiate these approaches are the sources that they identify for state interests, and the content of those interests. There is no reason that the study of international norms by constructivists is inherently mutually exclusive with the study of strategic behavior. The social construction of actors may well create instrumental, goal-seeking agents who pursue their goals in part by comparing costs and benefits, and their behavior cannot be understood apart from that process of construction. In other words, it is a mistake to separate the study of the logic of consequences from the logic of appropriateness (cf. March and Olsen 1998).

The more strictly that separation is enforced, the less insightful is the empirical research that can result. This conclusion is the logical consequence of my opening definitions, where I suggested that materialism, rather than rationalism, should be seen as the opposite of constructivism. Constructivism generally agrees with rationalists that states perceive some needs and interests and they act in order to satisfy them. To this, constructivism adds two things: an interest in explaining how state needs and interests come to be, and the possibility that different constructions of states could lead to radically different types of states and patterns of state behavior. Constructivism problematizes states and their interests and identities, but it has no problem accepting that states generally pursue “interests.” It is with materialism that constructivism has the more fundamental disagreement there is a clear distinction between the position that actors respond directly to material incentives and the view that meaning and interpretation necessarily mediate between material forces and Mearsheimer (1995, 86) identifies “power and interest” as variables associated exclusively with realist theory, so that when others make reference to them he concludes that they have become realists. Fred Halliday (2005, 32–3) says that constructivist scholars “run the risk of ignoring interests and material factors, let alone old-fashioned deception and self-delusion.” Michael Barnett (2005), by contrast, sees rationalism
as the opposite of constructivism. Social actors Behavior is motivated, and is studied, only through lenses acquired in and through social interaction.

**Constructivism and Rationalism**

The relationship between strategic behavior and international norms raises more general questions about the relationship between constructivism and rationalism, and this theme has recently received a great deal of attention. At issue are questions including whether the two stand as competitors to each other or complements, the nature of the disagreement between them, and the useful scope of each. The two approaches are often presented as competitors to each other. There are two versions of this claim. One suggests that rationalism and constructivism predict different behaviors from states and these differences should be measurable and testable. Jeffrey Lewis (2003) takes this approach to studying EU decision-making and he performs his “test” by assuming that strategic, instrumental behavior by states is evidence in favor of rationalism, while evidence of norm internalization supports constructivism. He treats the two as mutually exclusive and zero sum. The second version of the competitive relation argues that rationalism and constructivism are based on ontological commitments that are irreconcilable. These might be about holism or individualism, inherent or constructed rationality, or social construction versus essentialism. To the extent that these are fundamental commitments about what world politics is made of, they are unbridgeable. There are also at least two versions of the claim that rationalism and constructivism are complementary to each other.

One version sees the two as asking different questions about international relations and therefore as being fundamentally uninvolved with each other. This view suggests a division of labor in which constructivism is suited to answering questions about how actors acquire their interests and identities and rationalism specializes in explaining the pursuit of interests by already constituted actors. Sterling-Folker (2000, 97; cf. March and Olsen 1998), for instance, argues that
rationalist institutionalism seeks to explain “short-term behavioral cooperation in the moment,” while constructivism aims to explain “its development into communal cooperation in the future.” In her view, the two cannot be competitors over the same turf, because they are targeted at distinct questions. This approach presumes that the real world contains separable realms that are amenable to each approach and that the two realms do not overlap. Conflicts between the two are therefore avoidable as long as the boundary between the two realms is respected. A second version sees the two as providing different views on the shared questions. Duncan Snidal and Alexander Thompson (2002, 200), for instance, examine the ways in which international institutions constrain states and, finding both rationalism and constructivism useful, conclude that the two “provide different lenses through which to view the same empirical phenomena and outcomes.” On this view, the two are relevant to the same subject matter, but their different emphases allow, when combined, for greater insight into a problem than is provided by each alone. The relationship between rationalism and constructivism is ultimately an artefact of one’s definition of the two approaches.

Defining either one requires also defining the other, and so the relation between them is epiphenomenal of these definitions. By categorizing constructivism as a research agenda concerned with the social construction of actors, structures, and practices in international relations, I presume from the start that there are some kinds of research that are inaccessible to rationalist methods and assumptions, and this automatically brings up aspects of the complementary view. I am therefore skeptical of the competitive versions of the constructivism–rationalism distinction. The competitive empirical tests proposed by Lewis are undermined by the fact that the behavioral distinctions between the two are extremely faint. My definition of constructivism does not support the view that strategic behavior by states is evidence for the rationalist view and against the constructivist view. As James Fearon and Wendt (2002) suggest, there may be no
measurable variables in behavior that neatly differentiate the two approaches. A more substantive gap exists over the ontological questions regarding the nature of international actors and forces. A theory of ontology is unavoidable, not optional, and disagreements about ontology are real, profound, and consequential (Wight 2006). They might also, however, be best approached by setting against each other the research that follows from different ontological positions, rather than arguing for or against a theory of ontology in the abstract. It is the consequences (both ethical and analytical) of different ontological assumptions that are worth arguing about. Therefore, while there are indeed competing ontological positions between constructivists and others in international relations, the productive way forward would seem to be to assess the insights they generate when applied in research rather than compare them directly. This supports in practice the pluralism in research methods encouraged by the complementary views above, though it does not give up on the possibility that there are underlying differences in ontology between rationalism and constructivism.

Conclusion

To be a constructivist in international relations means looking at international relations with an eye open to the social construction of actors, institutions, and events. It means beginning from the assumption that how people and states think and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they participate. It should be clear, therefore, what constructivism is not: it does not mean setting aside the ideas that material power is important or that actors make instrumental calculations of their interests; nor does it necessarily assume the a priori existence of sovereign states, epistemological positivism, or the anarchy problematique.
Rather, it means that what goes on in these categories and concepts is constructed by social processes and interactions, and that their relevance for international relations is a function of the social construction of meaning. One sign of constructivism’s success in the past twenty years is the degree to which other approaches have come to recognize the socially constructed content of some of the concepts they use. The goods of realist competition, for instance, include status, prestige, reputation, and hegemony, all of which make sense only in terms of either legitimated power or shared understandings. They are, therefore, the stuff of constructivism as well. This has had the result of blurring the boundaries between the approaches, making them hard to define in exclusive terms, and raising the possibility that to attempt to define them creates artificial distinctions. The differences between realism, rationalism, and constructivism may be contested, but we move forward in arguing about them only by first being clear what we mean by the terms.
Critical Theory

Origins of critical theory

Critical theory has its roots in a strand of thought which is often traced back to the Enlightenment and connected to the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx. While this is an important lineage in the birth of critical theory it is not the only possible one that can be traced, as there is also the imprint of classical Greek thought on autonomy and democracy to be considered, as well as the thinking of Nietzsche and Weber. However, in the twentieth century critical theory became most closely associated with a distinct body of thought known as the Frankfurt School (Jay 1973; Wyn Jones 2001). It is in the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal and, more recently, Jürgen Habermas that critical theory acquired a renewed potency and in which the term critical theory came to be used as the emblem of a philosophy which questions modern social and political life through a method of immanent critique. It was largely an attempt to recover a critical and emancipator potential that had been overrun by recent intellectual, social, cultural, political, economic and technological trends.

Essential to the Frankfurt School’s critical theory was a concern to comprehend the central features of contemporary society by understanding its historical and social development, and tracing contradictions in the present which may open up the possibility of transcending contemporary society and its built-in pathologies and forms of domination. Critical theory intended ‘not simply to eliminate one or other abuse’, but to analyse the underlying social structures which result in these abuses with the intention of overcoming them (Horkheimer 1972: 206). It is not difficult to notice the presence here of the theme advanced by
Marx in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it’ (Marx 1977a: 158).

This normative interest in identifying immanent possibilities for social transformation is a defining characteristic of a line of thought which extends, at least, from Kant, through Marx, to contemporary critical theorists such as Habermas. This intention to analyse the possibilities of realizing emancipation in the modern world entailed critical analyses of both obstructions to, and immanent tendencies towards, ‘the rational organization of human activity’ (Horkheimer 1972: 223). Indeed, this concern extends the line of thought back beyond Kant to the classical Greek conviction that the rational constitution of the polis finds its expression in individual autonomy and the establishment of justice and democracy. Politics, on this understanding, is the realm concerned with realizing the just life.

There is, however, an important difference between critical theory and the Greeks which relates to the conditions under which knowledge claims can be made regarding social and political life. There are two points worth recalling in this regard: firstly, the Kantian point that reflection on the limits of what we can know is a fundamental part of Critical Theory theorizing and, secondly, a Hegelian and Marxian point that knowledge is always, and irreducibly, conditioned by historical and material contexts; in Mark Rupert’s words (2003: 186), it is always ‘situated knowledge’. Since critical theory takes society itself as its object of analysis, and since theories and acts of theorizing are never independent of society, critical theory’s scope of analysis must necessarily include reflection on theory. In short, critical theory must be self-reflective; it must include an account of its own genesis and application in society. By drawing attention to the relationship between knowledge and society, which is so frequently excluded from mainstream theoretical analysis, critical theory recognizes the political nature of knowledge claims. It was on the basis of
this recognition that Horkheimer distinguished between two conceptions of theory, which he referred to as ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ theories.

Traditional conceptions of theory picture the theorist at a remove from the object of analysis. By analogy with the natural sciences, they claim that subject and object must be strictly separated in order to theorize properly. Traditional conceptions of theory assume there is an external world ‘out there’ to study, and that an inquiring subject can study this world in a balanced and objective manner by withdrawing from the world it investigates, and leaving behind any ideological beliefs, values, or opinions which would invalidate the inquiry. To qualify as theory it must at least be value-free. On this view, theory is possible only on condition that an inquiring subject can withdraw from the world it studies (and in which it exists) and rid itself of all biases. This contrasts with critical conceptions that deny the possibility of value-free social analysis. By recognizing that theories are always embedded in social and political life, critical conceptions of theory allow for an examination of the purposes and functions served by particular theories.

However, while such conceptions of theory recognize the unavoidability of taking their orientation from the social context in which they are situated, their guiding interest is one of emancipation from, rather than legitimation and consolidation of, existing social forms. The purpose underlying critical, as opposed to traditional, conceptions of theory is to improve human existence by abolishing injustice (Horkheimer 1972). As articulated by Horkheimer (1972: 215), this conception of theory does not simply present an expression of the ‘concrete historical situation’, it also acts as ‘a force within [that situation] to stimulate change’. It allows for the intervention of humans in the making of their history. It should be noted that while critical theory has not directly addressed the international level, this in no way implies that international relations is beyond the limits of its concern. The writings of Kant and Marx, in particular, have demonstrated that what happens at the international level is of immense
significance to the achievement of universal emancipation. It is the continuation of this project in which critical international theory is engaged.

The Frankfurt School, however, never addressed international relations in its critiques of the modern world, and Habermas has made only scant reference to it until recently (see Habermas 1998, 2003; Habermas and Derrida 2003). The main tendency of critical theory is to take individual society as the focus and to neglect the dimension of relations between and across societies. For critical international theory, however, the task is to extend the trajectory of Frankfurt School critical theory beyond the domestic realm to the international or, more accurately, global realm. It makes a case for a theory of world politics which is ‘committed to the emancipation of the species’ (Linklater 1990a: 8). Such a theory would no longer be confined to an individual state or society, but would examine relations between and across them and reflect on the possibility of extending the rational, just and democratic organization of political society across the globe (Neufeld 1995: Chapter 1; Shapcott 2001).

To summarize, critical theory draws upon various strands of Western social, political and philosophical thought in order to erect a theoretical framework capable of reflecting on the nature and purposes of theory and revealing both obvious and subtle forms of injustice and domination in society. Critical theory not only challenges and dismantles traditional forms of theorizing; it also problematizes and seeks to dismantle entrenched forms of social life that constrain human freedom. Critical international theory is an extension of this critique to the international domain. The next part of the chapter focuses on the attempt by critical international theorists to dismantle traditional forms of theorizing by promoting more self-reflective theory.

The politics of knowledge in International Relations theory
It was not until the 1980s, and the onset of the so-called ‘third debate’, that questions relating to the politics of knowledge would be taken seriously in the study of international relations. Epistemological questions regarding the justification and verification of knowledge claims, the methodology applied and the scope and purpose of inquiry, and ontological questions regarding the nature of the social actors and other historical formations and structures in international relations, all carry normative implications that had been inadequately addressed. One of the important contributions of critical international theory has been to widen the object domain of International Relations, not just to include epistemological and ontological assumptions, but to explicate their connection to prior political commitments.

This section outlines the way in which critical theory brings knowledge claims in International Relations under critical scrutiny. Firstly, it considers the question of epistemology by describing how Horkheimer’s distinction between traditional and critical conceptions of theory has been taken up in International Relations; and secondly, it elaborates the connection between critical theory and emancipatory theory. The result of this scrutinizing is to reveal the role of political interests in knowledge formation. As Robert Cox (1981) succinctly and famously said, ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’. As a consequence, critical international theorists reject the idea that theoretical knowledge is neutral or non-political. Whereas traditional theories would tend to see power and interests as a posteriori factors affecting outcomes in interactions between political actors in the sphere of international relations, critical international theorists insist that they are by no means absent in the formation and verification of knowledge claims. Indeed, they are a priori factors affecting the production of knowledge, hence Kimberly Hutchings’ (1999: 69) assertion that ‘International Relations theory is not only about politics, it also is itself political’.

Problem-solving and critical theories
In his pioneering 1981 article, Robert Cox followed Horkheimer by distinguishing critical theory from traditional theory – or, as Cox prefers to call it, problem-solving theory. Problem-solving or traditional theories are marked by two main characteristics: first by a positivist methodology; second, by a tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures. Heavily influenced by the methodologies of the natural sciences, problem-solving theories suppose that positivism provides the only legitimate basis of knowledge. Positivism is seen, as Steve Smith (1996: 13) remarks, as the ‘gold standard’ against which other theories are evaluated.

There are many different characteristics that can be identified with positivism, but two are particularly relevant to our discussion. First positivists assume that facts and values can be separated; secondly, that it is possible to separate subject and object. This results in the view not only that an objective world exists independently of human consciousness, but that objective knowledge of social reality is possible insofar as values are expunged from analysis.

Problem-solving theory, as Cox (1981: 128) defines it, ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. It does not question the present order, but has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. Its general aim, says Cox (1981: 129), is to make the existing order ‘work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’. Neo-realism, qua problem-solving theory, takes seriously the realist dictum to work with, rather than against, prevailing international forces. By working within the given system it has a stabilizing effect, tending to preserve the existing global structure of social and political relations. Cox points out that neo-liberal institutionalism also partake of problem-solving. Its objective, as explained by its foremost exponent, is to ‘facilitate the smooth operation of decentralized international political systems’ (Keohane 1984: 63). Situating itself between the states-system and the liberal
capitalist global economy, neo-liberalism’s main concern is to ensure that the two systems function smoothly in their coexistence. It seeks to render the two global systems compatible and stable by diffusing any conflicts, tensions, or crises that might arise between them (Cox 1992b: 173).

As James Bohman (2002: 506) says, such an approach ‘models the social scientist on the engineer, who masterfully chooses the optimal solution to a problem of design’. In summary, traditional conceptions of theory tend to work in favour of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order and their accompanying inequalities of power and wealth. The main point that Cox wishes to make about problem-solving theory is that its failure to reflect on the prior framework within which it theorizes means that it tends to operate in favour of prevailing ideological priorities. Its claims to value-neutrality notwithstanding, problem-solving theory are plainly ‘value-bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework’ (Cox 1981: 130). As a consequence, it remains oblivious to the way power and interests precede and shape knowledge claims.

By contrast, critical international theory starts from the conviction that because cognitive processes themselves are contextually situated and therefore subject to political interests, they ought to be critically evaluated. Theories of international relations, like any knowledge, necessarily are conditioned by social, cultural and ideological influence, and one of the main tasks of critical theory is to reveal the effect of this conditioning. As Richard Ashley (1981: 207) asserts, ‘knowledge is always constituted in reflection of interests’, so critical theory must bring to consciousness latent interests, commitments, or values that give rise to, and orient, any theory. We must concede therefore that the study of international relations ‘is, and always has been, unavoidably normative’ (Neufeld 1995: 108), despite claims to the contrary.

Because critical international theory sees an intimate connection between social life and cognitive processes, it rejects the positivist distinctions between fact
and value, object and subject. By ruling out the possibility of objective knowledge, critical international theory seeks to promote greater ‘theoretical reflexivity’ (1995: Chapter 3). Cox (1992a: 59) expresses this reflexivity in terms of a double process: the first is ‘self-consciousness of one’s own historical time and place which determines the questions that claim attention’, the second is ‘the effort to understand the historical dynamics that brought about the conditions in which these questions arose’. Similarly, Bohman (2002: 503) advocates a form of theoretical reflexivity based on the ‘perspective of a critical-reflective participant’.

By adopting these reflexive attitudes critical theory is more like a meta-theoretical attempt to examine how theories are situated in prevailing social and political orders, how this situations impacts on theorizing, and, most importantly, the possibilities for theorizing in a manner that challenges the injustices and inequalities built into the prevailing world order. Critical theory’s relation to the prevailing order needs to be explained with some care. For although it refuses to take the prevailing order as it finds it, critical theory does not simply ignore it. It accepts that humans do not make history under conditions of their own choosing, as Marx observed in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1977e), and so a detailed examination of present conditions must necessarily be undertaken. Nevertheless, the order which has been ‘given’ to us is by no means natural, necessary or historically invariable. Critical international theory takes the global configuration of power relations as its object and asks how that configuration came about, what costs it brings with it and what alternative possibilities remain immanent in history.

Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatism it finds in traditional modes of theorizing. This critique reveals the unexamined assumptions that guide traditional modes of thought, and exposes the complicity of traditional modes of thought in prevailing political and social conditions. To break with dogmatic modes of thought is to ‘denaturalize’
the present, as Karin Fierke (1998: 13) puts it, to make us ‘look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar’. The knowledge critical international theory generates is not neutral; it is politically and ethically charged by an interest in social and political transformation. It criticizes and debunks theories that legitimate the prevailing order and affirms progressive alternatives that promote emancipation.

This immediately raises the question of how ethical judgements about the prevailing world order can be formed. Since there are no objective theoretical frameworks there can be no Archimedean standpoint outside history or society from which to engage in ethical criticism or judgement. It is not a matter of drafting a set of moral ideals and using them as a transcendent benchmark to judge forms of political organization. There is no utopia to compare to facts. This means that critical international theory must employ the method of immanent critique rather than abstract ethics to criticize the present order of things (Linklater 1990b: 22–3). The task, therefore, is to ‘start from where we are’, in Rorty’s words (quoted in Linklater 1998: 77), and excavate the principles and values that structure our political society, exposing the contradictions or inconsistencies in the way our society is organized to pursue its espoused values. This point is endorsed by several other critical international theorists, especially Kimberly Hutchings, whose version of critical international theory is heavily influenced by Hegel’s phenomenological version of immanent critique. Immanent critique is undertaken ‘without reference to an independently articulated method or to transcendent criteria’ (Hutchings 1999: 99).

Following Hegel’s advice, critical international theory must acknowledge that the resources for criticizing and judging can be found only ‘immanently’, that is, in the already existing political societies from where the critique is launched. The critical resources brought to bear do not fall from the sky, they issue from the historical development of concrete legal and political institutions. The task of the
political theorist is therefore to explain and criticize the present political order in terms of the principles presupposed by and embedded in its own legal, political and cultural practices and institutions (Fierke 1998: 114; Hutchings 1999: 102). Fiona Robinson (1999) similarly argues that ethics should not be conceived as separate from the theories and practices of international relations, but should instead be seen as embedded in them. In agreement with Hutchings she argues for a ‘phenomenology of ethical life’ rather than an ‘abstract ethics about the application of rules’ (Robinson 1999: 31).

On her account of a ‘global ethics of care’, however, it is necessary also to submit the background assumptions of already existing moral and political discourses to critical scrutiny.

Hutchings and Robinson agree with Linklater that any critical international theory must employ a mode of immanent critique. This means that the theorist must engage critically with the background normative assumptions that structure our ethical judgements in an effort to generate a more coherent fit between modes of thought and forms of political organization, and without relying on a set of abstract ethical principles. Critical theory’s task as an emancipatory theory if problem-solving theories adopt a positivist methodology and end up reaffirming the prevailing system, critical theories are informed by the traditions of hermeneutics and Ideologiekritik. Critical international theory is not concerned only with understanding and explaining the existing realities of world politics, it also intends to criticize in order to transform them. It is an attempt to comprehend essential social processes for the purpose of inaugurating change, or at least knowing whether change is possible. In Hoffman’s words (1987: 233), it is ‘not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions’. Neufeld (1995: Chapter 5) also affirms this view of critical theory. It offers, he says, a form of social criticism that supports practical political activity aimed at societal transformation.
Critical theory’s emancipatory interest is concerned with ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’ (Ashley 1981: 227). This plainly contrasts with problemsolving theories which tend to accept what Linklater (1997) calls the ‘immutability theses.

Critical theory is committed to extending the rational, just and democratic organization of political life beyond the level of the state to the whole of humanity. The conception of emancipation promoted by critical international theory is largely derived from a strand of thought which finds its origin in the Enlightenment project. This project was generally concerned with breaking with past forms of injustice to foster the conditions necessary for universal freedom (Devetak 1995b). To begin with, emancipation, as understood by Enlightenment thinkers and critical international theorists, generally expresses a negative conception of freedom which consists in the removal of unnecessary, socially created constraints. This understanding is manifest in Booth’s (1991b: 539) definition of emancipation as ‘freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do’. The emphasis in this understanding is on dislodging those impediments or impositions which unnecessarily curtail individual or collective freedom. More substantively, Ashley (1981: 227) defines emancipation as the securing of ‘freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their own future through full will and consciousness’.

The common thrust of these understandings is that emancipation implies a quest for autonomy. ‘To be free’, says LinklaterRichard Devetak 1990a: 135), is ‘to be self-determining or to have the capacity to initiate action. The objective of critical international theory therefore is to extend the human capacity for self-determination’ (Linklater 1990b: 10). In Linklater’s account of critical international
theory two thinkers are integral: Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx. Kant's approach is instructive because it seeks to incorporate the themes of power, order and emancipation (Linklater 1990b: 21–2). As expressed by Linklater (1992b: 36), Kant ‘considered the possibility that state power would be tamed by principles of international order and that, in time, international order would be modified until it conformed with principles of cosmopolitan justice’. Kant's theory of international relations is an early attempt to map out a critical international theory by absorbing the insights and criticizing the weaknesses in realist and rationalist thought under an interest in universal freedom and justice. While Linklater believes Marx's approach to be too narrow in its focus on class-based exclusion, he thinks it nevertheless provides the basis of a social theory on which critical international theory must build.

As Linklater observed (1990a: 159), both Marx and Kant share ‘the desire for a universal society of free individuals, a universal kingdom of ends’. Both held strong attachments to the Enlightenment themes of freedom and universalism, and both launched strong critiques of particularistic life-forms with the intention of expanding moral and political community. To conclude this part of the chapter, critical international theory makes a strong case for paying closer attention to the relations between knowledge and interests. One of critical international theory’s main contributions in this regard is to expose the political nature of knowledge formation.

**Rethinking political community**

Informing critical international theory is the spirit, if not the letter, of Marx's critique of capitalism. Like Marx, critical international theorists seek to expose and critically analyse the sources of inequality and domination that shape global power relations with the intention of eliminating them. Since the mid-1990s one of the core themes that has
grown out of critical international theory is the need to develop more sophisticated understandings of community as a means of identifying and eliminating global constraints on humanity’s potential for freedom, equality and self-determination (Linklater 1990b: 7).

Linklater’s approach to this task, which has set the agenda, is first to analyse the way in which inequality and domination flow from modes of political community tied to the sovereign state, and secondly to consider alternative forms of political community which promote human emancipation. This section elaborates three dimensions on which critical international theory rethinks political community (see Linklater 1992a: 92–7). The first dimension is normative, and pertains to the philosophical critique of the state as an exclusionary form of political organization. The second is sociological, and relates to the need to develop an account of the origins and evolution of the modern state and states-system. The third is the praxeological dimension concerning practical possibilities for reconstructing International Relations along more emancipatory and cosmopolitan lines. The overall effect of critical international theory, and its major contribution to the study of International Relations, is to focus on the normative foundations of political life. The normative dimension: the critique of ethical particularise and social exclusion one of the key philosophical assumptions that has structured political and ethical thought and practice about international relations is the idea that the modern state is the natural form of political community.

The sovereign state has been ‘fetishized’, to use Marx’s term, as the normal mode of organizing political life. Critical international theorists, however, wish to problematize this fetishization and draw attention to the ‘moral deficits’ that are created by the state’s interaction with the capitalist world economy. In this section, I outline critical international theory’s philosophical inquiry into the normative bases of political life and its critique of ethical particularism and the social
exclusion it generates. The philosophical critique of particularism was first, and most systematically, set out in Andrew Linklater’s *Men and Citizens* (1990a). His main concern there was to trace how modern political thought had constantly differentiated ethical obligations due to co-citizens from those due to the rest of humanity. In practice, this tension between ‘men’ and ‘citizens’ has always been resolved in favour of citizens – or, more accurately, members of a particular sovereign state. Even if it was acknowledged, as it was by most early modern thinkers, that certain universal rights were thought to extend to all members of the human community, they were always residual and secondary to particularistic ones. *Men and Citizens* is, among other things, a work of recovery. It seeks to recover a political philosophy based on universal ethical reasoning which has been progressively marginalized in the twentieth century, especially with the onset of the Cold War and the hegemony of realism.

That is, it seeks to recover and reformulate the Stoic–Christian ideal of human community. While elements of this ideal can be found in the natural law tradition, it is to the Enlightenment tradition that Linklater turns to find a fuller expression of this ideal. Linklater here is strongly influenced by the thought of Kant, for whom war was undeniably related to the separation of humankind into separate, self-regarding political units, Rousseau, who caustically remarked that in joining a particular community individual citizens necessarily made themselves enemies of the rest of humanity, and Marx who saw in the modern state a contradiction between general and private interests. The point being made here is that particularistic political associations lead to inter-societal estrangement, the perpetual possibility of war and social exclusion.

This type of argument underlies the thought of several Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century, including Montesquieu, Rousseau, Paine and Kant among others, for whom war was simply an expression of *ancien régime* politics and a tool of state. Marx extended the critique of the modern state by
arguing that, in upholding the rule of law, private property and money, it masks capitalism’s alienation and exploitation behind bourgeois ideals of freedom and equality. Marx, of course, viewed the separation of politics and economics as a liberal illusion created to mask capitalism’s power relations. In Rupert’s words (2003: 182), one of Marx’s enduring insights is ‘that the seemingly a political economic spaces generated by capitalism within and across juridical states are permeated by structured relations of social power deeply consequential for political life’. From this Marxian perspective, modern international relations, insofar as it combines the political system of sovereign states and the economic system of market capitalism, is a form of exclusion where particular class interests parade themselves as universal. The problem with the sovereign state therefore is that as a ‘limited moral community’ it promotes exclusion, generating estrangement, injustice, insecurity and violent conflict between self-regarding states by imposing rigid boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Cox 1981: 137, Linklater 1990a: 28). Such arguments have led in recent times, and especially in a century which saw unprecedented flows of stateless peoples and refugees, to more general and profound questions about the foundations on which humanity is politically divided and organized. In particular, as Kimberly Hutchings (1999: 125) notes, it has led critical international theory to a ‘questioning of the nation-state as a normatively desirable mode of political organisation’. Consistent with other critical international theorists Hutchings (1999: 122, 135) problematizes the ‘idealised fixed ontologies’ of nation and state as subjects of self-determination.

Hutchings goes further than Linklater, however, by also problematizing the individual ‘self’ of liberalism. Her intention is to examine the status of all normative claims to self-determination, whether the ‘self’ is understood as the individual, nation, or state. But insofar as her critique is aimed at placing the ‘self’ in question as a self-contained entity, Hutchings’ analysis complements and extends the philosophical critique of particularism undertaken by Linklater. Richard Shapcott
(2000b, 2001) also continues this critique by inquiring into the way different conceptions of the ‘self’ shape relations to ‘others’ in international relations. Shapcott’s main concern is with the possibility of achieving justice in a culturally diverse world. Although the main influences on his argument are Tzvetan Todorov and Hans-Georg Gadamer rather than Habermas, Shapcott’s critique of the self is consistent with Linklater’s and Hutchings’.

He rejects both liberal and communitarian conceptions of the self for foreclosing genuine communication and justice in the relationship between self and other. Liberal conceptions of the self, he says, involve a ‘significant moment of assimilation’ because they are incapable of properly recognizing difference (2000b: 216). Communitarians, on the other hand, tend to take the limits of political community as given and, as a consequence, refuse to grant outsiders or non-citizens an equal voice in moral conversations. In other words, ‘liberals underestimate the moral significance of national differences, while communitarians overestimate them. Both, in short, fail to do justice to difference’ (Shapcott 2001: Chapter 1). The common project of Hutchings, Linklater and Shapcott here is to question the boundedness of identity. A less dogmatic attitude towards national boundaries is called for by these critical international theorists, as national boundaries are recognized as ‘neither morally decisive nor morally insignificant’ (Linklater 1998: 61). They are perhaps unavoidable in some form. The point, however, is to ensure that national boundaries do not obstruct principles of openness, recognition and justice in relations with the ‘other’ (Linklater 1998: Chapter 2; Hutchings 1999: 138; Shapcott 2000a: 111).

Critical international theory has highlighted the dangers of unchecked particularism which can too readily deprive ‘outsiders’ of certain rights. This philosophical critique of particularism has led critical international theory to criticize the sovereign state as one of the foremost modern forms of social exclusion and therefore as a considerable barrier to universal justice and
emancipation. In the following section we outline critical international theory’s sociological account of how the modern state came to structure political community. The sociological dimension: states, social forces and changing world orders Rejecting realist claims that the condition of anarchy and the self-regarding actions of states are natural or immutable, critical international theory has always been a form of small-‘c’ constructivism. One of its essential tasks is therefore to account for the social and historical production of both the agents and structures taken for granted by traditional theories. Against the positivism and empiricism of various forms of realism, critical international theory adopts a more hermeneutic approach, which conceives of social structures as having an intersubjective existence. ‘Structures are socially constructed’ that is, says Cox (1992a: 138), ‘they become a part of the objective world by virtue of their existence in the inter-subjectivity of relevant groups of people’.

Allowing for the active role of human minds in the constitution of the social world does not lead to a denial of material reality; it simply gives it a different ontological status. Although structures, as intersubjective products, do not have a physical existence like tables or chairs, they nevertheless have real, concrete effects (1992b: 133). Structures produce concrete effects because humans act as if they were real (Cox 1986: 242). It is this view of ontology which underlies Cox’s and critical international theory’s attempts to comprehend the present order. In contrast to individualist ontologies which conceive of states as atomistic, rational and possessive, and as if their identities existed prior to or independently of social interaction (Reus-Smit 1996: 100), critical international theory is more interested in explaining how both individual actors and social structures emerge in, and are conditioned by, history. For example, against the Westphalian dogma that the state is a state is a state (Cox 1981: 127), critical international theory views the modern state as a distinctive form of political community, bringing with it particular functions, roles, and responsibilities that are socially and historically determined.
Whereas the state is taken for granted by realism, critical international theory seeks to provide a social theory of the state. Crucial to critical international theory’s argument is that we must account for the development of the modern state as the dominant form of political community in modernity. What is therefore required is an account of how states construct their moral and legal duties and how these reflect certain assumptions about the structure and logic of international relations. Using the work of Michael Mann and Anthony Giddens in particular, Linklater (1998: Chapters 4–5) undertakes what he calls an historical sociology of ‘bounded communities’. Linklater’s *Beyond Realism and Marxism* (1990b) had already begun to analyse the interplay of different logics or rationalization processes in the making of modern world politics. But in *Transformation of Political Community* (1998), he carries this analysis further by providing a more detailed account of these processes and by linking them more closely to systems of inclusion and exclusion in the development of the modern state. His argument is that the boundaries of political community are shaped by the interplay of four rationalization processes: state-building, geopolitical rivalry, capitalist industrialization and moral practical learning (Linklater 1998: 147–57).

Five monopoly powers are acquired by the modern state through these rationalization processes. These powers, which are claimed by the sovereign state as indivisible, inalienable and exclusive rights, are: the right to monopolize the legitimate means of violence over the claimed territory, the exclusive right to tax within this territorial jurisdiction, the right to demand undivided political allegiance, the sole authority to adjudicate disputes between citizens and the sole subject of rights and representation in international law (1998: 28–9). The combining of these monopoly powers initiated what Linklater refers to as the ‘totalizing project’ of the modern, Westphalian state. The upshot was to produce a conception of politics governed by the assumption that the boundaries of
sovereignty, territory, nationality and citizenship must be coterminous (1998: 29, 44).

The modern state concentrated these social, economic, legal and political functions around a single, sovereign site of governance that became the primary subject of international relations by gradually removing alternatives. Of crucial concern to Linklater is how this totalizing project of the modern state modifies the social bond and consequently changes the boundaries of moral and political community. Though the state has been a central theme in the study of international relations there has been little attempt to account for the changing ways that states determine principles which, by binding citizens into a community, separate them from the rest of the world. Linklater’s focus on the changing nature of social bonds has much in common with Cox’s (1999) focus on the changing relationship between state and civil society. The key to rethinking International Relations, according to Cox, lies in examining the relationship between state and civil society, and thereby recognizing that the state takes different forms, not only in different historical periods, but also within the same period. Lest it be thought that critical international theory is simply interested in producing a theory of the state alone, it should be remembered that the state is but one force which shapes the present world order. Cox (1981: 137–8) argues that a comprehensive understanding of the present order and its structural characteristics must account for the interaction between social forces, states and world orders. Within Cox’s approach the state plays an ‘intermediate though autonomous role’ between, on the one hand, social forces shaped by production, and on the other, a world order which embodies a particular configuration of power determined by the states-system and the world economy (1981: 141).

There are two fundamental and intertwined presuppositions upon which Cox founds his theory of the state. The first reflects the Marxist–Gramscian axiom that ‘World orders … are grounded in social relations’ (Cox 1983: 173). This
means that observable changes in military and geo-political balances can be traced to fundamental changes in the relationship between capital and labour. The second presupposition stems from Vico’s argument that institutions such as the state are historical products. The state cannot be abstracted from history as if its essence could be defined or understood as prior to history (Cox 1981: 133). The end result is that the definition of the state is enlarged to encompass ‘the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society’ (Cox 1983: 164). The influence of the church, press, education system, culture and so on, has to be incorporated into an analysis of the state, as these ‘institutions’ help to produce the attitudes, dispositions and behaviours consistent with, and conducive to, the state’s arrangement of power relations in society.

Thus the state, which comprises the machinery of government, plus civil society, constitutes and reflect the ‘hegemonic social order’ (1983). This hegemonic social order must also be understood as a dominant configuration of ‘material power, ideology and institutions’ that shapes and bears forms of world order (Cox 1981: 141). The key issue for Cox therefore is how to account for the transition from one world order to another. He devotes much of his attention to explaining ‘how structural transformations have come about in the past’ (Cox 1986: 244). For example, he has analysed in some detail the structural transformation that took place in the late nineteenth century from a period characterized by craft manufacture, the liberal state and pax Britannica, to a period characterized by mass production, the emerging welfare–nationalist state and imperial rivalry (Cox 1987). In much of his recent writing, Cox has been preoccupied with the restructuring of world order brought about by globalization. In brief Cox, and his colleague Stephen Gill, have offered extensive examinations of how the growing global organization of production and finance is transforming Westphalian conceptions of society and polity. At the heart of this current transformation is what Cox calls the ‘internationalization of the state’, whereby the
state becomes little more than an instrument for restructuring national economies so that they are more responsive to the demands and disciplines of the capitalist global economy.

However, the civilizing gains made by the modern states-system may be under threat by developments since September 11. Though there are different responses to the terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Linklater is concerned that the dominant rhetoric of a civilizational war against evil would unleash ‘de-civilizing’ potentials. The US-led ‘war on terrorism’, by privileging military means, putting more innocent lives at risk and suspending the rule of international law, raised the question of ‘whether the vision of a world in which fewer human beings are burdened with preventable suffering has been dealt a blow from which it will not easily recover’ (Linklater 2002b: 304). As he succinctly expresses the problem: ‘Compassion seems set to lose out in the struggle to deal with threats to security’ (2002b: 309). Implicit in Linklater, and explicit in the writings of others, is the argument that the greatest threat to world order may not be the terrorists who perpetrated such inexcusable harm, but the reaction by the United States. By placing itself outside the rules, norms and institutions of international society in its prosecution of the war on terrorism, the United States is not only diminishing the prospects of a peaceful and just world order, but undermining the very principles on which it was founded (Habermas 2003; Dunne 2003; Devetak 2005).

The praxeological dimension: cosmopolitanism and discourse ethics one of the main intentions behind a sociology of the state is to assess the possibility of undoing the monopoly powers and totalizing project and moving towards more open, inclusive forms of community. This reflects critical international theory’s belief that while totalizing projects have been tremendously successful, they have not been complete in colonizing modern political life. They have not been able to ‘erode the sense of moral anxiety when duties to fellow-citizens clash with duties to the rest of humankind’ (Linklater 1998: 150–1).
Conclusion

There can be little doubt that critical international theory has made a major contribution to the study of international relations. One of these contributions has been to heighten our awareness of the link between knowledge and politics. Critical international theory rejects the idea of the theorist as objective bystander. Instead, the theorist is enmeshed in social and political life, and theories of international relations, like all theories, are informed by prior interests and convictions, whether they are acknowledged or not. A second contribution critical international theory makes is to rethink accounts of the modern state and political community. Traditional theories tend to take the state for granted, but critical international theory analyses the changing ways in which the boundaries of community are formed, maintained and transformed. It not only provides a sociological account, it provides a sustained ethical analysis of the practices of inclusion and exclusion.

Critical international theory’s aim of achieving an alternative theory and practice of international relations rests on the possibility of overcoming the exclusionary dynamics associated with modern system of sovereign states and establishing a cosmopolitan set of arrangements that will better promote freedom, justice and equality across the globe. It is thus an attempt radically to rethink the normative foundations of global politics.

POST- MARXISM

In 1973 Alice Walker flew to Eatonville, Florida, to plant a tombstone on Zora Neale Hurston’s unmarked grave. Posing as Hurston’s niece, she interviewed the physician, undertaker, and neighbours of Hurston and sought but did not find the grave in the cemetery’s waist-high grass. Afterward, she commissioned a tombstone that declared Zora Neale Hurston “a genius of the South novelist folklorist anthropologist 1901 1960”. Walker says, “We are a people a people do not throw their geniuses away” however, after World War II the work
of Hurston, the most prolific African American woman writer at that time, was neglected, and Hurston herself forced to accept employment as a maid and welfare support from the state. Moreover, to explain her ensuing oblivion, many critics fault the Marxist realists who, like Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison, considered Hurston a "good darkie" indifferent to social injustice and class conflict.

As Mary Helen Washington says, "By the end of the forties, a decade dominated by Wright and the stormy fiction of social realism, the quieter voice of a woman searching for self-realization could not, or would not, be heard" As this critique of Richard Wright and the realists suggests, black feminism, which Walker, Toni Morrison, and others initiated, faults the class analyses of traditional Marxism because they emphasize the production of goods, not the reproduction of the family, and the common class oppression of blacks, whites, women, or other peoples of colour, not their historically unique experiences. Such faults pose what Angela Davis terms "the difficult question, yet unresolved in practice, of the relation between racism and national oppression on the one hand and exploitation at the point of production on the other".

As I will show, what best explains the "relation between racism and national oppression on the one hand and exploitation . . . on the other" is poststructuralist Marxism or post-Marxism, a theory that I derive from the work of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault and which, thanks to their extraordinary influence, has acquired philosophical, economic, historical, feminist, literary, and cultural versions. Including Judith Butler, John Frow, Richard Wolf, Ernesto Laclau, Tony Bennett, and others, the complex thinkers who represent post-Marxism address many traditions and methods and do not form a movement or a school; however, they all restate and revise Althusserian and Foucauldian theory, and, unlike traditional Marxism, which in Wright’s fashion emphasizes the priority of class struggle and the common humanity of oppressed groups, these scholars all reveal
social life’s sexual, racial, class, and ethnic divisions and progressive import. Initiating post-Marxism, Althusser’s account of Marx undermines the humanist and the totalitarian views of Marxism and opens the many schools and movements in philosophy to such political critique.

Indicates, in the early work, he argues that, far from a reductive determinism, Marx’s “theoretical practice” implicitly defines science in a formal way: it can grasp reality only if it independently develops its concepts, not if it conforms to practice, fact, or truth. By contrast, ideology, an unsystematic, decentred network of socially necessary images, myths, structures, and concepts, explains the subject’s role in a society’s socioeconomic structure, what Althusser calls the subject’s relation to the relations of production. Ideology, not theory, imposes the traditional “dialectical unity” of principles (“theory”) and practice or ideas and facts.

In later work, Althusser rejects such theoretical autonomy, which he terms “theoreticism”; as he says, Marx repudiated “every philosophical ideology of the subject” because it “gave classical bourgeois philosophy the means of guaranteeing its ideas, practices, and goals” (Essays 178). As a result, he criticizes the broad opposition of science and ideology and in a Foucauldian manner examines a discourse or discipline’s historical context of conventions and practices, what he calls its “problematic.” He still maintains that a particular science or discourse resists the ideological commitments that form part of its history; however, he claims that, in keeping with the conventions, norms, and ideals that make up its context or “problematic,” each science elaborates its own theoretical concepts. Economics, history, philosophy, mathematics, and other scientific disciplines and practices do not develop a general opposition of ideology and science; in accord with their distinct problematic, they establish their own
“inward” criteria of validity and produce their own legitimate objects and discourses.

He argues that, because diverse discourses evolve different versions of the science/ideology, the many schools and movements in philosophy are open to political critique, what he calls class struggle in theory. Despite this post-Marxist turn, he never abandoned the traditional notion of economic determination in that last instance or the traditional faith in the working class and its political parties. As he affirms in his popular autobiography, No other organization in France, I say really no other organization in France, can offer sincere militants a formation and practical political experience comparable to those that one can acquire in the French communist party.

Michel Foucault says that the study of the Soviet Gulag exposes the limits of the party as well as Marxism. He discusses the breakdown of the phenomenological tradition, not Marxism’s humanist or Stalinist limitations. He examines discourse, not the opposition of science and ideology, because he considers science “one practice among many.” He claims that the changing institutional contexts and the ruptures or gaps in a discourse’s historical development, not the autonomous norms nor the objective truths of a scientific theory, explain the history of a discourse and open it to critique. It is, nonetheless, true that, like Althusser, who was his teacher and colleague, Foucault dismisses humanist and scientific notions of theoretical self-consciousness and distinguishes the discourses of power/knowledge from the ruling class’ unifying interests. In his early works, he emphasizes the Nietzschean notion that discourse does not uncover a pre existent object; discourse constitutes the objects, including the human “object,” which it purports to uncover. In his later works, he examines the socio political import of distinct discourses, whose power to constitute a subject extends not only to the individual but also to the "social" subject.
As a consequence, while Althusser preserves traditional notions of economic determination and working class or communist party politics, Foucault’s positive, factual genealogies of punishment or sexuality implicitly foster the politics of marginal groups, what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe term a radical coalition of women’s, black, and other “new social movements.” Laclau and Mouffe defend these movements.

They also adopt the Althusserian theory that the ideological apparatuses of the state interpellator or construct a subject and, thereby, reproduce themselves, rather than the Hegelian belief that predetermined historical stages and contexts explain social development. Where they differ is that in a poststructuralist fashion they develop Gramsci’s notion of ideological hegemony.

They maintain that, since objects do not simply or literally mirror their socio historical contexts, the distinction between object and context, discursive and non discursive practices, or “thought and reality” breaks down; in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, “synonymy, metonymy, metaphor . . . are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted”

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union is close to its demise, the Western working class has turned conservative and independent movements of women, blacks, homosexuals, and others have developed. In this context Laclau and Mouffe suggest that, while hegemonic ideologies constitute the conservative identities of the working class, women, minorities, and others, their hostilities or “antagonisms,” not socio-economic contradictions, expose the fissures within these identities.

In other words, while the interests of trade unions and management objectively oppose each other, they may work together harmoniously, whereas women, Hispanics, blacks, or Asians may angrily oppose unfair or discriminatory
state or industrial policies even though the objective interests of those groups are not contradictory. Laclau and Mouffe claim, as a consequence, that the discursive conflicts by which contending political parties seek to impose their hegemony explain values and identities more fully than ruling-class interests or social structures do because, incomplete or dislocated, such structures produce only partial identities. The subject remains fissured because the antagonisms of diverse social movements or the dislocation of social structures matters more than the systematic contradictions and predetermined structures of the traditional view. Laclau forcefully demonstrates, moreover, that a successful politics requires strategic argument whose success predetermined working class or other socioeconomic contexts cannot ensure in advance. Opening discourse to the theoretical critique rejected by Foucault and, to an extent, Althusser, he maintains that, while the black, feminist, gay, and ethnic social movements properly defend their separate interests or their political independence, each movement must construct equivalent ideals establishing a new hegemonic bloc because what establishes identity is contextual oppositions, antagonisms, or exclusions, not essences or transcendent selves.

Well known as a feminist, Hegelian, and queer theorist, Judith Butler also adopts the poststructuralist or post-Marxist theories of Althusser, Foucault, and Laclau and Mouffe. Humanist assumption that the subject asserts its individual pre-discursive autonomy and agency and adopts the poststructuralist belief that ideology interrelates or discourses of power/knowledge discipline the subject. They maintain, however, that science preserves its independence of ideology or that hegemonic ideologies constitute fissured subjects, whereas she says that the heterosexual norms imposed by power govern the construction of gender. While traditional feminists assume that the terms “male” and “female” identify biologically distinct groups with equally distinct interests, experiences, and social organizations, she takes Althusser’s and Foucault’s views to suggest that gender
is not a matter of human nature or biological traits but a performance imposed by established cultural norms. Like Laclau and Mouffe, she defends resistance or theoretical critique, but she assumes that the heterosexual norms imposed by institutional practices preclude the political liberation sought by oppositional theorists.

In the early *Gender Trouble* she argues that, as parody or drag, sexuality still fosters resistance or makes gender trouble by multiplying or parodying the categories of gender. In later work, she goes on to adopt Freudian or Lacanian notions of the unconscious as well as post-Marxist versions of a radical democracy. While the Freudian notions contradict or, as she says, “supplement” the Foucauldian approach, making subjugation the desire of the complicit us subject, the post-Marxist account democratizes her notion of gender, opening it to articulation by African American, third world, and other peoples of color.

Pierre Macherey also adopts Althusserian Marxism and Foucauldian poststructuralism, but, unlike Butler and Laclau and Mouffe, he repudiates Freudian, Nietzschean, and Hegelian modes of theoretical critique and seeks significant historical depth.

In his early work, which includes *A Theory of Literary Production* and *Hegel ou Spinoza* (1979), Macherey, who was Althusser’s student, colleague, and collaborator for more than ten years, defends the Althusserian belief that scientific Marxism opposes Stalinist and humanist theory and that literature, situated between science and ideology, shows but does not tell the truth.

Foucault, adopts a historical or “materialist” perspective in which, never pure, independent, or scientific, theory is always situated in a practical context in which it reveals the antagonisms of and takes a position on the contrary views forming the context. While Laclau and Mouffe and Butler admit the democratizing
articulations or translations of the women’s, black, postcolonial, or other new social movements, Macherey defends a philosophical realism that denies the incommensurable, “relativist” perspectives of such movements; nonetheless, Macherey argues that the productive activities not only of authors but of readers as well give a literary or a philosophical text its meaning and, despite or because of their errors, their accounts explain its history.

The cultural theory of Tony Bennett, John Frow, and Toby Miller also rejects the scientific theory of the Althusserian tradition and examines the interpretive activity or democratic articulations of diverse readers. As the work of these scholars suggest, Althusser’s anti-humanist Marxism and Foucault’s genealogical studies have initiated a post-Marxism that rejects “objective” humanist guarantees of transcendent reality and public life and reveals the constitutive or hegemonic import of discourse. In *Marx@2000*, Ronaldo Munck rightly says that, thanks to these late or post-Marxist theorists, “we are now much more aware of the diversity of capitalism and the plurality of social struggles. Race, gender, sexuality, religion, disability, and region are all on this terrain, alongside and integrated with class”; however, he considers those who deny or reject the “plurality of social struggles” and defend the traditional notion of class context rigid fundamentalists who “retreat into blind dogmatism.”

The post-Marxists do, for the most part, depict this “terrain,” but the difficulties of traditional Marxism involve more than “blind dogmatism.”

No one would call Fredric Jameson, for example, a blind dogmatist, yet he defends Marxism’s traditional doctrines, including a “complex” distinction of base/superstructure, objective accounts of class contexts, systematic practices of revolutionary change, the global economy as late capitalism’s totality, and the Frankfurt School’s critique of commodity fetishism. One reason is that, since he considers Stalinism a positive modernizing force whose enviable successes gave
it worldwide influence, he does not admit that the Soviet historical experience or
conservative totalitarian theory raise significant epistemological issues or that
post-Marxism differs from Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist socialism. He also denies
that the formal autonomy of the sciences or the disciplines or the independence of
the women’s, black, and ethnic movements raise significant issues; rather, in
Georg Lukács’s humanist fashion he complains that what he calls the
“fragmentation and compartmentalization of social reality in modern times” divides
the surfaces of life from its depths, effaces its “underlying unity,” and acquires an
obsessive, dominating force.

As he says, this unity “would remain merely symbolic, a mere
methodological fiction, were it not understood that social life is in its fundamental
reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single inconceivable and trans-
individual process”. Michael Ryan rightly points out that “one effect” of Jameson’s
work on postmodernism “was to assure that . . . that the old models and
languages of understanding within Marxism would stand, that the moral and
intellectual order assured by the ascendancy of those languages and models
would hold”. In general, because the communist countries turned into
dictatorships and the academic or scientific disciplines and the modern social
movements achieved independence, these “old models and languages of
understanding,” including the humanist ideals and historical methodology of Karl
Marx, present epistemological difficulties which post-Marxism addresses but
traditional Marxism and its contemporary defenders, including Jameson, ignore or
dismiss.

The Difficulties of Traditional Marxism These difficulties, especially the
communist dictatorship and the disciplines’ and movements’ independence, arise
because traditional Marxism defends Karl Marx’s reductive belief that
socioeconomic changes explain the historical evolution of capitalist society and justify a communist revolution that restores the human or social powers of society.

Traditional Marxism takes Marx to show that philosophy, theology, economics, or art do not have a history apart from that of their socioeconomic systems; rather, the theoretical activity of the ruling class and its representatives brings these discourses together to form a unity (“form of consciousness”) that expresses and justifies the social system. As Marx says in *The German Ideology*, morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men . . . alter, along with . . . their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Old and Young Hegelians alike believe that the mind or spirit (“forms of consciousness”) is self-determining or self-constituting, but Marx rejects this belief: “In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, we ascend from earth to heaven” . To an extent, this claim simply denies that the “forms of consciousness” determine themselves. The mind of the intellectual does not control or change historical circumstances; rather, these circumstances influence the development of consciousness and its forms because “men . . . alter, along with . . . their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.”

At the same, Marx faults the fetishized character of ideas and goods. In the case of ideas, Marx maintains that the ruling elites may present them as universal, but in a particular society certain ideas prevail because they and not other ideas best defend the interests of the ruling elites; in his terms, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” . The figure of the ruling class stresses the interested character of “ideas,” what Gramsci calls their hegemonic force. Moreover, drawing on classical economics, which claims that labor creates the values embedded in commodities, Marx argues that the division of labor alienates
the working class from its products, including the products of thought. Although the labor of the working class gives commodities their value, capitalist production embues them with the mystical powers that tribal societies reserve for their totemic gods. Instead of using commodities, people worship them. People have diverse ends and purposes, but commodity production destroys the ability of individuals to define themselves; their products cars, machines, theories impose definition, self, and purpose upon them.

In the critical, Hegelian manner, Marx argues that communists take action to overcome the fetishized production of goods and ideas by ending the division of labor grounding it. In other words, since the working class produces the values that commodities embody and the ruling class appropriates and divides up the resulting surplus value, commodities acquire a reified character, but the communist revolution, which abolishes the division of labor, overcomes the reified character of wealth and reinstates he working class’ un alienated, human self. As he says, “All-round dependence . . . will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them”.

Marx claims, in other words, not only that the historical evolution of a capitalist society explains the development of its philosophical systems or artistic forms but also that a communist revolution overcomes the fetishism of commodities and restores the human or social powers of a society. Many scholars object, however, that in this account “ideas” come to mirror socioeconomic history passively, losing any vestige of autonomous development. They claim that Marx’s belief that socio-historical circumstances govern the evolution of consciousness
amounts to a reductive form of socioeconomic determinism and even a justification of totalitarian communism.

This difficulty with Marx’s view stems from two distinct twentieth-century developments: the growth and collapse of Soviet communism, which produced the Stalinist dictatorship, and the independence of modern disciplines and social movements, which undermine the humanist ideal of the unified, autonomous self. Consider, to begin with, the difficulties represented by Soviet communism. In the very influential Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956), Zbiginew Brzezinski and Carl J. Friedrich say that the rational ideals that Marx acquired from the French Enlightenment provided communism’s key ideas, such as “total democracy,” “rationalistic” revolution, and absolute political unanimity (82–83). As I explain more fully in these empirical political scientists claim that those ideas account for communism’s totalitarian characteristics a dogmatic ideology sanctioned by the state, a monolithic party ruled by a dictator, a terroristic system of police control, and a monopoly of communications, arms and weapons, and economic production. Like Theodor Adorno and other Frankfurt School theorists, Herbert Marcuse sharply condemns the “reified” empirical outlook of Brzezinski, Friedrich, and the political scientists, but he too derives totalitarian communism from the Western Enlightenment. He too argues that the scientific rationality imposed by the Enlightenment explains the repressive practices of the former Soviet state.

In One-Dimensional Man, for example, Marcuse admits that the totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet Communist Party intends to produce enlightenment and independence; however, just as Brzezinski and Friedrich claim that Western technology explains totalitarian practices, so Marcuse argues that Soviet Marxism perpetuates what he calls “technical progress as the instrument of domination”. Brzezinski and Friedrich say that the blind, fanatic ideology of the Soviet

Setting the chapter in the context of Marx’s political activity and evolving thought, Marsden argues that, like Marx’s other early works, the chapter describes the relationship of the “atomic” citizen or civil society and the political state, not the influence of the base on the superstructure. This mainly biographical account of *The German Ideology* assumes, however, that the critical mind of the genius shines above the movements and schools that establish and dispute his import. Marsden says that we value traditional Marxism because “it has a familiar, necessary quality. We are grateful to it, for it was better than the alternatives, and better than nothing at all”; actually, it matters because, even though it may not get Marx’s views right, it made his work important. Traditional Marxism claims, in particular, that Marx’s theory represents the humanist ideal of critical thought rejected not only by scientific Stalinists and totalitarian theorists but also poststructuralists such as Lyotard or Foucault. For example, Raymond Williams, who was a communist militant in his youth, disavowed traditional Marxism because of its reductive passivity (*Culture and Society* 209–84). In the 1960s, when he returned to Marxism, he adopted a Hegelian view, which claims that great thinkers or artists articulate what he calls the “structure of feeling” of those who share the thinker’s milieu, class, or experience and which preserves the traditional Marxist notion that historical development explains the evolution of ideas.

This Hegelian view effectively overcomes this passivity, resisting both the established doctrines of scientific Marxism and the abstract jargon of postmodern theory. Similarly, Christopher Hill, E. P. Thompson, Arnold Kettle, Alvin Kiernan, and other British critics and scholars supported the British Communist Party in the 1940s and 1950s, but represented a humanist opposition to scientific Stalinism. In the 1960s and 1970s they adopted independent leftist stances and, in the 1970s and 1980s, went on to oppose structuralist and poststructuralist Marxism, which
Thompson derisively labeled the “poverty of theory.” Marx and traditional Marxists consider humanism a universal truth transcending and opposing contemporary movements or fashions; however, the modern humanist ideal of a unified or autonomous self begins in the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when Kant argued that the subjective categories of human reason and the categorical imperatives of the human will dominate nature, and breaks down in the twentieth century, when scientific or academic disciplines acquire formal autonomy.

As Foucault says in the figure of man is a quite recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago: but he has grown old so quickly that it has been only too easy to imagine that he had been waiting for thousands of years in the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he would be finally known.

The nineteenth century invented what Tony Davies calls “the myth of essential and universal Man: essential, because humanity is the inseparable and central essence of human beings; universal, because that essential humanity is shared by all human beings, of whatever time or place”. Applied to the working-class movement, this myth explains Marx’s belief that wage labor alienates the worker from what Feuerbach termed his or her species essence. Applied to literary study, the myth formed what Matthew Arnold called “disinterested” humanism, which, by appealing to the reader’s “best” self, would reconcile the social classes and unify the state. Moreover, this modern humanism differs substantially from Renaissance humanism. A loose collection of peregrinating scholars whose friendships concealed their many differences, the Renaissance humanists esteemed classical eloquence as well as the ancient Greeks and Romans but never formed a coherent movement or overcame chauvinist sentiments and adopted truly universal human ideals.
Early Renaissance humanists, including Rudolph Agricola and Desiderius Erasmus, claimed that the study of classical rhetoric would ensure that the good speaker is a good man. These humanists argued that, unlike the dry scholastic logic of the medieval era, classical rhetoric fostered the religious, moral, and civic virtue of the good orator. Ensconced in the endowed private schools and great universities, this Latinate humanist theory justified the aristocracy, the clergy, and the Tudor court, whose vast patronage made it a central route to wealth and power, not the grounds of social criticism.

Later humanists also believed that good rhetoric promotes virtue, decorum, or civility; however, inspired by Ramus, these humanists treated rhetorical techniques as useful skills applicable to law, government, and other areas. More importantly, the later humanists justified the use of the “vulgar” vernacular languages, rather than the learned Latin. Successful in the marketplace, the church, dissenting adult schools, commercial academies, female seminaries, but not in the university, the later humanist defence of a vernacular rhetoric promoted the English language and literature of the nationalist middle class. Codifying the practices of Renaissance humanism, this neoclassical humanist criticism flourished in the eighteenth century, when it was able to unite the aristocracy and the middle classes, and to define the educated public or, as Jürgen Habermas says, the public sphere when the middle classes acquired more power, partisan journals formed diverse publics, and the modern disciplines acquired formal autonomy, the neoclassical ideal lost its ability to unite the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.

Foucault and François Lyotard both show that this breakdown of humanism enables the disciplines to acquire a formal autonomy contrary to humanist ideals. As I indicate Foucault says that, to ground the disciplines, the nineteenth-century episteme invents the figure of man, whom the eighteenth century does not
discuss; in the twentieth century, however, the modern episteme, which breaks into the mathematical sciences, the social sciences, and philosophical disciplines, subverts the human figure grounding the disciplines and allows them to establish their formal autonomy. Similarly, in *The Postmodern Condition* Lyotard says that in the twentieth century, the traditional grand narratives, which include Marxist accounts of historical development, Christian accounts of religious salvation, and liberal accounts of social progress, can no longer justify the specialized sciences or disciplines, which, as a result, provide their own legitimating “ideological” rationales. Georg Lukács, the most important traditional Marxist, defends the autonomy and rationality of the humanist subject and the revolutionary potential of the working class and opposes the reified character of commodity production, the breakdown of the public sphere, and the divisions and independence of the disciplines and social movements. In the early *The Theory of the Novel*, he accepts the Kantian belief that ethical or aesthetic norms preserve freedom and autonomy but argues that, contrary to Kant, who maintained that we cannot know the thing-in-itself, experience reveals real essences or underlying conditions.

He also adopts the historical method of G. W. F. Hegel, who argues in *The Phenomenology of Mind* that outside of consciousness or “appearance” the Kantian essence or thing-in-itself reduces to an empty abstraction, a substance less ideal. Lukács preserves and extends Hegel’s systematizing account of experience but repudiates Hegel’s faith in absolute knowledge because Lukács fears that, in pursuing such an absolute consciousness, the philosopher experiences an alienating and vitiating self-consciousness. To overcome it, he turns to Marx and Feuerbach, who suggest that the limited totalities of “practical” men relieve this self consciousness and justify political action. Revising and extending Marx’s critique of commodity production, Lukács argues that capitalism extends the commodity’s illusory autonomy to all social institutions.
More precisely, he divorces commodity production from the labor theory of value which Marx derives from classical economics and which justifies Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism. Marxist economists defend a revised labor theory of value against modern economics, which has rejected that theory; by contrast, Lukács, who denies the autonomy of the disciplines, treats commodity fetishism as objectively valid. He claims that it grounds an instrumental rationality, which calculates means and not ends, evaluates techniques and not values, and seeks autonomy and not community. As J. M. Bernstein points out, Lukács maintains that, once economic institutions gain their independence, capitalism imposes this rationality on all realms, including the intellectual. The sciences, the humanities, and the other disciplines functioning within this context examine the internal relations of their disciplines and ignore their social relations. Like commodities, these “reified” disciplines consider them autonomous and ignore their underlying social conditions.

In The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer also assume that, divorced from the labor theory of value; a general instrumental rationality governs bourgeois social institutions, including the disciplines. Adorno and Horkheimer too claim that the sophisticated dialectics of Hegelian theory overcome these reified institutions and reveal the critical insights of great art or theory; however, more negative than Lukács, who defends the working class’ revolutionary potential, they argue that, while empirical science sought to dismiss primitive mythology and superstition and to control nature, science produced, instead, its own mythology. Unlike the great art work, which retains the absolute totality and spiritual aura of the old, primitive myth, this scientific mythology denigrated nature, reified logic, aesthetics, information, and the status quo, and ensured, thereby, the conformity and the repression of the masses, including the working class.
In other words, the Enlightenment itself, not just Marxism, is “totalitarian” In the early work, Lukács also expects the lost totalities of the great art work to provide independent grounds of social critique, but in the influential essay “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” Lukács argues that history does not provide a perspective critical enough to demolish the reified state of modern society. The autonomous ethical subject of the modern era can oppose but cannot destroy society’s reified forms of commodity production. In addition, the critic must adopt the terrain of the working class, the only class whose practical activity can overcome the divisions and the conflicts of social life. With fascism recently defeated, the cold war underway, and the capitalist economy booming, Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer argue that instrumental rationality assimilates the working class, whereas, in 1921, when the Soviet revolution was still flowering and even Western revolutions looked possible, an optimistic Lukács moves to the USSR because he believes that the working class is “the identical subject-object of the social and historical processes of evolution”. Jürgen Habermas also denies that the working class possesses this revolutionary import or that the “forms of consciousness” or instrumental reason imposes ruling class domination.

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, he grants that the life world or historical context explains the evolution of an era’s ideas or the pre-suppositions of a writer or speaker and that the “system” of social institutions rationalizes and distorts the life world, as Marx said. Habermas argues, just the same, that, far from totalitarian, the institutional “rationalization” produced by Enlightenment reason overcomes the reified character of the social system and, as the neoclassical humanists said, maintains the independent public spheres of art, ethics, and science. He says that rational communication mitigates the reified character of economics, the law, or disciplinary knowledge and fosters the democratic practices instituted by the Enlightenment.
What determine the best argument is the rules governing validity claims in each public sphere, not the social status or economic influence possessed by the speaker. As a result, the best argument will prevail provided those who engage in debate in the public spheres set aside their partisan interests and seek consensus. In this way Habermas’s account of Enlightenment reason justifies the specialized, disciplinary knowledge repudiated by the traditional Hegelian humanism of Lukács and Adorno and Horkheimer; still, while he also faults the subjectivity of Kantian humanism as well as its division between pure and practical reason, he preserves its autonomous norms.

For example, he maintains that what explains totalitarian oppression is not Enlightenment rationality but its breakdown, what he terms the failure of “praxis philosophy” to clarify its “normative foundations” or to oppose the communists’ false totalities. This account accommodates the conservative, totalitarian account of communism but on the basis of a Kantian “self-reflection.” That is, the totalitarian theorists say that Marx shared the Enlightenment’s overly optimistic view of science and technology; Habermas fears that Marx remains too committed to the Fichtean “ego” of the industrial engineer to provide for that moment of self-reflection in which the theorist explains and critiques the intellectual contexts influencing social thought. His critique of postmodern theory also reveals a Kantian bias.

He complains that, “young conservatives,” the postmodernists forcefully reject the theoretical totalizing whereby Hegel resists the philosophical context of the modern subject, but they do not escape the limits of the modern subject or establish the validity of their theoretical ideals. He fears, moreover, that their critique of Enlightenment reason discourages rational communication and destroys the liberal consensus legitimating art, ethics, science, and other public spheres.
Conclusion

In general, traditional Marxism and its humanist defenders oppose specialized disciplinary discourse as well as structuralism and poststructuralist theory on the grounds that, more effectively than any theory, Marx’s humanist ideals or socioeconomic theories overcome the divisions and fragmentation of modern social life and justify political critique, if not a communist revolution. As Randy Martin says, what compels acceptance of given Marxist foundations is precisely that they do provide a way of lining up theoretical framework, historical project, and political organization. This alignment between Marx, socialism, and the left draws upon a powerful tradition and provides a comprehensive framework for action and reflection that has yet to be equalled.

Such defences of “Marxist foundations” accommodate the totalitarian critique of Marx or ignore or deny it as well as the independence of disciplinary knowledge and of modern social movements. In Martin’s terms, “History has not erased Marx, but vindicated him. Anti humanists such as Étienne Balibar and Alain Badiou also defend traditional Marxism, but, as I show in later chapters, their defences face similar difficulties. By contrast, the post-Marxism initiated by Althusser’s account of ideology and critique of humanist and Stalinist theory as well as Foucault’s genealogies of discourse rejects “objective” humanist guarantees of rational truth, human independence, and public life and reveals the constitutive or hegemonic import of discourse.

Some of these post-Marxists preserve the normative force of Freudian, Hegelian, or critical theory and justify thereby the radically democratic articulations, translations, or potential hegemony of oppositional or independent movements. Other post-Marxists emphasize the socio-historical contexts of modern discursive practices, not the ideals of theoretical critique, and as a result open these practices to political critique. The work of all these scholars suggests,
nonetheless, that, unlike traditional Marxism, which defends the priority of class struggle and the common humanity of oppressed groups, post-Marxism reveals the sexual, racial, class and ethnic divisions of social life and promotes its progressive transformation.

POST MODERN FEMINISM

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s, researchers have been using gender as an analytic category to study information technology (IT). In the decades since then, several questions have been raised on an ongoing basis, such as: How is gender constituted and reproduced in electronic spaces? Can the Internet be a place where there is no gender, a place where gender becomes fluid and malleable? How are identity and the politics of identity constructed online? Some scholars studying these questions have relied on feminist standpoint theory to frame and inform their inquiries into these issues, which foregrounds the differences between men’s and women’s experiences in electronic spaces and computing in general. However, others, particularly throughout the 1990s, have found postmodern feminist theory to be not only more accurate for explaining the actual practices of electronic communication and behaviour, but also more conducive to the achievement of feminist political goals. The sections that follow will explain the general principles of postmodern feminist theory and its use in studies of gender and computer mediated communication.

BACKGROUND

What is known as postmodern feminism is often associated with the work of Judith Butler (1990, 1993) and is marked, in part, by a “linguistic turn,” a view of gender as a discursive construction and performance rather than a biological fact. These theorists criticize the conflation of sex and gender, essentialist
generalizations about men and women, and the tendency to view gender as fixed, binary, and determined at birth, rather than a fluid, mobile construct that allows for multiple gender expressions. The gender dichotomy of man/woman so pervasive Western culture can be understood in terms of the cultural imperative to be heterosexual and a history of biological determinism in Western philosophy. Postmodern feminism rejects a dualistic view of gender, hetero normativity, and biological determinism, pointing to the inseparability of the body from language and social norms. Medical professionals can, for example, conform to and reinforce social norms by surgically transforming an infant with ambiguous genitalia into a culturally intelligible girl proper whose clitoris is a socially acceptable size (Butler, 1990). Medical technological intervention is also responsible for sexual reassignment surgery, making the materiality of gender malleable and blurring the boundaries between “man” and “woman.” Postmodern feminists argue against the assumption that all women share a common oppression; this assumption has, unwittingly totalized and naturalized the category of “woman” into a white, heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied, young- to middle-aged norm. Moreover, avowing political categories such as “woman” or “queer” as part of one’s identity, what is called “identity politics” is both intellectually and politically misguided. Identitarian terms, such as “transgender,” according to the postmodern school of thought, emerge into discourse at certain points in history, and it is important to keep this point in the foreground. Ignoring a term’s history can end up reifying the term and reinforcing its place in a discursive hierarchy. From this body of work, the theorist whose work has been particularly influential to scholars of gender and IT is Donna Haraway. Haraway (1985) argues that in a culture of high technology, the boundaries are no longer clear between human and animal, animal and machine, or human and machine. While not a new observation, Haraway recasts it as a windfall for feminist theory; hierarchical
dualisms such as man/woman, heterosexual/homosexual, and white/black are no longer stable in high-tech culture.

**Postmodern Feminism**

Gence, genetic modification of organisms, and reproductive technologies) that the technologies are no longer tools deployed by agents in positions of power but now, to a great extent, they construct those agents. New technologies prompt redefinition of such concepts as literacy, work, nature, reproduction, and culture. Haraway argues that taking the cyber, a figure without boundaries that is both human and machine, as a metaphor for socialist feminist theoretical interventions can be useful for feminist theory because it can help feminist theorists imagine a world that is not seen in or confined to hierarchical dualisms. The cyborg resists and eludes final definitions, as should feminist theory to avoid totalizing the category of “woman.” Braidotti (2003) suggests three potential ways to use the cyborg metaphor as an intellectual tool. First, the cyborg as an analytical tool “assists in framing and organizing a politically invested cartography of present-day social and cognitive relations”. Second, the cyborg functions in a normative mode to offer a more complex and nuanced evaluation of social practices (see Selfe & Selfe, 1996). Third, we can use it as a “utopian manifesto” for imagining ways to “reconstruct subjectivity in the age of advanced technology” (p. 209). Also, with its focus on the organic and technological body, the cyborg metaphor keeps the body in view; one charge against postmodern feminism is that the materiality of the body “on the ground” gets lost in theorists’ preoccupation with discourse.

**POSTMODERN THEORY AND IDENTITY IN CYBERSPACE**

When the World Wide Web became popular and commonly used, some wondered if the Web could become a truly democratic place, where discrimination on the basis of race, class, or gender could be eliminated. As much research has shown, however, and indeed as anyone who happens upon racist and misogynistic Web sites can attest to, the Web is not a utopia. Feminists have
responded to gender inequalities online in several fashions, but Hall’s (1996) study of women’s experiences online makes a useful distinction between what she calls “liberal cyber feminism” and “radical cyber feminism” in online discussion practices (see also Wolmark, 2003). What Hall terms liberal cyber feminism is “influenced by postmodern discussions on gender fluidity by feminist and queer theorists, imagines the computer as a liberating utopia that does not recognize the social dichotomies of male/female and heterosexual/homosexual”. Radical cyber feminists, on the other hand, are concerned with everyday online problems: homophobia, harassment of women and pornographic representations of women, and they seek to create safe spaces for women only (see Herring, 1996).

Liberal cyber feminism corresponds with a postmodern feminist view of gender as mobile and performative, not necessarily tied closely to identity. In online spaces, identity is constructed in communities with certain discursive norms, and identity is based on conversations and credibility established in those conversations; as such, only the community decides whether they accept the user as a woman, a disabled person or the like. Turkle (1995) and Stone (1995) use postmodern theories that problematize the humanist subject to show that online heightens the sense that identity is shifting, fluid, de-cantered, and multiple; online, identity is a series of fictions and textual play “personae all the way down”. Turkle (1995) claims that computing is taking us “from a modernist culture of calculation toward a postmodernist culture of simulation,” from “centralized structures and programmed rules” to “a postmodern aesthetic of complexity and decentring”. Turkle (1995) agrees with Haraway that “the computer is an evocative object that causes old boundaries to be renegotiated” (p. 22). One such boundary is that between “man” and “woman.” Turkle (1995) cites net sex as one such simulation that allows for the flexibility of identitarian categories, with what she suggests is rampant “virtual gender-swapping” (p. 212; see also Bruckman, 1993). Turkle describes several cases of gender swapping and finds that “a virtual
gender swap gave people greater emotional range in the real” (p. 222). Not only does this kind of gender play give users a space in which to express masculine and feminine aspects of their personalities, virtual gender-swapping also lets users explore their sexuality. For example, women can play men to have net sex with other women, and men can play women to have net sex with other men. Heterosexual women can play lesbian and bisexual more pages are available in the full version of this document, which may be purchased using the "Add to Cart" button on the publisher's webpage.
UNIT-4
TERM PAPER TOPIC
IS THE ENVIRONMENT A SECURITY THREAT?
Introduction

The impact of environmental degradation and consequences of environmental changes are increasingly associated with non-conventional notions of security. Considering the environment as a threat to individual, national, or global security has created a new agenda in the discourse of security studies. The increasing scope of international security now readily includes environmental degradation, global warming, and climate change. These issues have extended human understanding of environmental change, conflict, and vulnerability and explored the roles of conservation and sustainable development in promoting peace, stability, and human security. This is a broad definition of environmental security, as considered by a large number of academics and proponents. The importance of understanding environmental security is two-fold. First, one has to understand the transformations in the theoretical developments of the concept of security. Second, one also has to envisage the link between environmental change and livelihood strategies of human beings on the local level and the broader impact of environmental changes on a society. These two dimensions help define environmental issues as important factors of security.

The academic strength of environmental security and its current position in the international security discourse largely depend on the answers to a few essential questions: what is security? Whose security are we talking about? What counts as a security issue? and how can security be achieved? Environmental security offers an intricate relationship between the contemporary environmental changes in the world and environment-led threats and cooperation.
Conceptual Understanding of Security: The making of an alternative security discourse

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the study of international security added a new dimension. New conceptions of security (e.g. human security) considered that the traditional notion of state-centric security, typically defined by military aspects, was insufficient to explain emerging threats. As an alternative to the conventional understanding of security affairs, human security discourse incorporated poverty, environment, and intra-state conflict as threats to an individual's life. Thus, the security discourse experienced a shift from traditional to non-traditional security. The traditionalists, backed by political realism, define security in terms of power. In realism, meaning is closely linked to the military capability of a state. This state-centric and conventional concept of security has been challenged by the post-realist security scholarship. This is the reason why redefining the concept of national security has been a prime target of numerous research agendas since the 1980’s. Non-traditional security is a significant shift from the conventional idea of security to a new paradigm of security that includes poverty, environment, health and social instability as threat factors. There are two subcategories of followers of the non-traditional security approach: wideners and the deepeners. Wideners reflect the new scope of the security studies and have included diverse issues (e.g. environment, internal conflict, and economic crisis) as part of security affairs. On the other hand, deepeners discuss the focus of security (i.e., whose security is being threatened). Apart from these two categories of non-traditional aspects, there are security concerns that are not limited by borders. These transnational security concerns include ethnic conflict, weapons of mass destruction, political instability, and international organized crime (e.g. drug and human trafficking).
The Copenhagen School, led by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, has developed a framework called securitization to conceptualize security. This theory introduces a social-constructivist perspective that considers how problems are transformed into security issues. The Copenhagen School hypothesizes that security can be understood as a result of speech acts, a process of repeated usage of the event in the public domain, and through this process, a perceived problem becomes an important agenda for national and international security.

Securitization labels an issue as its prime concern and transforms the way the issue is dealt with the concerned stakeholders. According to the concept of securitization, any security problem can be transformed into an existential threat that requires exceptional, emergency, and rescue measures. A kind of political manipulation is present in the whole process of convincing the concerned actors (e.g. activists, politicians, government, donors) that environmental change is a significant security matter. Buzan and Wæver have projected their logic to establish the idea that security is a socially constructed concept. They have also proposed a methodological survey, different from the traditional approach to study security, focusing on the details of specific issues such as poverty, environment, and climate and their interrelation with the locus of security. Here, locus refers to the context and framework of security. Through the process of securitization, a potential issue may transform into a security matter. Importantly, it may not necessarily happen because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented in such a way that creates the perception of a security threat. Followers of this school of thought advocate that security is a speech act, because, the process of securitization is a methodological task facilitated by the stakeholders (securitizing actors) who speak in favour of the particular issue and debate it so that the image of the issue is built as a proper referent object of security.
The Copenhagen School has conducted research on the nature of the securitizing actor, the scope of the diverse context, and the framework of the act of securitization. Typical examples of securitizing actors include political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, media, lobbyists, and various pressure groups. Actors can express their opinion about or perform a task to securitize a particular referent object. However, no single actor conclusively takes the credit of securitizing the issue. Therefore, when an issue is securitized, it reflects the institutional and hierarchical structures that exist in the society. In other words, the socially constructed nature of the society becomes reflected in the securitization process. Along with the actors and the environment (context of securitization), another significant factor is the audience of the securitization process. The audience is the citizen of a state or a particular section of the society.

According to Buzan and Wæver, the securitizing move will only be successful if the audience accepts that there is an existential threat to a shared value. Traditionally, in a nation-state, the government is the primary driving force behind the securitization process. Buzan and Wæver have also concluded that government usually plays the role of the speaker for and promoter of security for a society and a state. It is part of the national responsibility that the government feels is mandated to it. Nevertheless, civil society has contributed significantly in the securitization process. The environmental movement is an example that is securitized by both non-state and state actors.

Wideners have significantly contributed to expand the scope of the security discourse. Apart from the state-centric idea of national security that scholars have mostly dealt with, issues of societal security have gained prominence. An issue is a matter of concern under societal security if a society perceives it to constitute an existential threat. Similarly, it becomes necessary that society perceives the issue as a security concern. This implies that a society can also de-securitize an issue (i.e., cease to perceive it as a threat). Richard Ullman, in his article-Redefining
Security sought to widen the concept to non-military threats, including threats to the quality of life of citizens in a society. As a result, defining non-military threats has become a challenging task for scholars. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development convened by the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 1987 was the first time that non-military threats to security moved to the forefront of global concern. Later on, the United Nations Human Development Report, 1990, emphasized economic crisis as a threat to human security. With the developments both in scholarly activities and practical aspects of non-traditional security paradigm, new concept of security constitutes underdevelopment, declining prospects for development, poor governance, and resource waste as its referent objects.

Is the Environment a Security Threat? Linking environment and security

The literature on environmental security has introduced an interdisciplinary perspective into security studies. Environmental security encompasses the interactive dynamics of the diverse human and natural networks that constitute the modern world. Furthermore, environment as a resource has strategic significance for nation-states who build power through natural resources like water, oil, gas, and various other minerals. Increasing state control over environment and natural resources has spill over effects such as environmental degradation, resulting in undue catastrophes. These include uncontrolled migration, high population growth, and human casualties. Such catastrophes have become real security concerns for the affected states.

Traditionally, the realist understanding of security does not include the environment as a matter of concern. However, post-realist scholars do include the environment as an important security concern. Shaukat Hassan in *Adelphi Paper* discusses the relationship between the environmental foundation of a nation and
its effect on the economy. According to his argument, continuous environmental calamities decrease the economic growth of a nation, hamper its social cohesion, and destabilize its political structure. Environmental change reduces economic opportunities for a country by causing demographic displacement within states and across international borders. An unexpected movement of population across the international border raises political tension between neighbouring countries. Environmental stress can also cause an affected sub-national group to shift its allegiance from the centre to the periphery, increasing the possibilities of political disorder, civil strife, and even insurgency. In the south-western part of Bangladesh, the government had undertaken the Coastal Embankment Project in the 1960s without taking into consideration its environmental impacts. Initially, this project contributed to better agricultural production.

However, it irreversibly affected the region’s ecosystem. As a result of such unplanned development project, a whole range of economic disasters such as water-logging and silting of rivers affected the region. The project hampered the productivity of the soil and thereby caused residents to migrate to already over-populate urban areas in search of a better livelihood. Environmental calamities trigger policy choices that can catalyze a potential conflict or aggravate an existing one. Environmental devastation faced by a country due to natural calamities, especially those originating from beyond its borders, eventually sour bilateral relations and hamper regional stability. In recent times, environmental challenges ranging from pollution, excessive carbon emissions and rapid population growth have led to increased scarcity of natural resources like water, energy, and food. The case of Darfur is the most suitable example in this regard. Darfur faced relentless desertification over the past several decades.

The process of desertification had eroded the surface clay and soils, and finally depleted the productivity of arable lands in the greater region of Darfur and particularly in northern Darfur. This environmental degradation caused forced
ecological migration towards the southern part of Sudan. This internal displacement caused tensions in the issues of land use and resource sharing, which finally continued to threaten peaceful coexistence and the social cohesion of Darfur. Hence, the situation ignited local tensions and provoked violent resource-based conflicts since February 2003.

There are debates on environment as the primary source of conflict or cause of war. Alan Dupont argues that environmental difficulties are unlikely to be the primary cause of major conflict between states. Environmental issues, according to Dupont, interact with more direct causes of conflict to prolong or complicate existing disputes. For example, environmental degradation can create refugee crisis between two neighbouring countries. Now, refugee issues may aggravate conflicts in between the neighbours. Thus environment is not the direct cause of a conflict. Daniel Deudney has also vehemently opposed considering environmental degradation as a reference object of international security.

According to Deudney, the concept of national security, as opposed to national interest or well-being, has been centred upon organized violence. He gives the example of natural calamities like earthquakes or hurricanes that had caused excessive damage; he opposes the notion that such ents are threats to national security. However, Deudney's analysis is flawed as it is very biased to the natural disasters which have comparatively fewer effects on developed countries. He does not consider the lacking capacity of underdeveloped countries to tackle these environmental disasters. For example, the February 2010 earthquake in Chile was stronger than the one that devastated Haiti just a month before. Yet, Haiti faced more casualties and damages than Chile, because of its poor and unprotected infrastructure, lack of preparation to face such disaster, and absence of emergency response to the post-earthquake situation. On the contrary, Chile maintained its building codes and built its own emergency response system for such situations. Chile is a wealthier nation with the experience of tackling such
seismic catastrophes. While Haiti has experienced several catastrophic earthquakes over the course of its history, the country's lack of building codes, preparation and disaster planning resulted in total crisis in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. Haiti still carries the devastation and is on a slow path to recovery.

Debates are also concerned with the link between environmental problems and involvement of the defence institutions to counter potential conflicts arising from these kinds of problems. Daniel Deudney suggests that applying the concept of securitization in environmental problems is nothing but a convincing act for a statesman or actor who runs the state to legitimize military action to protect the state. Wæver and Brock have also identified the idea of linking the army and environmental degradation as a counterproductive linkage. This is because of the nature of the traditional defence institutions controlled by the state lack instruments of cooperative measures or support in tackling natural disasters like cyclones or floods. However, this argument may not be applicable to the modern security institutions of many states. Modern military institutions are quite adaptive to such situations and develop capacities to handle these disasters and conduct relief and recovery programs, among other activities.

Moreover, climate change receives considerable attention in strategic documents of the defence forces in many countries such as the United States, Germany, France, China, Finland and Australia. Today, these defence forces are capable of disaster management and post-disaster rehabilitation program, and are further supported by non-governmental organizations and international donors that provide post-disaster service to the affected population. In May 2009, Bangladesh faced cyclone Aila in its south-western coastal belt. The Armed Forces of Bangladesh took the lead role to manage the post-disaster conditions in terms of massive immediate response and subsequent rehabilitation of the affected people. The Bangladesh army and Coast Guard reestablished the local
communication and helped in setting 278 water treatment plants in 14 cyclone-affected districts of Bangladesh. They continued rescue operations in those areas.

The idea of human security widens the focus of the environmental security beyond its conflict-oriented focus. Human security usually concentrates on the security of the individual or groups in a society to ensure their well-being. Human security or insecurity is then a function of multiple factors affecting the well-being of the concerned group. A 2000 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) & Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report, *State of the Art Review of Environmental Security and Co-operation*, mentions that the human security approach takes focus away from state-centred interests and highlights the multiple stresses (e.g., poverty, food crisis, no access to health service) that may cause insecurity and the types of resilience that promote security for individuals and groups. The report advocates the idea that security and insecurity are closely related to poverty, resource scarcity, and social discrimination. This approach also advocates that environment-induced conflict is one of the many factors influencing individual or societal security. In the areas of environment and security, the prominent example of scholarly work is the Global Environmental Change and HumanSecurity Project (GECHS) initiated by Steve Lonergan, which describes the linkages between environmental change and human security. GECHS addresses a particular case of population displacement and scrutinizes how environmental change and other concerned stimuli contribute to insecurity and vulnerability.

The research has explored the status of environmental refugees as a significant cause of human insecurity that arises because of environmental change. The GECHS report finds that there are many hypothetical statements available regarding the causal relationship between environmental degradation and displacement. However, it is difficult to identify or isolate the specific role that environmental drivers play in causing the displacement of people. Therefore,
environmental change or degradation is yet to be established as the primary cause for displacement led internal conflicts.

Going back to Daniel Deudney's critique of environmental security, he concludes that the making of environmental security is an outcome of the causal relations of securitization of the environment and the policy response of the state institutions. Though this thesis could not explain many unanswered questions raised by scholars, it has successfully linked the securitization process and the environment, which legitimizes state policy initiatives regarding the mobilization of different institutions in tackling environment-induced security threats. Furthermore, the environment has also been identified as a cross-border issue that requires a shared responsibility of concerned nation-states. This transnational character of environmental degradation upholds its links with international security. Therefore, securitization is not always able to satisfy all requirements to link the environment and security. It is often a fusion of many concepts encircling environment and security that helps to identify environmental changes as a security threat.

**Environment-Threat-Vulnerability Nexus: Real security threat**

The environment-threat-vulnerability nexus plays a vital role in proving that environment is a real security threat. Two aspects of this nexus are significant. First, ecosystem integrity is crucial for the population's sustainable livelihood. Therefore, certain environmental conditions often resulting from environmental change, such as pollution depletion, or natural disasters can pose an acute threat to security. Environmental degradations and climate change increase an individual's vulnerability. Moreover, environment is linked with international security as it becomes evident that national solutions to environmental problems would not be sustainable in the long-run without international cooperation. In one of its report, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
mentions that only 1.5% of Haiti was forested in 2008, in comparison with 60% in 1923. Haiti has lost its forest along with its agricultural self-sufficiency. After a dramatic rise in food prices in 2008, violent protests culminated in the city of Alexis. This has created enormous plight for the Haitians and has contributed to Haiti’s political instability. It was not only the 2010 earthquake that devastated this Caribbean nation, but also a continued destruction of the environment that has worsened instability, poverty and social development within the country.

The second aspect is the direct relationship between environment and transnational conflict. One assumption in this context is that a number of environment-related factors such as environmental degradation, depletion, and lack of access to natural resources can lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. Günther Baechler shows how environmental conflicts are inevitable because of overuse of renewable resources, overstrain of the environment’s sink capacity, and impoverishment of the space of living. He argues in favour of the existence of the environment-violence nexus, and notes violent conflicts triggered by the environment due to degradation of renewable resources (water, land, forest, vegetation) generally manifest themselves in socioeconomic crisis regions of developing and of transitional societies if and when social fault lines can be manipulated by actors in struggles over social, ethnic, political, and international power.

There have been attempts to link ecological degradation and resource scarcity as the significant risk factor for a society and a nation. Scarcity generates more demands for the natural resources. Lack of supply in response to an increasing demand increases environmental risks and brings adverse changes to the world system. Thus these changes raise environment-induced tensions or conflicts. The following model illustrates the potential for economic activity to cause environmental changes that lead to a conflict.
Regional and global climatic & environmental change. Altered resource availability, Human activity, Political disputes, ethnic tensions, civil unrests. Regional Conflict, Global Conflict, Environmental Routes to Conflict (Chalecki, 2009). This dispute leads to inter-state or intra-state conflict with regional or global implications. Chalecki has explained how the patterns of human behaviour and its interaction with the economic variables of society can bring climatic changes both regionally and globally.

The relevant example is the increase of carbon dioxide gas emissions due to industrialization in many parts of the world. Climate change and ecological degradation hamper the natural flow of resource supply and lead to political disputes as well as ethnic and civil unrests. Due to the transnational nature of resources, conflict due to scarcity affects the regional or global level in the long-run.

Homer-Dixon has investigated the relationship between population growth, renewable resource scarcities, migration, and violent conflict and thus has contributed in framing a nexus among environment, threat, and vulnerability. He mentions three reasons that connect the environment with conflict. These are the degradation and depletion of renewable resources, the increased consumption of those resources, and their uneven distribution. This annotation establishes environment as the core referent object of security.

**Impact of Environmental Degradation and National and International Responses**

The *Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index* reveals that more than 650,000 people died worldwide from extreme weather events, and losses of more than $2.1 trillion occurred globally during 1990 to 2009. *The State of the World 2010* and *2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* reports provide
detailed information on environmental degradation and its impact on human life and biodiversity. According to the reports, 50% of forests have been cleared. Only one-fifth of the Earth's forests remain intact. Forest area has increased slightly since 1980 in industrial countries, but has declined by almost 10% in developing countries. The rapid industrialization of developing countries has had an inverse effect on its forests. Carbon dioxide emissions are a big crisis. Two major sources of carbon emissions are coal and petroleum. Global carbon emission raised the average temperature of the world.

The 19th century Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius found that human activities were responsible in the large emission of CO2 to the atmosphere, which could cause to global warming and sea level rise. This global warming theory found another strong advocate in the 20th century, when an English engineer, Guy Stewart Callendar, researched a doubling of CO2 could gradually bring a 2°C rise in future centuries. Recent literature shows that with the current rates of emissions, the earth will experience 1°C (1.8°F) warming by 2030 at the latest, and 3°C (5.4°F) increase in temperature before the end of the next century.

This can have tremendous consequences, such as widespread extinction of plant and animal species, sea level rise, and coastal flooding. It is projected that by 2050 the sea level will rise approximately 1.5 meters, flooding low-lying countries like Bangladesh and the Maldives. Numbers of storms and other climatic disorders such as hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons will increase due to global warming. Biological diversity will be severely hampered. The ocean plays a vital role in maintaining biodiversity, regulating climate and weather patterns, and providing food and livelihood for millions of people worldwide. These roles will be hampered significantly. Coastal areas are increasingly experiencing habitat loss due to sea-level rise and severe storm events.

As a result of the rise in sea-water temperature, the intensity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, typhoons, and cyclones is expected to rise.
Climate change and ocean acidification create negative impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems. Overfishing, pollution, coastal destruction, and declining water quality cause this degradation, which is already limiting coastal and marine ecosystems in performing their functions. A sharp rise in urbanization also creates pressures upon nature and makes the process of resource distribution uneven. Hence, environmental degradation is caused by depletion of natural resources and damages to the ecosystem. There are policy options as response measures to these environmental crises. One of these responsive policy measures is known as adaptation strategy. This is considered as the central focus of environment-based development activities. Adaptation refers to adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts.

This strategy refers to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change. As part of the national response, countries usually go through a consultative process to integrate environmental and climate change issues into sectoral policies. The government also conducts needs assessments of the availability of resources to implement relevant policies. Institutional capability at the state level has been identified as a major constraint in implementing policy and enforcing environmental acts and regulations. To overcome these constraints, states concentrate on developing the capacity of individuals and institutions in this regard.

The government commissions research studies and implements action plans to prevent further deterioration of the environmental resource base and to assess making environment-friendly sectoral policies. Furthermore, nations explore avenues for regional and international cooperation to fight against environmental insecurity. For example, Bangladesh has adopted a set of policies to manage its environment more effectively. Bangladesh began its activities with
limited capacity to fight against the impacts of climate change. However, it is now playing a proactive role in many regional and international environmental forums such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the United Nations. The reason for being proactive is that Bangladesh has been identified as one of the most vulnerable countries by the United Nations. The Bangladeshi government signed and ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and kept its commitment to adopt the National Adaptation Programs of Action 16 (NAPA) by 2005. These programs address urgent needs for adaptation strategies to avoid future vulnerabilities.

Recently, the international community has paid much attention to the security implications of environmental problems and climate change. In 2004, the Chief Scientific Advisor of the United Kingdom, Sir David King, suggested that climate change is a far greater threat to the world's stability than international terrorism. His assertion was further supported by several statements made by Margaret Beckett, the British Foreign Secretary, between May 2006 and June 2007. During her stay at the Foreign Office, she openly declared, Climate security as the central plank of British foreign policy. In October of 2006, at a major foreign policy address in Berlin, Mrs. Beckett noted, today, being a credible foreign minister means being serious about climate security.

A group of eleven high-ranking, retired American military officials released a report in April 2007. They argued that climate change would act as a threat multiplier that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to the national security interests of the United States. In the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCC in Copenhagen, the participatory nations have agreed to explore further collective approaches to include environmental policies and adaptation measures as a part of their national strategy. The Sixteenth COP was held in Cancun, Mexico in 2010. Governments of participant countries
renewed their hopes for a concerted effort to combat climate change. They negotiated a balanced package‘(six-pack‘ package), which combines progress on mitigation, transparency (measurement, reporting and verification), adaptation, finance, technology, and REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation). Finally, the governments set up a new Green Climate Fund‘to manage $100 billion in aid by 2020 to nations who are affected by climate change.

The fund will be monitored by a 24 member board chosen evenly from developed and developing nations. Unfortunately, the Cancun Declaration could not address the crucial question of by how much all nations will cut carbon emissions, which are chiefly responsible for global warming. Nevertheless, on the success of the Cancun Conference, Christiana Figures, the Executive Secretary of UNFCC, mentions that nations have shown they can work together under a common roof; to reach consensus on a common cause. This effort has restored the faith of the policy-makers on a multilateral approach to combat climate change and environmental insecurity.

International pressure along with national awareness is rising to protect the global climate and environment. National governments are collaborating with their international development partners. The Government of Bangladesh is implementing long-term planning to manage environmental risks with the help of the international development agencies. The Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Department of Foreign and International Development (UK), Canadian International Development Agency, and other development partners are involved in building the capacity of government and non-government organizations to produce an effective and efficient governance mechanism to fight against environmental threats. Therefore, managing environmental security has become a significant policy issue where the stakeholder is not only the government of a state; various non-governmental and international development agencies are also involved in the process.
*It* explains the policy formulation process of adaptation strategies regarding environmental management. This becomes a collective process to attain environmental security. Environmental adaptation strategies today are formed and implemented collectively by different stakeholders: governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), the international donor community, and experts from home and abroad. They act together in innovating strategies to ensure environmental security. The above figure also portrays the number of responsible actors who are involved in the context of securitizing environment. Addressing environment security is no longer dependent only on the national actors it becomes transnational considering the context of further cooperation among the divergent actors. This cooperation framework may embrace a new idea of collective security from the perspective of the 21st century. Here, all the actors are willing to design a framework of security to decipher the codes of environmental threats and promote mutual engagements.

From the securitization perspective, one can also relate environment and security through this framework. Numbers of securitization actors are increasing from the vulnerable population group to more active agencies like NGOs and international donor communities (e.g. donor countries, the UN, international NGOs). These actors formulate policies that are foremost concerns of the national strategy of a country. Speech act (i.e., the politicization factor of securitizing the environment) is significantly present when these actors are involved to create a framework of environmental security and influence this framework to be incorporated to the national security strategy. Therefore, both national and international responses to negate environmental risk factors are significant to justify environmental change as a prominent security threat.
Concluding Remarks

In the 21st century, nations face diversified threats and vulnerabilities, ranging from religious extremism to cyber-terrorism. The nature and sources of various security threats transform the notion of the security. In many cases, the acts of the concerned stakeholders also define the nature of the security. One has to consider these three factors to comprehend security threats today: the nature and act of the concerned actors, the scope of the diverse context, and the framework of the security act. This paper critically addresses different schools of thought in security studies and especially focuses on how environment is a security threat. It discusses mainly the contribution of constructivist school of thought in the creation of the idea of environmental security. The role of securitizing the environment has been critically discussed. In explaining securitization, it has been found that the concept could not successfully answer the question whose security is addressed? ‘The human security approach helps to answer this question by deepening’ the debate.

Deepeners discuss more about the extent of harm to an individual and a society. The consequences are different but mutually affect each other. Formulating cooperation strategies to encounter environmental threats requires all the concerned actors to critically observe whose security is addressed and how the security can be addressed. To consider environment as a security threat, it is obvious that conventional security discourse requires reform of its state-centric conceptual underpinnings. Further, a mono-disciplinary approach is highly unlikely to perform the task of understanding the security concerns in the 21st century.

An interdisciplinary research approach is essential to understand the environmental security properly. This approach should involve a range of experts from environmentalists to defence specialists; an understanding the research questions and permit more detailed investigation about security; observation of
the capacity of the concerned actors to secure the subjects; and a definition of the network of security actors who define/redefine security.

Finally, the approach should successfully correlate the causal factors of environmental threats to human security. Over the years, research on the environment-security nexus has experienced new developments. Identifying environmental threats as security concern becomes an interdisciplinary practice for academics and activists. These interdisciplinary research scholarships deal with the idea of environmental security, thereby enriching security studies discourse with more insightful thoughts.

Human Security

Many important aspects of human development relate also to people’s security: loosely defined as people’s freedom from fear and freedom from want in a broad sense. Applying a human security approach offers an opportunity to analyse many issues in an informative way. This note explains how one might go about doing that.

Human security relates to much more than security from violence and crime. A report team wanting to look at the security of people’s livelihoods (economic, food, environment or health security) might apply a human security approach. Human security can also be used to look into personal, community and political security.
Indeed, human development reports from around the world have applied the approach in other innovative ways. But on each occasion, these reports have analysed a threat, or groups of threats, and how they affect particular groups of people. And so if one is interested in preparing a human development report that is focused on one or more of the threats people face, then a human security approach is worth considering. This note explains how such an approach could help, and how it might be applied.

What is Human Security?

The human security approach was introduced in the 1994 global Human Development Report (HDR), which led to a range of literature and initiatives building on the idea (some of these are mentioned in the annex to this guidance note), and to a series of discussions in the United Nations. In 2012 the General Assembly (GA) adopted a common definition of the concept.

The human security approach broadens the scope of security analysis and policy from territorial security to the security of people. The 2012 GA Resolution stresses the role of “Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people”. In other words, threat(s) to – and values under threat in – people’s lives are the key starting point of a human security report.

The 1994 HDR highlighted two major components of human security: ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. These freedoms, from the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are part of the four human freedoms that President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously referred to in a speech in 1941. He was advocating a world founded on: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. Subsequent debate in the 1990s added the freedom ‘to live in dignity’.
The 1994 HDR was more specific, listing seven essential dimensions of human security:

- Economic • Food
- Health • Environmental
- Personal • Community
- Political

This list is neither comprehensive nor definitive, and the UN Charter refers more flexibly to ‘fundamental freedoms’. National and regional HDRs aiming to address varying categories of threats and values can use the human security approach in analyzing the topic. Previous reports based on the human security approach have, for example, dealt with social exclusion, modernization and climate change; they have used examples where the State has been a threat; or explored possible future threats. Human security is a flexible approach and can be tailored to different contexts and topics, according to the specific context. No matter which topic is addressed, a guiding principle of the human security approach is that it requires understanding the particular threats experienced by particular groups of people, as well as the participation of those people in the analysis process. Threats to human security can exist at all levels of development. They can emerge slowly and silently or appear suddenly and dramatically.

Central to the approach is the idea that people have ‘the right to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair… with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.’

At the end of 2012, some 45 Human Development Reports in the HDRO database discussed human security in different ways. Around a third of these discuss the concept explicitly and this guidance note draws mainly on these latter reports. It synthesizes insights from these reports and draws on their lessons for
developing an R/NHDR on different threats, using the human security approach. It is complemented with insights from the wider literature on human security analysis.

Overall, this guidance note will guide R/NHDR teams through the report writing process, not least by clarifying the human security concept, how it relates to human development and how it can help in structuring a report on a certain threat, such as environmental insecurity, food insecurity or violence and crime. It will help report teams in deciding the approach for an R/NHDR, using the human security approach. The note and its background material provide ample reference to previous reports on specific subjects that will be helpful.

Country Offices (COs) considering the human security approach should bear in mind two points at the outset:

Not only reports on violence can use the human security approach. As we explain in the following section, there are at least four common types of human security reports and COs are free to choose (and adapt) the type of approach that helps them the most.

The concept does not only apply to fragile states. Security, in the broad sense, is important for all societies. The human security approach is flexible and can be tailored to different countries.

Human Development and Human Security: How Do They Differ?

Human development and human security are interlinked but are by no means identical. Human development is a broad concept, aiming at enlarging people’s choices and freedoms. Human security is about assuring priority freedoms so that ‘people can exercise choices safely and freely’ (HDR 1994, page 23) and can be confident that the opportunities they have are protected.
Some elements of the 2012 GA resolution show the links between human security and human development and help with the conception of a human security report:

“Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses…”. The first three elements are shared with human development, although human security analysis is focused on threats; the last element implies understanding the threats in order to implement preventive measures; “… that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities” – human security analysis considers multiple providers of security, including citizens themselves. Human security analysis explores using both empowerment and protection to tackle specific threats to people’s lives, and empowerment especially links closely with human development.

“Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;” – thus human security forms part of the family of human concepts (including human rights, human needs, human development).

“Human security is based on national ownership.” This is also a necessary standard that all NHDRs should meet."

**SELECTING OBJECTIVES AND THEMES**

An important initial question is whether the report should make a comprehensive review of the values under threat (usually presented as a list of securities) and the specific threats; or focus on one issue of special interest. Experience shows that both approaches are useful and have different applications.

*Multi-issue reports can:*
Map the situation of the country or region, and help identify an agenda for action (part of which may eventually become the theme for a future HDR).

Explore differences between perceived insecurities and documented threats, within and across different groups and different issues.

Provide the basis for a future in-depth exploration of priority threats.

Analyse issues that may become threats in the future, including climate change.

Promote improvement in a nation’s human-security related statistics.

**Single-issue reports can:**

Offer in-depth analysis on selected threats (or values under threat).

Raise awareness and motivate action on threats that are not yet widely recognized, but where evidence suggests they need to be taken seriously.

Based on existing experience in R/NHDRs, we have divided all reports dealing with human security into four main groups. The last three are types of single-issue reports whereas the first is a multi-issues report. This list offers a starting point for discussing the focus and theme of an R/ NHDR on human security:

1. **Comprehensive mapping reports** try to cover major threats to all priority values, put them in perspective, and offer ideas on agendas for action.

2. **State-building reports** see state collapse/failure as the greatest threat to human security, and so focus on building a state.

3. **‘Citizen Security’ reports** focus on a subset of civil rights that is often of particular concern in the daily lives of citizens, notably physical safety and freedom from unlawful dispossession. Such reports could also be called citizen safety reports, but the name ‘citizen security’ has become more common for this set of concerns.
4. **Special-focus reports**, centered on key challenges other than state-building or violence and crime, focus on some other single threatened value or type of threat, e.g. food insecurity or climate change. For ease of reference, we here call them ‘Challenge-driven’ or, since the other types of report also respond to challenges, ‘Lead-challenge driven’.

There is more to the report conception stage, however, than simply deciding which of these four styles of report to use. The human security approach can be used flexibly; the many threats offer many options for analysis, and so the country context should be assessed very carefully for each report. Some basic questions can help brainstorming during the report conception phase:

Whose security? Human security work focuses on the security of people. Particular reports may focus on certain target (i.e. vulnerable) groups, but should explain their selection criteria.

- Security of what? What values are in need of protection? The human security approach considers the ‘survival, livelihood and dignity’ of individuals. The 1994 HDR list of seven areas of security offers examples of important values, but it is up to teams to tailor their selection of values according to the context of the study.

- Security from what? What threats are most relevant at a particular time and place? One must also decide on the number of issues to be included and how they interrelate. Consider as well the perception of threats compared to their actual occurrence.

- Who can play a role? While recognizing the state’s primary role, many actors can and should play a part, including individuals, businesses, communities and international organisations.

- What means for promoting human security can be used? While some common tools/strategies are suggested (e.g. the principles of being comprehensive,
contextual, participatory, and preventive), reports should be creative, innovative, and differentiate according to the context.

• Target levels – are there examples of too little or too much (human) security? One should preferably use some form of cost-benefit analysis to explore trade-offs implicit in focusing on one threat rather than another, and on one type of response compared to another (Jolly and Basu Ray 2006).

Another consideration at this stage is whether to focus primarily on institutional consolidation or institutional innovation. These approaches are not exclusive, but the choice will have an impact on many aspects of the report. The decision to favor one over the other is usually justified by one or more of the following reasons.

Institutional consolidation, often emphasised in state-building and citizen security reports, is most relevant when:

  . Institutions for a particular issue already exist, but need to be strengthened (and offer good possibilities for strengthening).
  . The relation between particular institutions and the issue is very close.

Institutional innovation, most relevant when:

  . The issue is an emerging challenge requiring new institutional approaches.
  . The report would like to explore the roles of different stakeholders in the provision of security.
  . The present approach to the issues would benefit from a far-reaching reinterpretation.

Some additional considerations in choosing the overall approach are:
. Degree of structural ownership: if national stakeholders are well accustomed to the production of R/NHDRs, it can be easier to deal with sensitive issues.
. Precedents: previous reports could have opened the opportunity to follow-up in depth on certain issues.
. Timeliness: forthcoming events can determine the focus—e.g., approaching the end of the MDG period can trigger a comprehensive mapping report to explore how to set the post-2015 agenda.
. COs, especially if preparing their first human security report, may wish to include issues already conventionally recognized as ‘security’ matters, in order to show the value added by also broadening the meaning of ‘security’ beyond these conventional topics.

The key steps in the process for preparing every R/NHDR apply here (see Section 2 in the R/NHDR toolkit). But adopting a human security focus also requires highlighting the following aspects.

. Build strong partnerships throughout the whole report process. The process of preparing an R/NHDR depends on established partners and new strategic ones, the choice of which should vary according to the type of human security report and issues selected.

. Broad consultations around strategic choices are important in order to decide an approach and framework. As human security reports are tailored to the context, and the choices taken must take into account sensitivities around the issues discussed, involving all stakeholders is important. The consultations could start by asking what human security means in this specific country at this time.4

. Given the novelty of human security reports in some places, it can be useful to identify jointly with all stakeholders a distinctive profile/ rationale for the report, to clarify its specific contribution to the nation.

. Involve strategic partners. The choice of emphasis on institutional change or institutional consolidation has implications for which organizations would be of most strategic interest for the report team. A report focused on consolidation would seek a close interaction with the organizations targeted. One focused on innovation could be catalyzed by the involvement of recognized agents of change (Such as those seeking change through advocacy, investment, building knowledge and/or political will).
As the UN General Assembly Resolution notes, human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, a human security approach must strengthen national solutions which are compatible with local realities.

Match the budget and the methodology selected. Different types of reports have different budget requirements. Comprehensive mapping reports and those including elaborate surveys are more expensive.

Consider the need to train people in human security analysis, particularly if it is new to the country, and ensure there is a range of different skills and perspectives present in the report team. The team should reflect the transdisciplinary nature of human security.

The background papers are the backbone of the report, and thus it is crucial that agreement on all the basic questions about the perspective of the study has been reached and is reflected in the terms of reference for commissioned work.

The final report can be greatly improved through extensive peer review, throughout the course of the project that gathers feedback on conceptual, statistical and political issues, etc.

A long-term perspective is important. Human security is an exploratory and relatively new approach, which partly will deliver impacts in the longer term because it can stimulate thinking and promote new cross-sector linkages. Therefore it is valuable to engage actors in the process who will reflect on the concept and have a capacity/willingness to innovate after they return to their daily roles (e.g. in the police, military, or planning offices).

Be sure to nurture the technical networks that are created around the report process. The capacity created is an impact of the report and those people can go on to champion human security thinking.
ctivity in terms of time, effort and resources, so each group has to make a cost-benefit analysis before deciding what to do. In any case, the more sensitive the issue at stake, the more important it is to have solid evidence.

WORLD SYSTEM ANALYSIS

World-system theory is a macro sociological perspective that seeks to explain the dynamics of the “capitalist world economy” as a “total social system”. Its first major articulation, and classic example of this approach, is associated with Immanuel Wallerstein, who in 1974 published what is regarded as a seminal paper, *The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis*. In 1976 Wallerstein published *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. This is Wallerstein’s landmark contribution to sociological and historical thought and it triggered numerous reactions, and inspired many others to build on his ideas. Because of the main concepts and intellectual building blocks of world-system theory—which will be outlined later—, it has had a major impact and perhaps its more warm reception in the developing world.

Where is world-system theory positioned in the intellectual world? It falls at the same time, into the fields of historical sociology and economic history. In addition, because of its emphasis on development and unequal opportunities across nations, it has been embraced by development theorists and practitioners. This combination makes the world-system project both a political and an intellectual endeavor. Wallerstein’s approach is one of praxis, in which theory and practice are closely interrelated, and the objective of intellectual activity is to create knowledge that uncovers hidden structures and allows oneself to act upon the world and change it. “Man’s ability to participate intelligently in
the evolution of his own system is dependent on his ability to perceive the whole” (p. 10). World-system research is largely qualitative, although early on Wallerstein rejected the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodologies to understand the world. For Wallerstein, there is an objective world which can be quantitatively understood, but it is, no matter for how long it has existed, a product of history. But to the most part, his methods are associated with history and with interpretive sociology. His work is methodologically somewhere in between Marx and Weber, both of whom were important inspirations for his own work. Immanuel Wallerstein was born in 1930 in New York, where he grew up and did all his studies.

Third World and he wrote his dissertation on the processes of national formation in West Africa. Here, Goldfrank tells us, he started to build his world view of “creative self destruction”, of rise and demise. His exposure to the third world had a great impact on his work. In his introduction to The Modern World System, Wallerstein, in a revealing statement, says that “In general, in a deep conflict, the eyes of the downtrodden are more acute about the reality of the present. For it is in their interest to perceive correctly in order to expose the hypocrisies of the rulers. They have less interest in ideological deflection.”

Historical Origins of World-Systems Analysis

From Social Science Disciplines to Historical Social Sciences world system analysis originated in the early 1970S as a new perspective on social reality. Some of its concepts have been in use for a long time and some are new or at least newly named. Concepts can only be understood within the context of their times. This is even more true of whole perspectives, whose concepts have their meaning primarily in terms of each other, of how they make up a set. New perspectives are, in addition, generally best understood if one thinks of them as a
protest against older perspectives. It is always the claim of a new perspective that the older, and currently more accepted, one is in some significant way inadequate, or misleading, or tendentious, that the older one therefore represents more a barrier to apprehending social reality than a tool for analyzing it. Like any other perspective, world-systems analysis has built on earlier arguments and critiques.

There is a sense in which almost no perspective can ever be entirely new. Someone has usually said something similar decades or centuries earlier. Therefore, when we speak of a perspective being new, it may only be that the world is ready for the first time to take seriously the ideas it embodies, and perhaps also that the ideas have been repackaged in a way that makes them more plausible and accessible to more people. The story of the emergence of world-systems analysis is embedded in the history of the modern world-system and the structures of knowledge that grew up as part of that system. It is most useful to trace the beginning of this particular story not to the 1970s but to the mid-eighteenth century.

The capitalist world-economy had then been in existence for some two centuries already. The imperative of the endless accumulation of capital had generated a need for constant technological change, a constant expansion of frontiers-geographical, psychological, intellectual, and scientific. There arose in consequence a felt need to know how we know, and to debate how we may know. The millennial claim of religious authorities that they alone had a sure way to know truth had been under challenge in the modern world-system for some time already. Secular (that is, nonreligious) alternatives were increasingly well received. Philosophers lent themselves to this task, insisting that human beings could obtain knowledge by using their minds in some way, as opposed to receiving revealed truth through some religious authority or script.
Such philosophers as Descartes and Spinoza however different they were from each other were both seeking to relegate theological knowledge to a private corner, separated from the main structures of knowledge. While philosophers were now challenging the dictates of the theologians, asserting that human beings could discern truth directly by the use of their rational faculties, a growing group of scholars agreed about the role of theologians but argued that so-called philosophical insight was just as arbitrary a source of truth as divine revelation. These scholars insisted on giving priority to empirical analyses of reality. When Laplace in the beginning of the nineteenth century wrote a book on the origins of the solar system, Napoleon, to whom he presented the book, noted that Laplace had not mentioned God once in his very thick book. Laplace replied: "I have no need of that hypothesis, Sire." These scholars would now come to be called scientists. Still, we must remember that at least until the late eighteenth century, there was no sharp distinction between science and philosophy in the ways in which knowledge was defined. At that time, Immanuel Kant found it perfectly appropriate to lecture on astronomy and poetry as well as on metaphysics. He also wrote a book on interstate relations. Knowledge was still considered a unitary field. About this time in the late eighteenth century, there occurred what some now call the "divorce" between philosophy and science. It was those defending empirical "science" who insisted upon this divorce. They said that the only route to "truth" was theorizing based on induction from empirical observations, and that these observations had to be done in such a way that others could subsequently replicate and thereby verify the observations. They insisted that metaphysical deduction was speculation and had no "truth" value. They thus refused to think of themselves as "philosophers." It was just about this time as well and indeed in large part as a result of this so-
called divorce, that the modern university was born. Built upon the framework of the medieval university, the modern university is really quite a World d-Systems Analysis different structure. Unlike the medieval university, it has full-time, paid professors, who are almost never clerics, and who are grouped together not merely in "faculties" but in "departments" or "chairs" within these faculties, each department asserting that it is the locus of a particular "discipline." And the students pursue courses of study which lead to degrees that are defined by the department within which they have studied. The medieval university had had four faculties: theology, medicine, law, and philosophy. What happened in the nineteenth century was that almost everywhere, the faculty of philosophy was divided into at least two separate faculties: one covering the "sciences"; and one covering other subjects, sometimes called the "humanities;" sometimes the "arts" or "letters" (or both), and sometimes retaining the old name of "philosophy." The university was institutionalizing what C. P. Snow would later call the "two cultures." And these two cultures were at war with each other, each insisting that it was the only, or at least the best, way to obtain knowledge. The emphasis of the sciences was on empirical (even experimental) research and hypothesis testing. The emphasis of the humanities was on empathetic insight, what later was called hermeneutic understanding. The only legacy we have today of their erstwhile unity is that all the arts and sciences in the university offer as their highest degree the PhD, doctor of philosophy. The sciences denied the humanities the ability to discern truth. In the earlier period of unified knowledge, the search for the true, the good, and the beautiful had been closely intertwined, if not identical. But now the scientists insisted that their work had nothing to do with a search for the good or the beautiful, merely the true. They bequeathed the search for the good and the beautiful to the philosophers. And many
of the philosophers agreed to this division of labor. So, the division of knowledge into the two cultures came to mean as well creating a high barrier between the search for the true and the search for the good and the beautiful. This then justified the claim of the scientists that they were "value-neutral." In the nineteenth century, the faculties of science divided themselves into multiple fields called disciplines: physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, zoology, mathematics, and others. The faculties of humanities divided themselves into such fields as philosophy, classics (that is, Greek and Latin, the writings of Antiquity), art history, musicology, the national language and literature, and languages and literatures of other linguistic zones. The hardest question was into which faculty one ought to place the study of social reality. The urgency of such a study was brought to the fore by the French Revolution of 1789 and the cultural upheaval it caused in the modern world-system. The French Revolution propagated two quite revolutionary ideas. One was that political change was not exceptional or bizarre but Historical Origins Normal and thus constant.

The second was that "sovereignty" - the right of the state to make autonomous decisions within its realm - did not reside in (belong to) either a monarch or a legislature but in the "people" who, alone, could legitimize a regime. Both of these ideas caught on and became widely adopted, despite the political reversals of the French Revolution itself. If political change was now to be considered normal and sovereignty was to reside in the people, it suddenly became imperative for everyone to understand what it was that explained the nature and pace of change, and how the "people" arrived at, could arrive at, the decisions they were said to be making. This is the social origin of what we later came to call the social sciences. But what were the "social sciences" and how did they situate themselves in the new war between the "two cultures"?
These are not easy questions to answer. Indeed, one might argue that these questions have never been satisfactorily answered. Initially what one saw is that the social sciences tended to place themselves in the middle between the "pure sciences" and the "humanities." In the middle, but not comfortably in the middle. For the social scientists did not evolve a separate, third way of knowing; rather they divided themselves between those who leaned toward a "scientific" or "scientistic" view of social science and those who leaned toward a "humanistic" view of social science.

The social sciences seemed tied to two horses straining in opposite directions, and pulled apart by them. The oldest of the social sciences is of course history, an activity and a label that go back thousands of years. In the nineteenth century there occurred a "revolution" in historiography associated with the name of Leopold Ranke, who coined the slogan that history should be written wie es eigentlich gewesen ist (as it really did happen). What he was protesting against was the practice of historians to engage in hagiography, telling tales that glorified monarchs or countries, including invented tales. What Ranke was proposing was a more scientific history, one that eschewed speculation and fable. Ranke was also proposing a specific method by which such history might be written-by searching for documents describing events that were written at the time of the events. Eventually, such documents would come to be stored in what we call archives.

It was the assumption of the new historians when they studied the documents in the archives that actors at the time had not been writing for future historians but were revealing what they really thought at the time or at least what they wanted others to believe. Of course, the historians acknowledged that such documents had to be handled
carefully, to verify that there was no fraud, but once verified, these documents were considered largely exempt from the intrusive bias of the later historian. To minimize bias further, historians would insist that they could write history only of the "past" and not of the "present," since writing about the present inevitably bore the imprint of the passions of the moment. In any case, archives (which were controlled by the political authorities) were seldom "open" to the historian until a long period had passed (fifty to a hundred years), so they normally did not have access in any case to the important documents about the present. (In the late twentieth century, many governments came under pressure from opposition politicians to open their archives much more quickly. And while this openness has had some effect, it seems also true that governments have found as well new ways of guarding their secrets.) Nonetheless, despite this more "scientific" bent, the new historians did not choose to be located in the faculty of science, but rather in the faculty of humanities.

This might seem strange, since these historians were rejecting the philosophers because of their speculative assertions. In addition they were empiricists, and thus one might have thought they would feel sympathetic vibrations for the natural scientists. But they were empiricists who were by and large suspicious of large-scale generalizations. They were not interested in arriving at scientific laws or even formulating hypotheses, often insisting that each particular "event" had to be analyzed in terms of its own particular history. They argued that human social life was quite unlike the physical phenomena studied by the pure scientists, because of the factor of human will, and this emphasis on what we today call human agency led them to think of themselves as "humanists" rather than "scientists." But which events were worthy of their regard? Historians had to make decisions about
objects of study. That they were relying on written documents from the past already biased what they could possibly study, since the documents in archives were written largely by persons linked to political structures—diplomats, civil servants, political leaders.

These documents revealed little about phenomena that were not marked by political or diplomatic occurrences. Furthermore, this approach presumed that the historians were studying a zone in which there existed written documents. In practice, historians in the nineteenth century tended therefore to study first of all their own country, and secondarily other countries which were considered "historical nations," which seemed to mean nations with a history that could be documented in archives. But in which countries were such historians located? The overwhelming majority (probably 95 percent) were to be found in only five zones: France, Great Britain, the United States, and the various parts of what would later become Germany and Italy. So at first, the history that was written and taught was primarily the history of these five nations. There was in addition a further question to decide: What should be included in the history of an accumulation is a quite simple concept: it means that people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate still more capital, a process that is continual and endless. If we say that a system "gives priority" to such endless accumulation, it means that there exist structural mechanisms by which those who act with other motivations are penalized in some way, and Rates of unemployment rise worldwide. Producers seek to reduce costs in order to maintain their share of the world market. One of the mechanisms is relocation of the production processes to zones that have historically lower wages, that is, to semi peripheral countries. This shift puts pressure on the wage levels in the processes still remaining in core zones, and wages there tend to become lower as well. Effective demand
which was at first lacking because of overproduction now becomes lacking because of a reduction in earnings of the consumers. In such a situation, not all producers necessarily lose out. There is obviously acutely increased competition among the diluted oligopoly that is now engaged in these production processes. They fight each other furiously, usually with the aid of their state machineries. Some states and some producers succeed in "exporting unemployment" from one core state to the others. Systemically, there is contraction, but certain core states and especially certain semi peripheral states may seem to be doing quite well different kinds of hierarchies. They were not against what they thought of as natural hierarchies; they were against inherited hierarchies. Natural hierarchies, they argued, were not only natural but acceptable to the mass of the population and therefore a legitimate and legitimated basis of authority, whereas inherited hierarchies made social mobility impossible.

The modern state is a sovereign state. Sovereignty is a concept that was: invented in the modern world-system. Its prima facie meaning is totally. Autonomous state power. But modern states in fact exist within a larger circle of states, what we have come to call the interstate system. So we shall: have to investigate the degree and the content of this presumed autonomy. The historians talk of the emergence of the "new monarchies" in England, France, and Spain at the end of the fifteenth century, at just the moment ‘onset of the modern world-system. As for the interstate system, its ancestry is usually attributed to the development of Renaissance diplomacy on the “Italian peninsula and its institutionalization are usually thought to be the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Westphalia, signed by most of the states or: Europe, codified certain rules of interstate relations that set limits to as well ' as guarantees of relative autonomy.
These rules were elaborated and expanded later under the rubric of international law. The new monarchies were centralizing structures. That is, they sought to ensure that regional power structures were effectively subordinated to “the overall authority of the monarch. And they sought to ensure this by 'strengthening (really by creating) a civil and military bureaucracy. Most crucially, they sought to give themselves strength by securing some significant taxing powers with enough personnel actually to collect the taxes. In the seventeenth century, the rulers of these new monarchies declared “themselves "absolute" monarchs. This seems to suggest that they had unlimited power. In actual fact they lacked not only unlimited power but .very much power at all. Absolute monarchs merely claimed the right to have unlimited power. The term "absolute" comes from the Latin absolute us, which meant not that the monarch is all-powerful but that the monarch is not subject to (is absolved from) the laws and therefore cannot be legitimately constrained by any human from doing what the ruler thinks best.

This allowed for arbitrary power, but it didn't mean that the monarch had effective power, which as we have said was relatively low. To be sure, the states sought through the centuries to overcome this lack of real power, and they had a certain amount of success in achieving this. Consequently, one of the secular trends of the modern world-system from its beginning (at least until about the 1970S, as we shall see) was a slow, steady increase in real state power. If we compare the real power, (ability to get decisions actually carried out) of Louis XIV of France (who reigned 1661-1715) , usually taken as the arch-symbol of absolute power, with say the prime minister of Sweden in the year 2000, we will see that the latter had more real power in Sweden in 2000 than Louis in France in 1715. The major tool that the monarchs used to increase their effective power was the construction of
bureaucracies. And since they at first did not have the tax revenues with which to pay for bureaucracies, they found a solution in the sale of offices, which gave the monarchs an increase in both bureaucrats and revenue-and therefore some additional power, albeit less than if they had been able to recruit bureaucrats directly, as they would at later times. Once the rulers had a minimal bureaucracy in place, they sought to use it to give the states control over all sorts of political functions: tax collection, the courts, legislation, and enforcement agencies (police and army). At the same time, they sought to eliminate or at least limit the autonomous authority of local notables in all these fields. They also sought to create an informational network to make sure that their intentions were respected.

The French elaborated the institution of prefects persons who represented the central state and were resident in the various parts of the country-and this institution was emulated in various ways by almost all modern states. Sovereignty was a claim of authority not only internally but externally that is, vis-a-vis other states. It was first of all a claim of fixed boundaries, within which a given state was sovereign, and therefore within which no other state had the right to assert any kind of authority-executive, legislative, judicial, or military. To be sure, these claims of the states that other states should not "interfere" in their domestic affairs have always been more honoured in the breach than sedulously observed. But the mere claim has one the less served to constrain the degree of interference. Nor have border seen unchanging. Border claims between states have been constant and the recurrent. Nonetheless, at any given moment there almost always exist de facto realities about the borders within which sovereignty is exercised.

There is one further fundamental feature of sovereignty. It is a claim, and claims have little meaning unless they are recognized by
others. Others may not respect the claims, but that is in many ways less important than that they recognize them formally. Sovereignty is more than anything else a matter of legitimacy. And in the modern world-system, the legitimacy of sovereignty requires reciprocal recognition. Sovereignty is a hypothetical trade, in which two potentially (or really) conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of power; exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy. Reciprocal recognition is a fundament of the interstate system. There have often been entities that have proclaimed their existence as sovereign states but failed to receive the recognition of most other states. But without such recognition, the proclamation is relatively worthless, even if the entity retains de facto control of a given territory. Such an entity is in a perilous condition. However, at any given time most states are recognized by all other states.

There are usually nonetheless a few putative states which are recognized by no one or sometimes by only one or two other states (which in effect are protector states). The most difficult situation is that in which a state is recognized by a significant number of other states but is also not recognized by a significant number. This situation may occur in the wake of secessions or revolutionary changes in regimes. Such a split in the recognition process creates a dilemma and a tension in the interstate system which the states concerned eventually will try to resolve, in one direction or the other. We can easily find three examples of the variety of possible situations in the world-system in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The United States and Cuba, although politically hostile to each other, did not contest each other’s sovereignty, nor did other countries. In a second case, in China, the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949—with the new government gaining de facto control of the mainland
and the previous government effectively retreating to Taiwan while still claiming nonetheless to be the sovereign authority of the Republic of China as a whole created one of those middle situations in which part of the world recognized one government and part the other as the sovereign authority of all of China. This situation was largely resolved in the 1970s, when the United Nations recognized the credentials of the People’s Republic of China for China’s seat in the General Assembly and Security Council and withdrew the credentials of the Republic of China (which controlled de facto only Taiwan).

This step occurred at about the same time as the United States and then many other countries recognized the legitimacy of the People’s Republic as the sole government of “one China;” while not disturbing de facto control of Taiwan by the erstwhile government of China. After that, there remained only a few (mostly small) countries which continued to recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate government of the whole of China, but the overwhelming balance was on the side of the People’s Republic. The third situation was that of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It claimed to be a sovereign state and had de facto authority on the northern half of the island.

But it was recognized as sovereign only by Turkey. It therefore had no international legitimacy, the rest of the world still acknowledging the theoretical sovereignty of Cyprus over the land area occupied by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Were it not for the strong (ultimately military) support of Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would have soon ceased to exist. We see in these three instances the crucial role of reciprocal recognition.

We might look at one hypothetical, but plausible, situation. Suppose, when the Parti Quebecois first came to power in Quebec in 1976, it had immediately declared Quebec to be a sovereign state
(which was after all the principal program of the party), and suppose that the Canadian government had vigorously opposed this, politically and perhaps militarily. Suppose then that France had recognized Quebec, Great Britain had refused to do so, and the United States had tried to remain neutral. What might have happened, and would Quebec have been a sovereign state?

Reciprocity also operates internally, although we conventionally use a different language to describe it. Local authorities must "recognize" the sovereign authority of the central state, and in a sense the central authority must recognize the legitimate authority and define the sphere of the local authorities. In many countries, this mutual recognition is enshrined in a constitution or in specific legislation that specifies the division of power between center and localities.

This agreement can and often does break down. If the breakdown is serious, we have what is called a civil war. Such a war may be won by the center. But it may also be won by the local authority or authorities, and in this case, there may be either a revision of the rules governing the division of powers in the existing state boundaries or the creation of one or more new sovereign states through secession, which then poses the issue for the newly created states of obtaining recognition in the interstate arena. The breakup of Yugoslavia is a good example of this, a breakup which left somewhat unresolved several questions of boundaries and autonomies, such that a decade after the breakup there existed de facto boundaries which were still being contested. Sovereignty thus is a legal claim with major political consequences. It is because of these consequences that issues involving sovereignty are central
From the point of view of entrepreneurs operating in the capitalist world-economy, the sovereign states assert authority in at least seven principal arenas of direct interest to them:

(1) States set the rules on whether and under what conditions commodities, capital, and labor may cross their borders.

(2) They create the rules concerning property rights within their states.

(3) They set rules concerning employment and the compensation of employees.

(4) They decide which costs firms must internalize.

(5) They decide what kinds of economic processes may be monopolized, and to what degree.

(6) They tax.

(7) Finally, when firms based within their boundaries may be affected, they can use their power externally to affect the decisions of other states.

This is a long list, and just looking at it makes one in practice, however, it does not work that way. The profit is a reward not merely for efficiency but for greater access to the assistance of the state. Few producers pay all the costs of their production. There are three different costs that are normally externalized in significant measure: costs of toxicity; costs of exhaustion of materials; costs of transport. Almost all production processes involve some kind of toxicity, that is, some kind of residual damage to the environment, whether it is disposal of material or chemical waste, or simply long-term transformation of the ecology. The least expensive way for a producer to deal with waste is to cast it aside, outside its property. The least expensive way to deal with transformation of the ecology is to pretend it isn't happening. Both ways reduce the immediate costs of production. But these costs are then externalized, in the sense that immediately or, more usually, much later, someone must
pay for the negative consequences, by means of either a proper cleanup or restitution of the ecology. This someone is everyone else-the taxpayers in general, through their instrumentality the state.

The second mode of externalizing costs is to ignore the exhaustion of materials. In the end, all production processes use some primary materials, organic or inorganic, which are part of the transformation processes that result in a "final" good sold on the market. Primary materials are exhaustible, some quite speedily, some extremely slowly, most at some intermediate pace. Once again, replacement costs are almost never part of the internalized costs of production.

Thus eventually, the world has either to renounce the use of such materials or seek to replace them in some way. In part, it does so by innovation, and one can make an argument that in this case the economic cost of non-replacement is small or nil. But in many other cases this is not possible, and then the state must step in once again to engage in the process of restoring or re-creating the materials, and this is of course paid for by someone other than those who pocketed the profits. A good example of materials that have not been adequately replaced is the world wood supply.

The forests of Ireland were cut down in the seventeenth century. And throughout the history of the modern world-system, we have been cutting down forests of all kinds without replacing them. Today we discuss the consequences of not protecting what is considered the last major rain forest in the entire world, the Amazon area in Brazil.

Finally, there is the cost of transport. While it is true that firms generally pay fees for transporting goods coming to them or from them, they seldom pay the full costs. Creating the necessary infrastructure of transportation- bridges, canals, railway networks, airports-represents a very large cost, and this cost is normally borne, in large part, not by the
firms which make use of the infrastructure but by the collectively. The justification is that the costs are so massive, and the reward for an individual firm so small, that the infrastructure would never come into existence without a large input of costs from the state.

This may well be true, if perhaps exaggerated, but it is further evidence of the critical role of state involvement in the process of the endless accumulation of capital.

We have already discussed how central the creation of monopolies or rather quasi monopolies is to the accumulation of capital. We need only remember that every decision to make possible a quasi-monopoly of any kind, whatever the mechanism, represents an advantage to some but a disadvantage to others. Here as elsewhere, there exist no neutral positions for the state in enabling capital accumulation. For capital accumulation is always capital accumulation by particular persons, firms, or entities. And competition between capitalists is unavoidable in a capitalist system. In discussions of state "interference" with firms, it is most often noted that states tax. Of course they do. They could not exist without taxation. And we have noticed how the most crucial element in the establishment of the state structures was acquiring not the authority but the effective ability to tax. No one, it is said, likes taxes. In fact the opposite is true, although few avow it.

There are basically two problems that people have with taxes. One is the feeling or suspicion that the states are using the taxes not to help the honest taxpayers we all assume ourselves to be, but to help others (the politicians, the bureaucrats, rival firms, the poor and undeserving, even foreigners). To this extent we wish taxes to be lower, and these undesirable uses of the taxes to cease. The second complaint about taxes is of course true: the money that is taxed is money that otherwise would have been available to each person to spend at his or her own
discretion. So basically, one is yielding control over this money to some collective body, which is deciding how to spend it.

In point of fact, most people and most firms are willing to be taxed in order to provide the minimum services that each person and each firm thinks will serve its interests. But no one is willing, or ready, to be taxed more than that. The question is always the location of the line which separates legitimate from illegitimate levels of taxation. Since persons and firms have different interests, they draw the line differently. And since, in addition to the amount of taxes, the state can and does choose among a vast array of modes of taxation, persons and firms prefer those modes which affect them least and others most. It is no wonder then that taxes are certain and that tax struggles are endemic to politics in the modern world. The state cannot be neutral, but it can certainly affect seriously the benefits that firms and persons will derive from its tax policies.

Finally, we have been discussing the role of the state in relation to firms as though this were a matter internal to the state's boundaries. But of course firms are affected by the decisions not only of their own state but of many other states, insofar as their goods, capital, or personnel cross or have crossed state boundaries, a process that is constant and massive. Few firms can afford to be indifferent to the policies of states which are not their own, in terms of domiciliation. The question is how the firms can deal with these other states. And the answer is in two ways-directly and indirectly. The direct way is to behave as though they were domiciled in the other state, and to use all the mechanisms and arguments they would use with their own bribery, political pressure, exchange of advantages.

This may suffice, but often the "foreign" firm is at a considerable disadvantage in the local political arena. If the "foreign" firm is domiciled
in a "strong" state, it can appeal to its own state to use state power to put pressure on the other state to get it to accede to the needs and demands of the strong state's entrepreneurs. And of course, this process is central to the life of the interstate system. In the last third of the twentieth century, U.S. manufacturers of automobiles and steel, and airlines, were not shy about asking the U.S. government to pressure Japan and western Europe to change their policies in ways that would improve the position of U.S. manufacturers and the access that U.S. air carriers had to transoceanic traffic rights.

The large majority of the population in any state is accounted for by the households of those who work for the firms and other organizations. The capitalist system provides for a certain mode of dividing up the surplus value that is produced, and obviously at any given moment this is a zero sum game. The larger the portion allocated to the accumulation of capital, the smaller the one that can be allocated as compensation for those who work for the production units creating this surplus-value. One of the basic realities is that this division of the surplus-value has some limits (it cannot be 100 percent one way and 0 percent the other), but the gamut of possibilities in between is very large, certainly in the short run, and even in the longer run up to a point.

It follows logically that there will be a constant struggle over this allocation of the surplus-value. This is what has been called the class struggle. Whatever one feels about the politics of the class struggle, it is an unavoidable analytic category, which can be verbally disguised but never ignored. And it is quite clear that in this ongoing class struggle (which is no doubt a very complex phenomenon, with no simple binary distribution of loyalties), the state is a central actor in shifting the allocation in one direction or the other.
Hence, both sides organize politically to put pressure on the state as an executive and legislative structure. If one takes a long view of the internal politics of the multiple states throughout the history of the capitalist world economy, one can see that it took quite a while, several centuries, before the working strata were able to organize themselves sufficiently to play the political game with any minimal degree of efficacy.

The historic turning-point was undoubtedly the French Revolution. For the French Revolution brought about the two fundamental changes in the geo culture of the modern world-system that we have already noted: it made change, political change, into a "normal" phenomenon, something inherent in the nature of things and in fact desirable. This was the political expression of the theory of progress that was so central to Enlightenment ideas.

And secondly, the French Revolution reoriented the concept of sovereignty, from the monarch or the legislature to the people. When the genie of the people as sovereign escaped from the bottle, it would never be put back inside. It became the common wisdom of the entire world-system. One of the central consequences of the idea that the people were sovereign is that the people were now defined as "citizens." Today, the concept is so elementary that we find it hard to understand how radical the shift from “subjects” to “citizens.” was. To be a citizen meant to have the right to participate, on an equal level with all other citizens, in the basic decisions of the state. To be a citizen meant that there were no persons with statuses higher than that of citizen (such as aristocrats). To be a citizen meant that everyone was being accepted as a rational person, capable of political decision. The logical consequence of the concept of citizen was universal suffrage. And as we know, the political history of the following 150 years was one of steady expansion of the suffrage in country after country.
Today, virtually every country claims that its citizens are all equal, and exercise their sovereignty through a system of universal suffrage. Except we know that in reality this is not really so. Only part of the population exercises the full rights of citizenship in most countries. For if the people are sovereign, we must then decide who falls within the category of the people, and many, it turns out, are excluded. There are some exclusions which seemed "obvious" to most people: those who are merely visitors to the country (aliens); those who are too young to have judgment; those who are insane. Once one starts on the path of enumerating the exceptions to the term "people:" the list can get very long. The "people:" which began as a concept of inclusion, turned rather quickly into a concept of exclusion.

As a consequence, the politics of inclusion and exclusion became a centrepiece of national politics throughout the following two centuries. Those who were excluded sought to be included, and those who were already included were most often inclined to keep eligibility for citizens' rights defined narrowly, maintaining the exclusions. This meant that those who were seeking inclusion had to organize outside the parliamentary channels in order for their cause to be heard. That is, quite simply, they had to engage in demonstrative, rebellious, sometimes revolutionary activity.

This led to a great strategic debate among the powerful in the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, there were those whose fears led them to feel that these movements had to be suppressed (and indeed the very idea of popular sovereignty rejected). They called themselves conservatives and extolled "traditional" institutions—the monarchy, the church, the notables, and the family as bulwarks against change. But opposed to them was another group which thought that this strategy was doomed to failure, and that only by accepting the inevitability of some
change could they limit the degree and the speed of the change. This group called themselves liberals, and they extolled the educated individual as the model citizen and the specialist as the only person who could wisely determine the details of social and political decisions. They argued that all others should slowly be admitted to full citizens’ rights when their education had become sufficient to enable them to make balanced choices. By embracing progress, the liberals sought to frame its definition in such a way that the "dangerous classes" would become less dangerous and those with "merit" would play the key roles in political, economic, and social institutions. There was of course a third group, the radicals, who would associate themselves with the anti-systemic movements, indeed lead them for the most part. In this trinity of ideologies that emerged in the wake of the French Revolution—conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism—it was the centrist liberals who succeeded in dominating the scene in the world-system, at least for a very long time. Their program of modulated change would be enacted everywhere and they would persuade both the conservatives and the radicals to modulate their positions such that both conservatives and radicals came in practice to be virtual avatars of centrist liberalism. The politics of all these movements were affected by the strength of the states in which they were located. As we know, some states are stronger than other states. But what does it mean to be a strong state internally? Strength certainly is not indicated by the degree of arbitrariness or ruthlessness of the central authority, although this is a frequent criterion that many observers use.

Dictatorial behaviour by state authorities is more often a sign of weakness than of strength. Strength of states is most usefully defined as the ability to get legal decisions actually carried out. (Remember our earlier example of Louis XIV)
We have said that historical systems have lives. They come into existence at some point in time and space, for reasons and in ways that we can analyze. If they survive their birth pangs, they pursue their historical life within the framework and constraints of the structures that constitute them, following their cyclical rhythms and trapped in their secular trends. These secular trends inevitably approach asymptotes that aggravate considerably the internal contradictions of the system: that is, the system encounters problems it can no longer resolve, and this causes what we may call systemic crisis. Most often, people use the word crisis loosely, simply to mean a difficult period in the life of any system. But whenever the difficulty can be resolved in some way, then there is not a true crisis but simply a difficulty built into the system. True crises are those difficulties that cannot be resolved within the framework of the system, but instead can be overcome only by going outside of and beyond the historical system of which the difficulties are a part. To use the technical language of natural science, what happens is that the system bifurcates, that is, finds that its basic equations can be solved in two quite different ways. We can translate this into everyday language by saying that the system is faced with two alternative solutions for its crisis, both of which are intrinsically possible. In effect, the members of the system collectively are called upon to make a historical choice about which of the alternative paths will be followed, that is, what kind of new system will be constructed.

Since the existing system can no longer function adequately within its defined parameters, making a choice about the way out, about the future system (or systems) which are to be constructed, is inevitable. But which choice the participants collectively will make is inherently unpredictable. The process of bifurcating is chaotic, which means that every small action during this period is likely to have significant
consequences. We observe that under these conditions, the system tends to oscillate wildly. But eventually it leans in one direction. It normally takes quite some time before the definitive choice is made. We can call this a period of transition, one whose outcome is quite uncertain. At some point, however, there is a clear outcome and then we find ourselves ensconced in a different historical system. The modern world system in which we are living, which is that of a capitalist world economy, is currently in precisely such a crisis, and have been for a while now. This crisis may go on another twenty-five to fifty years. Since one central feature of such a transitional period is that we face wild oscillations of all those structures and processes we have come to know as an inherent part of the existing world-system, we find that our short-term expectations are necessarily quite unstable. This instability can lead to considerable anxiety and therefore violence as people try to preserve acquired privileges and hierarchical rank in a very unstable situation. In general, this process can lead to social conflicts that take a quite unpleasant form.

When did this crisis start? Geneses of phenomena are always the most debatable topic in scientific discourse. For one can always find forerunners and forebodings of almost anything in the near past, but also of course in the very far past. One plausible moment at which to start the story of this contemporary systemic crisis is the world revolution of 1968, which unsettled the structures of the world-system considerably. This world revolution marked the end of a long period of liberal supremacy, thereby dislocating the geo-culture that had kept the political institutions of the world system intact. And dislocating this geo-culture unhinged the underpinnings of the capitalist world-economy and exposed it to the full force of political and cultural shocks to which it had always been subject, but from which it had previously been somewhat sheltered.
The shock of 1968 to which we shall return is not, however, enough to explain a crisis in the system. There have to have been long existing structural trends which were beginning to reach their asymptotes, and therefore made it no longer possible to overcome the repeated difficulties into which any system gets itself because of its cyclical rhythms. Only when we have perceived what these trends are and why the recurrent difficulties can no longer be easily resolved can we then understand why and how the shock of 1968 precipitated an unravelling of the geoculture which had been binding the system together.

In the ceaseless quest for accumulation, capitalists are constantly seeking ways of increasing the sales prices of their products and reducing the costs of production. Producers cannot however arbitrarily raise sales prices to just any level. They are constrained by two considerations. The first is the existence of competitive sellers. This is why the creation of oligopolies is so important, because they reduce the number of alternative sellers. The second is the level of effective demand-how much money buyers have in total and the choices that consumers make because their buying power is limited.

The level of effective demand is affected primarily by the world distribution of income. Obviously, the more money each buyer has, the more he or she can buy. This simple fact creates an inherent and continuing dilemma for capitalists. On the one hand, they want as much profit as possible, and therefore wish to minimize the amount of surplus that goes to anyone else, for example their employees. On the other hand, at least some capitalists must allow for some redistribution of the surplus-value created, or there would normally be too few buyers overall for the products. So, intermittently at least some producers in fact favor increased remuneration for employees to create a higher effective
demand. Given the level of effective demand at any given time, the choices that consumers make are decided by what economists call the elasticity of demand.

This refers to the value that each buyer places on alternate uses of his or her money. Purchases vary in the eyes of the buyer from the indispensable to the totally optional. These valuations are the result of interplay between individual psychologies, cultural pressures, and physiological requirements. The sellers can only have a limited impact on the elasticity of demand, although marketing (in the broadest sense) is designed precisely to affect consumer choice. The net consequence for the seller is that the seller can never raise the price to a level where (a) competitors can sell more cheaply, (b) buyers do not have the money to purchase the product, or (c) buyers are not ready to allocate that much of their money to the purchase.

Given the inbuilt ceiling to sales price levels, producers usually spend most of their energy in the effort to accumulate capital in finding ways to reduce the costs of production, something which is often termed efficiency of production. To understand what is happening in the contemporary world-system, we have to look at the reasons why the costs of production have been rising worldwide over time despite all the efforts of producers, thereby reducing the margin between the costs of production and the possible sales prices. In other words, we need to understand why there has been a growing squeeze on the average Worldwide rate of profits.

There are three main costs of production for any producer. The producer must remunerate the personnel who work in the enterprise. The producer must purchase the inputs of the production process. And the producer must pay the taxes that are levied by any and all governmental structures which have the authority to levy them on the
particular production process. We need to examine each of these three costs in turn and in particular to see why each has been steadily rising over the longue duree of the capitalist world-economy.

How does an employer decide how much to remunerate an employee? There may be laws, which set minimum levels. There are certainly customary wages at any given time and place, although these are subject to constant revision. Basically, the employer would almost always like to offer a figure lower than the employee would like to receive. Producer and worker negotiate about this; they struggle over this question, constantly and repeatedly the outcome of any such negotiation or struggle depends on the strengths of each side economic, political, and cultural.

Employees may grow stronger in the bargaining because their skills are rare. There is always a supply-and-demand element in determining levels of remuneration. Or the employees may grow stronger because they organize with each other and engage in syndical action. This applies not only to the production workers (both skilled technicians and unskilled workers) but also to managerial personnel (both senior managers and middle-level cadres). This is the part of the question of economic strength internal to each productive enterprise. There is also an external part. The overall state of the economy, locally and worldwide, determines the level of unemployment and therefore how desperate each side of each production unit is to come to a remuneration arrangement. The political strengths derive from a combination of the political machinery and arrangements in the state-structure, the strength of syndical organization by the workers, and the degree to which employers need to secure the support of managers and middle-level cadres to hold off the demands of ordinary workers. And
what we mean by cultural strength the mores of the local and national community is usually the result of prior political strengths.

In general, in any production area the syndical power of workers will tend to increase over time, by dint of organization and education. Repressive measures may be used to limit the effects of such organization, but then there are costs attached to this too-perhaps higher tax, perhaps higher remuneration to cadres, perhaps the need to employ and pay for repressive personnel. If one looks at the most profitable loci of production oligopolistic firms in leading sectors-there is a further factor at play, in that highly profitable firms do not wish to lose production time because of workers’ discontent. As a result, remuneration costs in such firms tend to rise as time goes on, but sooner or later these same production units come to face increased competition and therefore may need to restrain price increases, resulting in lower rates of profit.

There is only one significant counter to the consequent creeping rise in remuneration costs runaway factories. By moving production to places where the current costs of production are much lower, the employer not only gets lower costs of remuneration but gains political strength in the zone out of which the enterprise is partially moving, in that existing employees may be willing to accept lower rates of remuneration to prevent further "flight" of jobs. Of course, there is a negative in this for the employer. If there weren't, the production site would have moved much earlier. There are the costs of moving. And in these other zones, the transaction costs are normally higher because of the increased distance from eventual customers, poorer infrastructure, and higher costs of "corruption" that is, unadvised remuneration to non-employees.
To the extent that the producers are being required to pay for them economists call this internalization of costs-the costs of production are rising for individual producers. Finally, there is the issue of infrastructure, a term which refers to all those physical institutions outside the production unit which form a necessary part of the production and distribution process—roads, transport services, communications networks, security systems, water supply as collect taxes. These costs are inescapable, although obviously there can be strong and wide differences in views as to what should be spent and how. There is however a second reason to tax, which is more recent (it has arisen only in the last century to any significant degree).

Background

Dependency Theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, their studies suggested that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always equally shared. Prebisch's initial explanation for the phenomenon was very straightforward: poor countries exported primary commodities to the rich countries who then manufactured products out of those commodities and sold them back to the poorer countries. The "Value Added" by manufacturing a usable product always cost more than the primary products used to create those products.
Therefore, poorer countries would never be earning enough from their export earnings to pay for their imports.

Prebisch's solution was similarly straightforward: poorer countries should embark on programs of import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary products on the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad. Three issues made this policy difficult to follow. The first is that the internal markets of the poorer countries were not large enough to support the economies of scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low. The second issue concerned the political will of the poorer countries as to whether a transformation from being primary products producers was possible or desirable. The final issue revolved around the extent to which the poorer countries actually had control of their primary products, particularly in the area of selling those products abroad. These obstacles to the import substitution policy led others to think a little more creatively and historically at the relationship between rich and poor countries. At this point dependency theory was viewed as a possible way of explaining the persistent poverty of the poorer countries. The traditional neoclassical approach said virtually nothing on this question except to assert that the poorer countries were late in coming to solid economic practices and that as soon as they learned the techniques of modern economics, then the poverty would begin to subside.

However, Marxists theorists viewed the persistent poverty as a consequence of capitalist exploitation. And a new body of thought, called the world systems approach, argued that the poverty was a direct consequence of the evolution of the international political economy into a
fairly rigid division of labor which favored the rich and penalized the poor.

**The Central Propositions of Dependency Theory**

There are a number of propositions, all of which are contestable, which form the core of dependency theory. These propositions include:

1. *Underdevelopment* is a condition fundamentally different from *undevelopment*. The latter term simply refers to a condition in which resources are not being used. For example, the European colonists viewed the North American continent as an undeveloped area: the land was not actively cultivated on a scale consistent with its potential. Underdevelopment refers to a situation in which resources are being actively used, but used in a way which benefits dominant states and not the poorer states in which the resources are found.

2. The distinction between underdevelopment and undevelopment places the poorer countries of the world in a profoundly different historical context. These countries are not "behind" or "catching up" to the richer countries of the world. They are not poor because they lagged behind the scientific transformations or the Enlightenment values of the European states. They are poor because they were coercively integrated into the European economic system only as producers of raw materials or to serve as repositories of cheap labor, and were denied the opportunity to market their resources in any way that competed with dominant states.

3. Dependency theory suggests that alternative uses of resources are preferable to the resource usage patterns imposed by dominant states. There is no clear definition of what these preferred patterns might be, but some criteria are invoked. For example, one of the dominant state practices most often criticized by dependency theorists is export agriculture. The criticism is that many poor economies experience rather
high rates of malnutrition even though they produce great amounts of food for export. Many dependency theorists would argue that those agricultural lands should be used for domestic food production in order to reduce the rates of malnutrition.

4. The preceding proposition can be amplified: dependency theorists rely upon a belief that there exists a clear "national" economic interest which can and should be articulated for each country. In this respect, dependency theory actually shares a similar theoretical concern with realism. What distinguishes the dependency perspective is that its proponents believe that this national interest can only be satisfied by addressing the needs of the poor within a society, rather than through the satisfaction of corporate or governmental needs. Trying to determine what is "best" for the poor is a difficult analytical problem over the long run. Dependency theorists have not yet articulated an operational definition of the national economic interest.

5. The diversion of resources over time (and one must remember that dependent relationships have persisted since the European expansion beginning in the fifteenth century) is maintained not only by the power of dominant states, but also through the power of elites in the dependent states. Dependency theorists argue that these elites maintain a dependent relationship because their own private interests coincide with the interests of the dominant states. These elites are typically trained in the dominant states and share similar values and culture with the elites in dominant states. Thus, in a very real sense, a dependency relationship is a "voluntary" relationship. One need not argue that the elites in a dependent state are consciously betraying the interests of their poor; the elites sincerely believe that the key to economic development lies in following the prescriptions of liberal economic doctrine.
The Policy Implications of Dependency Analysis

If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the questions of how poor economies develop become quite different from the traditional questions concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/export strategies. Some of the most important new issues include:

1. The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a model for the currently developing economies. When economic development became a focused area of study, the analytical strategy (and ideological preference) was quite clear: all nations need to emulate the patterns used by the rich countries. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s there was a paradigmatic consensus that growth strategies were universally applicable, a consensus best articulated by Walt Rostow in his book, *The Stages of Economic Growth*. 

2. Dependency theory repudiates the central distributive mechanism of the neoclassical model, what is usually called "trickle-down" economics. The neoclassical model of economic growth pays relatively little attention to the question of distribution of wealth. Its primary concern is on efficient production and assumes that the market will allocate the rewards of efficient production in a rational and unbiased manner. This assumption may be valid for a well-integrated, economically fluid economy where people can quickly adjust to economic changes and where consumption patterns are not distorted by noneconomic forces such as racial, ethnic, or gender bias. These conditions are not pervasive in the developing economies, and dependency theorists argue that economic activity is not easily disseminated in poor economies. For these structural reasons, dependency theorists argue that the market alone is not a sufficient distributive mechanism.
3. Since the market only rewards productivity, dependency theorists discount aggregate measures of economic growth such as the GDP or trade indices. Dependency theorists do not deny that economic activity occurs within a dependent state. They do make a very important distinction, however, between economic growth and economic development.

For example, there is a greater concern within the dependency framework for whether the economic activity is actually benefitting the nation as a whole. Therefore, far greater attention is paid to indices such as life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, education, and the like. Dependency theorists clearly emphasize social indicators far more than economic indicators.

4. Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance. Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is not necessarily a good choice for poor countries. Often this policy perspective is viewed as an endorsement of a policy of autarky, and there have been some experiments with such a policy such as China's Great Leap Forward or Tanzania's policy of *Ujamaa*. The failures of these policies are clear, and the failures suggest that autarky is not a good choice. Rather a policy of self-reliance should be interpreted as endorsing a policy of controlled interactions with the world economy: poor countries should only endorse interactions on terms that promise to improve the social and economic welfare of the larger citizenry. 


**Dependency Theory**

Dependency theory posits that the cause of the low levels of development in less economically developed countries (LEDC's) is
caused by their reliance and dependence on more economically
developed countries (MEDC's) - i.e. the LEDC's are undeveloped
because they rely on the MEDC's. Some proponents of dependency
theory assert that LEDC's will remain less developed because the
surplus that they produce will be siphoned off by MEDC's - under the
guise of multinational corporations. There is, as such, no profit left for
reinvestment and development.

As a corollary of this theory, LEDC's should cut off ties with
MEDC's, retain their surplus production, and follow economically
independent and socialistic ideas in order to further develop their
economies, as the Soviet Union had done to great effect. Additionally, it
also emphasises the virtuous circle of self-perpetuating benefits that the
MEDC's gain from their existing prosperity.

Dependency theory, as a theory based on materialist and
structuralist theories, has been criticised or placing too much emphasis
on material and economic factors. The development of many Asian
economies that developed along capitalistic, open lines, also serves as
an empirical contradiction to dependency theory. Frank proposed an
alternative to dependency theory - "Development Theory". How does
Frank's "dependency theory" differ from the traditional "development
theory"?

The conventional view of the undeveloped countries denies them a
history: "To classify these countries as "traditional societies" implies
either that the underdeveloped countries have no history or that it is
unimportant." (Griffin 1969). But it is increasingly clear that the history of
the post-colonial countries has been crucially important in shaping their
present underdevelopment. The most influential proponent of the thesis
that European expansion and colonialism created the underdevelopment
of these countries has been Andre Gubder Frank.
Frank has documented "the development of underdevelopment" in Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba. Conspiracy Theories that suggest "development" is all a multi-national capitalist scheme to enslave the world, saddling many Third World countries today with international debts crippling economic growth. Donors missing overseas assistance for flagrant strategic political ends, notably during the Cold War to support and reward allies, but continuing up to present times by tying aid to trade. The neo-Malthusian argument that relentless population growth is wiping out any technological gains, despite the fact that yield statistics demonstrates that the world produces enough food to feed us all. What was wrong with the "top-down" approach?

It is widely agreed that the "top-down" approach which many agencies took to development was partly to blame.

Green revolution Dramatic increases in agricultural production from genetically engineered hybrid grains that produce high yields in return for high inputs of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. ELDCs are importing three times more cereals from EMDCs because the green revolution has made these ELDCs increasingly dependant on foreign grain imports although the revolution was supposed to promote self-sufficiency. Need for petrochemical fertilisers, mechanised farming, irrigation etc. Therefore except where the country transforming its agriculture is self-sufficient in oil, fertiliser manufacture and industrial capacity to produce tractors and other machinery. The Green revolution creates markets for the industrial countries and plunges under-developed countries into deeper and deeper dependency.

Consequences for rural populations- radical transformation in the agrarian class structure, The costs favour the large land-owner and relatively prosperous peasant farmer. The poor are forced to sell their land to the expanding capitalist farmers and join the labour force. This
causes rural depopulation as poor people seek jobs elsewhere; e.g. Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, India, Philippines. How did the development discussions make conflict worse in one Bangladeshi village? The Bangladesh projects have followed established participatory approaches, striving to empower while facilitating technology transfer. Further, the scientists have adopted a problem-centred approach, generating a range of potential options from which "beneficiaries" might choose.

The Dependency Thesis

Proponents of fair trade maintain that trade between and among nations occurs in coercive and uneven ways. Even if nations trade freely, smaller nations become increasingly reliant on richer states, whose interaction with smaller countries depletes natural resources in those countries, and slows their progress. Dependency theory has many variations, and has undergone changes over several decades. Here are the basics. Richer, powerful nations are collectively known as the “core,” while LDCs and other very poor countries are known collectively as the “periphery.” Dependency theories entertain the idea that periphery states depend for their well-being on the core. The core produces more luxury goods, while the periphery specializes in basic and industrial goods. Although there are many putative mechanisms driving the dependency – some of them highly disputed even among dependency theorists – the general theme is that such a dependent relationship exists, and is ruinous to the LDCs. F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto published Dependency and Development in Latin America in 1969, the first academic statement of dependency theory. In it, Cardoso and Faletto argue that “economic development has frequently depended on favorable conditions for exports.” Argentina in 1900 looked economically very similar to the United States of 1900, but Argentina’s growth was
severely depressed when compared to U.S. economic growth over the twentieth century.

Cardoso and Faletto attribute this decline to unfavorable terms of trade relationships for Argentina. Later versions of the dependency theory hold that governments mismanage money, while private investors regard the Third World as risky investment. So, the Third World finds itself perpetually disadvantaged. John Gray of the London School of Economics argues in False Dawn:

The increased interconnection of economic activity throughout the world accentuates uneven development between different countries. It exaggerates the dependency of ‘peripheral’ developing states such as Mexico on investment from economies nearer the ‘centre’, such as the United States. Though one consequence of a more globalized economy is to overturn or weaken some hierarchical economic relationships between states – between western countries and China, for example – at the same time it strengthens some existing hierarchical relations and creates new ones.

Dependency theory ultimately maintains that the terms of trade between center and peripherynations is unbalanced and therefore unfair. Alleviation of Poverty and Human DignityFair trade advocates maintain that nations that have limited export opportunities become poorer, and hard-working individuals and their children struggle to meet basic life needs. Fairtrade.org argues that trade introduces an exploitative mechanism which impoverishes those in the Third World:

Particularly in the field of trade, our area of attention, the law of the strongest is frequently the only law. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, both male and female craftsmen and farmers know all about this. If they cannot free themselves from the grasp of the numerous middlemen and
buyers, who from their position of power prescribe the lowest prices, they will remain slaves of circumstances their entire lives.

According to the principles of fair trade, the prevailing terms of trade between rich and poor nations are unjust because prevailing market prices for the goods produced in the Third World are too low for the laborers to reap a wage reflecting their dignity. Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, in Development as Freedom notes another problem of poverty: Many of the same people who have small incomes also have deficiencies in the ability to convert those incomes to useful life pursuits. In other words, there are “unequal advantages in converting incomes into capabilities.” Sen continues, “The interpersonal income inequality in the market outcomes may tend to be magnified by this ‘coupling’ of low incomes with handicaps in the conversion of incomes to capabilities.” Poorer nations are thereby perpetually punished even further as they are less able to efficiently use the income they accumulate. Fair trade organizations take up the project of buying products from Third World producers at supra-competitive prices prices that exceed the equilibrium price, as a form of poverty alleviation.

The Case for Free Trade

Voluntariness

Proponents of free trade argue that voluntary exchange meets the demands of justice because each party to the trade leaves the trade richer than he or she was before. Johan Norberg writes in his book In Defense of Global Capitalism: It may seem odd that the world’s prosperity can be augmented by swapping things with each other, but every time you go shopping you realize, subconsciously, how exchange augments wealth. You pay a dollar for a bottle of milk because you would rather have the milk than your dollar. The shop sells it at that price because they would rather have your dollar than keep the milk. Both parties are satisfied with the deal, otherwise it would never have taken place. Both of you emerge
from the transaction feeling that you have made a good exchange, your needs have been provided for.

Advocates of free trade note that parties to a transaction participate freely because it improves their own lot. This lesson applies more generally to trade among nations. If producers and consumers in world markets adopt the same producing and consuming behaviors that they do as individuals, then exchange among nations is just and wealth increasing. Other academics have focused on the connection between open exchange and the larger program of freedoms in society. Nobel laureate Milton Friedman writes Capitalism and Freedom in which he argues that there is a very real connection between economic freedom and the political freedoms. In this way, voluntary exchange is a component of a larger bundle of freedoms in society. Friedman illustrates this view tellingly: No one who buys bread knows whether the wheat from which it is made was grown by a Communist or a Republican, by a constitutionalist or a Fascist... Instead of recognizing that the existence of the market has protected the oppressed from the attitudes of their fellow countrymen, critics of free trade mistakenly attribute the residual discrimination to the market. Discrimination can therefore be a self-punishing choice for producers who select workers on the basis of something other than performance and for consumers, for whom it is costly to determine the often anonymous sources of goods and services. Voluntariness permits incentive structures that accord with fairness.

Advocates of free trade find many economists in their ranks; economists nearly unanimously support measures to increase the flow of goods between nations, and thereby to make trade freer. Countries, like people, are more or less talented at producing various goods. When countries specialize in producing what they are relatively more talented
at producing, they can trade with other countries doing the same thing, and all participating countries can enjoy a more extensive package of total goods and services than they did before. Economists call this the Ricardian trade model, and empirical evidence appears to confirm trade’s enriching effect on participating countries. Consider two fictional countries: Here and There. Here and There each have 10 units of Labor with which to produce gin and vermouth. Here and There fought some brutish wars many decades back, but they have come to terms with each other by finding their common ground.